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Scholars have engaged actively with the link between customary practices and ecological 
conservation in Africa as part of a broader debate on governance approaches for natural 
resource management.  To a large extent, this is in response to a growing voice articulating 
the need to integrate traditional institutions and customary practices into a more 
contemporary form of governance for Africa’s democratic and socio-economic 
transformation. To date, however, the integration of customary and statutory approaches to 
governance has yielded only modest progress in the forest sector and knowledge remains 
limited about the interface between these governance systems and the effect of this dualism 
on natural resource management. Using the lens of the baobab tree, this research set out to 
address these gaps and to elucidate understanding of the interplay between customary and 
statutory governance in managing natural resources; the influence of such interactions on 
ecological sustainability and livelihoods; and the contextual factors that shape such 
approaches.  Uses of the baobab tree as well as factors affecting access were analysed.  
Two study sites were selected on the basis of similarities in resource endowment and 
contrasting use patterns and forms of governance.  Both quantitative and qualitative methods 
were used. Quantitative methods included an ecological survey to examine the relationship 
between different indicators of ecological sustainability and different tenure regimes. A 
household survey was also carried out to examine the extent to which households use and 
benefit from baobab products. Qualitative methods included focus group discussions, 
institutional mapping, ranking and scoring, and oral histories. The study engaged with debates 
around governance, bricolage, non-timber forest products, bifurcation, livelihoods and 
access.  
Findings show that the baobab tree is used in multiple ways by households, and has both 
consumptive values as well as intrinsic values which are typically overlooked in the discourse 
of natural resource governance. The study illustrates that the interest of traditional 
institutions in regulating baobab use and access has been informed by reasons relating to 
sustainable livelihoods, ecological sustainability and the need to maintain a delicate link 
between environmental sustainability, the spirits of the land and resource users. Local 
arrangements are robust, dynamic and are entrenched in the day to day lives of the resource 
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users. These arrangements may not fit into existing technical toolkits or environmental 
blueprints, and policy from the top may not be connecting with reality on the ground. 
Although traditional authorities and customary practices have remained relevant for local 
people in the realm of resource governance, they are weakening in the face of commercial 
baobab use. Where statutory forms of governance are overlaid onto existing customary forms 
of governance without due regard for local practices, unintended consequences arise. A key 
finding is that history profoundly informs the way local people harvest and use resources due 
to the long trajectory of the interplay between customary and statutory forms of governance 
that spans back to the colonial era. 
The main conclusion from the study is that both customary and statutory systems of 
governance are important, but need to be used in a graduated manner. Statutory forms of 
governance can be introduced to assist customary practices on a demand-driven basis. 
Results emphasise the importance of considering seemingly peripheral forms of governance 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
Customary practices and rules have prevailed over the governance of forest resources in 
communal areas for many generations.1 Customary practices have also been influential as the 
de facto form of governance for perceived “low value” natural resources that the state cannot 
reach due to budgetary constraints (Ribot & Oyono, 2005; Pollard & Cousins, 2007; 
Mutimukuru et al., 2008; Cerutti et al., 2012). Yet, customary practices have not typically been 
considered as a central component of governance despite the fact that natural resources in 
Africa are typically found in common property regimes where access is ordinarily regulated 
using customary rules (Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), 2008; Economic Commission 
for Africa (ECA), 2007). For the purposes of this study, customary practices and rules will be 
used to refer to the suite of traditional practices and traditional institutions used to govern 
natural resources. 
Emergent markets for forest products, in particular non-timber forest products (NTFPs), 
driven in part by consumer desires in Northern countries for “natural” products, are 
increasingly arousing interest in governments (Schumann et al., 2010).2 NTFPs include all 
biological materials other than timber, extracted from natural forests or savannahs for human 
use. These include parts of individual plants such as leaves, bark, fruits, and latexes, or parts 
of the populations’ life cycle, such as seeds, flowers, caterpillars and eggs (Mudavanhu, 1998; 
Belcher, 2003).3 
 The state’s involvement in the governance of NTFPs is typically motivated by concerns about 
ecological degradation. In some cases, the state may also be motivated by concerns about 
the impacts of commercialization on vulnerable groups whose livelihoods heavily depend on 
                                                          
1 By way of definition, customary practices mean a code of conduct approved by tribal tradition, the hereditary 
body of established conduct that has been observed, recognized and enjoyed through many generations, and 
handed down by the fore-fathers (Katerere & Zaag, 2003). Customary rules often go hand in glove with 
customary practices, describing the substantive and procedural rights, decision-making processes, norms and 
taboos and institutional arrangements that apply to a defined group of people (Katerere, 2001).  
2 NTFP are plant or animal products that exclude wood harvested from natural or managed plant forests 
(Neumann & Hirsch, 2000). 
3 Cultivation of NTFPs on a commercial basis is emerging (Ros-Tonen & Kusters, 2011). This study will only focus 




natural resources (Vantomme & Walter, 2002; United Nations Development Program (UNDP), 
2005; Shackleton et al., 2015). The state may also see the commercialization of NTFPs as an 
opportunity to raise revenue through levies, taxes and permits (Schumann et al., 2010). 
The ecological impact of commercially harvesting NTFPs has received mixed views, largely due 
to the varied nature of the plant part that is used, and the form of governance in place 
(Wynberg & van Niekerk 2014). In its infancy, NTFP commercialization was promoted on the 
basis of its perceived benign negative impacts on the environment (Mudavanhu, 1998; 
Neumann & Hirsch, 2000; Belcher et al., 2005; Belcher & Schreckenberg, 2007). More 
recently, the view has become increasingly pessimistic. For example, Brown and Lassoie 
(2010) argue that customary forms of governance get strained due to commercialization and 
this results in overexploitation of the resource, ultimately compromising the livelihoods of 
vulnerable groups. At the same time, there is evidence that disputes this assertion, arguing 
that with proper governance systems in place, commercialization can be ecologically 
sustainable (Ticktin, 2015; Wynberg & van Niekerk, 2015). 
The commercialization of NTFPS and the subsequent involvement of the state in its 
governance, raises important questions about how customary and statutory systems operate 
next to each other and with what outcomes. A common tendency has been for statutory 
systems to be super-imposed onto existing customary practices, in the process creating 
multiple centres of authority with different outcomes (Mukamuri, 1995a; Mamdani, 1996; 
Wynberg & Laird, 2007). In a study of the governance of natural resources in developing 
countries, FAO (2008) identifies ecological sustainability and equitable access to be an 
outcome of contests between customary and statutory forms of governance. Within the 
natural resources sector there has been little research done on this issue (notable exceptions 
being Sola, 2004;  Wynberg & Laird, 2007; and Wynberg et al., 2015) with scholars mainly 
focusing on administrative governance (George & Binza, 2011; Baldwin, 2015), and power 
struggles around land allocation (Nemarundwe, 2003). A theoretical blind spot has emerged 
in terms of the ecological and livelihood outcomes of using customary practices to govern 
natural resources. What is clear is that the interrogation of customary-statutory forms of 
governance should go beyond the generalities of institutional analysis and critically look at 
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the economic and ecological outcomes that emerge with the intertwining of these two 
systems. 
1.1 The re-emergence of traditional authorities as guardians of customary practices 
At the centre of the discourse on customary practices has been the role of traditional 
authorities (TAs), particularly chiefs who are responsible for local governance and are the 
highest office overseeing customary practices (Dore, 2001; Makumbe, 2010). In the recent 
past, chiefs have reasserted their authority in the governance arena (Nuesiri, 2014; Baldwin, 
2011b & 2015). After reviewing the role of TAs in Africa, Nuesiri (2014) concluded that the 
authorities are on the ascendance. He concluded thus, “It is clear that chiefs’ power is re-
emerging all across Africa and the principal reason for this is the transition to democracy…” 
(Nuesiri, 2014: 52). To that effect, several countries in southern Africa are realigning their 
constitutions in order to recognise the role and function of TAs in governance structures (ECA, 
2007). Indeed, much of today’s forest tenure combines elements of traditional forest 
management with government controlled conservation (FAO, 2008). 
The task of using both forms of governance is complex. Argues Nuesiri (2014: 48): 
“Establishing democratic local government as the singular public decision-maker at the local 
level, where traditional authority is just one among a number of civic actors holding local 
government to account, is a formidable challenge”. While customary practices have great 
potential to result in livelihood improvement and ecological conservation (International 
Institute for Environment and Development (IIED), 2009; Bennet & Dearden, 2014) 
governments have a legal mandate to manage forests in their jurisdiction and to ensure their 
sustainable use (Mandondo, 2001). This interface has been poorly explored. Key questions 
that arise from the use of both customary and statutory forms of governance in natural 
resource management include the dynamics that emerge when the two forms of governance 
interplay, and how the use of both customary and statutory forms of governance impact on 
the ecology of the resources and livelihoods.  
1.1.1 Baobab as a case study 
This study uses the baobab tree as the lens through which these questions will be analysed. 
The baobab tree is important because it has a myriad of uses and its fruits are being 
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popularized as a super fruit in Europe (Gruenwald, 2009) while locally, harvesters derive over 
300 consumptive and non-consumptive uses from the tree (Sanchez, 2010). The market for 
baobab products in sub Saharan Africa has been estimated to be over US$1billion per year, 
benefiting over one million harvesters, and is projected to increase (Bennet, 2006; Sanchez, 
2010). Historically, customary systems have been used to manage the tree, but increased 
commercialization led to greater state engagement, and the resource is now managed by 
both customary and statutory systems. 
1.2 Aim of the research 
Using the lens of baobab commercialization, the research aims to elucidate understanding of 
the interplay between customary and statutory governance in managing natural resources, 
the influence of such interactions on ecological sustainability and livelihoods, and the 
contextual factors that shape such systems. 
Specific objectives supporting the research aim are: 
i. To identify baobab products harvested and their contribution to livelihoods; 
ii. To determine linkages between different governance systems and the sustainable use 
of baobab, with a focus on different tenure regimes; 
iii. To elucidate historical and contemporary forms of statutory and customary 
governance regulating baobab use; and 
iv. To propose a framework to understand how customary and statutory forms of 
governance influence ecological sustainability and livelihoods. 
1.3 Significance of the study and justification 
This study demonstrates the role of local and national level factors shaping natural resources 
governance practices and livelihood and ecological outcomes. It thus seeks to provide a better 
understanding of the multiple forms of governance that are used concurrently to regulate 
access to natural resources. Broadly, this research contributes to issues vexing African 
governance about the role of TAs and the role customary practices can play. It also contributes 
to debates about how customary practices form part of the overarching pluralistic 
governance framework (McAuslan, 2005). 
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At the local level, the study demonstrates how local communities and their livelihoods are 
embedded within customary practices. By focusing at the local level, the study contributes 
empirical data to a debate that has typically been framed at a very theoretical and abstracted 
level. Moreover, it also provides a view from the village level, rather than from the chieftaincy. 
This is pertinent because “it is at the local government level that the conflict between 
tradition and modernity is more pronounced” (Egwurube, 1988 in Nuesiri, 2014:44). Most 
studies investigating the traditional authority-state interface have been focused at the 
chieftaincy level (Weinrich, 1971; Mamdani, 1996; Makumbe 2010; Boone, 2003; Nuesiri, 
2014; Baldwin, 2015). Yet chiefs are mainly responsible for administrative governance. 
At policy level, the study contributes to debates on what role governance can play in 
enhancing livelihoods through commercialization without compromising ecological 
sustainability of the resource. Many rural economies are dependent on the harvesting and 
trading of natural products (Wiersum et al., 2014), underpinning the importance of 
understanding the contribution of these activities towards ecological degradation. 
Insights from this study also contribute to the body of knowledge being generated on the 
increasingly commercialised baobab tree. With the exception of an exploratory study by 
Mukamuri and Kozanayi (1999) on the institutional arrangements surrounding baobab bark 
use in Zimbabwe, understanding of the impact of forms of governance on local livelihoods 
and the ecology of the tree remains limited. Without such knowledge, resource degradation 
can take place unabated, while inequitable resource sharing can result in powerless 
community members being denied access to baobab products.  
1.4 The context of Non-Timber Forest Products  
The study is located in southern Africa, which is predominately arid or semi- arid, with mostly 
infertile soils (Frost & Mandondo, 1999). While this limits agricultural potential, agriculture is 
still the main source of livelihood for the more than 200 million peasant farmers living in rural 
areas in the region (Mubaiwa, 2004; World Bank, 2007). Consequently, the majority of rural 
people harvest forest resources for subsistence and commercial purposes (Campbell, 1996; 
Cavendish, 2000; Campbell et al, 2001 & 2002b). Among the forest products harvested are 
Non-Timber Forest Products (NTFPs) (Campbell & Luckert, 2002). 
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Use of NTFPs is gaining momentum with the emergence of markets for natural products in 
the global West (Bennet, 1996; WHO, 2003). Drawing on the extensive work on NTFPs 
commercialization of Neumann and Hirsch (2000) and Brown and Lassoie (2010), there are 
four immediate outcomes that can be discerned, namely: 1) intervention by the state and 
subsequent usurpation of local management roles by the state; 2) better management of the 
resource base as actors are incentivised to manage a resource from which they draw benefits; 
3) inequitable distribution of benefits as marginalised groups such as women and poor 
households lose out; and 4) degradation of the resource if existing rules, particularly 
customary practices, weaken. 
Overall, there has been in rise in the commercial use of NTFPs, due in part to the emergence 
of a market for super foods in Europe.4 Globally, to varying degrees, 1.6 billion people (25% 
of the global population) depend on forest products for survival (World Bank, 2014). Annually, 
trade in NTFPs generates $17 billion (Tewari, 2014). Commercialization has been promoted 
on the assumption that harvesting NTFPs has mild negative impacts on the environment and 
equally important, harvesting has been justified as NTFPs have been seen to play a key role 
in the development-conservation discourse (Peters, 1994). 
The importance of governance in this context is clear, as witnessed by an emerging 
scholarship on NTFP governance (Bennett & Dearden, 2014). Wiersum et al. (2014) identify 
three main trends in the governance of NTFPS, namely: 1) increasing formalisation of 
customary practices; 2) emergence of new formal standards for production and trade; and 3) 
the increasing hybridisation of customary and statutory forms of governance. This 
characterisation resonates well with research emerging from across Africa regarding the use 
of and governance of natural resources where both the state and TAs are increasingly getting 
involved (FAO, et al 2013; Nuesiri 2014). 
1.5 Theoretical debates 
The concept of governance which underpins this study has received much scholarly attention 
(e.g. Stoker, 1998; Weiss, 2000; Katerere, 2002; Rival, 2003; Brinkerhoff, 2005; Bartley et al., 
                                                          
4 These are forest products that are not timber. In this case I am focussing on fibre and fruits. See Belcher (2003) 
for a comprehensive definition of NTFPs. 
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2008; Colfer & Feintrenie, 2011; Ngeta, 2014; Sowman & Wynberg, 2014) and its meaning is 
increasingly contested (Sowman & Wynberg, 2014). Governance has been described as 
adaptive, interactive or collaborative (Wiersum et al., 2014), implying that it involves many 
actors to deal with the complexities on the ground. According to Brinkerhoff (2005:2), 
“governance concerns the rules, institutions, and processes that form the nexus of state-
society relations where government and citizens interact” for the purposes of achieving 
greater efficiency in the production of public services. This definition, which acknowledges 
that governance is broader than the government, is the one used for purposes of this study. 
Several frameworks have been proposed to understand governance (e.g. Stoker, 1998; Weiss, 
2000; Rival, 2003; Brinkerhoff, 2005; Kooiman et al 2005; Kooiman et al., 2008) but most are 
generalised and lack the specificity to capture complex interactions in the African context. 
Moreover, many are based on Northern contexts which are quite different from the African 
context. Understanding such a dynamic and adaptive phenomenon requires a theoretical 
approach that integrates elements of scale and dynamism. Additional interlinked concepts 
that are considered in this thesis include access, bricolage, bifurcation, and structuration. 
These are further discussed in Chapter 2, with a summary provided below. 
1.5.1 Access to resources 
Access to resources is a key parameter in governance and is complex in the African context 
where it stands between impoverishment and survival for rural people (Ribot, 1998; 
Nemarundwe & Kozanayi, 2003; Ribot & Peluso, 2003; Cleaver 2012). Broadly, access is about 
who gets or does not get what, in what ways, and when (Ostrom, 1990; Ribot & Peluso, 2003). 
To regulate access, statutory and customary practices may be used in isolation or overlaid on 
each other (Ostrom, 1990; Schlager & Ostrom, 1992; de Soto, 2000). 
1.5.2 Structuration 
To access natural resources, harvesters have to act in response to the institutions enforcing 
forms of governance. To be able to act, actors have agency, explained by Giddens’s 1984 
seminal work on structuration. Unlike functionalist theory that portrays structures of society/ 
institutions as having power to regulate and limit human behaviour (North, 1990; Ostrom, 
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1990), the structuration theory argues that the very harvesters whose behaviour 
institutions/structures try to regulate, are not powerless. They have agency which enables 
them to extricate themselves from unfavourable conditions and influence structure (Giddens, 
1984). In sociology, human agency is celebrated as a liberating factor. The influence of 
institutions is not unidirectional as espoused by mainstream institutional economic theory 
(North, 1990). Resource harvesters have power to influence structure in what Giddens (1984: 
xxi) calls the “duality of structure”. 5 “Structure (therefore), is the medium and outcome of 
the conduct it recursively organises; the structural properties of social systems do not exist 
outside of action but are chronically implicated in its production and reproduction”, (Giddens 
1984: 376).  
1.5.3 Bricolage 
Drawing on ‘post-institutionalist’ perspectives, and building on Giddens’ structuration theory, 
Cleaver (2012) rejects over-formalised managerial approaches, preferring instead to embrace 
a variety of partial and contingent solutions that are more reflective of the ever-changing 
evolution of institutions. Actors (regulators and harvesters alike) are constantly interacting 
and reconfiguring themselves in ways that result in different desired outcomes, so much so 
that neat fit institutional design is elusive. Bricolage is a French word meaning making do with 
whatever is available (Cleaver, 2012).  
Institutional bricolage is a process through which people, consciously and non-consciously, 
assemble or reshape institutional arrangements, drawing on whatever materials and 
resources are available, regardless of their original purpose. In this process, old arrangements 
are modified and new ones are invented. Institutional components from different origins are 
continuously reused, reworked, or refashioned to perform new functions. Adapted 
configurations of rules, practices, norms and relationships are attributed meaning and 
authority (Cleaver & de Koning, 2015: 4). 
                                                          
5 See also Le Grand (2003) on the same, but looking at public administration in the United Kingdom. She argues 
that if people are unhappy with the form of governance or service delivery, they walk out rather than just be 
willing victims. Scott (1985) also gives a cocktail of actions so called weak people use to extricate themselves 




In addition to the above theories, Mamdani’s seminal work on the “citizen and the subject” 
has informed the recent conceptualization and analytical framing of traditional authority in 
the governance of contemporary Africa (Mamdani, 1996). In the main, TAs have been viewed 
as despots that exist largely for the political expedience of the central state (Mamdani, 1996; 
Ntsebeza, 2003, 2005; Chakaipa, 2010; Govo et al., 2015). Analysing the evolution of 
customary practices through the lens of political administration, Mamdani (1996) argues that 
repressive colonial regimes erroneously used customary practices to oppress the locals in the 
name of ‘enforcing’ tradition, when the strategy was to create a bifurcated state with two 
systems of governance for the colonialists (citizens) and the locals (subjects). Contesting this 
view, Boone (2003) and Baldwin (2011a & 2011b) demonstrate that during and after colonial 
periods, TAs were not completely subjugated by the central state. Nuesiri (2014) advances 
this discussion by arguing that TAs are on the ascendancy and that they are being more 
assertive in the governance of natural resources. It is these themes that the thesis engages 
with. 
1.6 Methods and study site 
To fully understand complex governance, ecological and livelihood issues, a combination of 
qualitative and quantitative methods were used. An ecological survey was undertaken to 
assess harvesting and productivity patterns of baobab trees under different tenure regimes. 
A household questionnaire survey (336 households) was carried out to capture the quantities 
of baobab products harvested by households, income levels and knowledge and perceptions 
of existing governance practices. Qualitative methods included a number of Participatory 
Rural Appraisal (PRA) approaches. A case study approach was used in the study. 
The study was carried out in Chimanimani district, eastern Zimbabwe. Two study sites, Jinga 
village and Nyanyadzi were selected as the study areas. Nyanyadzi is made up of several 
villages under one chief. The two sites have striking similarities as well as differences (Figure 
1). Both are similar in economic, biophysical and socio-historical terms (Chapters 4 and 5). 
Additionally, both areas share commonalities in that they use customary and statutory forms 
of governance, albeit to varying degrees. The major difference is in the use and governance 
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of the baobab tree. In Jinga, use is highly regulated using customary practices and is largely 
limited to domestic purposes. On the other hand, in Nyanyadzi there is high 
commercialization of baobab products, mainly fibre and fruits. Fibre harvesting dates to about 
the 17th century while commercial fruit selling started around 2004. Further, in Nyanyadzi 
statutory rules, local bylaws and customary practices are used to regulate use. The long 
history of domestic and commercial use of baobab products, and the involvement of many 
stakeholders in the regulation of the resource base, makes Nyanyadzi an appropriate site to 
study how different governance systems impact on different community members who are 





Figure 1: The location of the study sites 
1.7 Structure of the thesis 
This thesis consists of nine chapters. Chapter 1 identifies and engages with key theoretical 
debates on governance of natural resources and articulates the research aim and objectives. 




Chapter 2 presents and engages with literature that informs the thesis. This chapter situates 
debates around customary and statutory practices within the natural resource governance 
discourse. Key terms relating to debates around customary practices, as well as theories 
around governance are discussed. 
Chapter 3 describes the case study approach used in this thesis and presents the research 
methods used to gather data. The philosophical considerations underpinning the choice of 
research methods used are also presented. The chapter ends with a presentation of ethical 
issues and lessons learned from carrying out field work in a politically charged environment. 
Chapter 4 focuses on the research site, giving the political history of the country and study 
site from pre-colonial through to independence periods. It also gives a biophysical description 
of the study site and an overview of the villages where research took place. This chapter also 
presents a critical analysis of the Zimbabwe policy arena from the pre-colonial to present day 
period, highlighting key laws, policies enacted and other contemporary developments that 
have unfolded and that impinge on the use of natural resources. 
Chapter 5 is a detailed description of the study site, highlighting key biophysical and 
demographic characteristics of the area and available livelihood options. The chapter 
presents uses of the baobab tree, income accruing to different households and expenditure 
patterns of that income. 
Chapter 6 describes customary practices and their effectiveness at ensuring ecological 
sustainability of baobab use. Three tenure regimes are used to frame the study, namely 
private, state and communal, and a set of sustainability indicators guide analysis. Tree 
productivity under each of the tenure systems is analysed and discussed within the 
framework of broader governance debates. 
Chapter 7 presents contemporary customary and statutory systems of governance that are 
used to manage the baobab tree in the Chimanimani District. Resource users’ knowledge, 
perceptions and compliance with the different forms of governance are presented. 
Chapter 8 discusses the research findings in the context of literature and theory discussed in 
Chapter 2, drawing inferences and insights about factors that shape current relations between 
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customary practices and statutory forms of resource governance and the consequent 
ecological and livelihood outcomes of this interplay. The implications of these findings in 
terms of the role of governance on livelihoods and ecology of baobab in Zimbabwe, and 
natural resources elsewhere in general. 





CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
First, the chapter develops some conceptual understanding of the term governance. Second, 
debates related to traditional authorities are engaged with, beginning with Mamdani’s thesis 
of the bifurcated state, then followed by Nuesiri’s (2014) scholarship on the re-emergence of 
traditional authorities in Africa. Third, the chapter explores the emergent theory on bricolage 
(Cleaver, 2012), as well as Giddens’s (1984) theory of structuration and agency. Finally, the 
last part of the chapter presents the theoretical framework that informed the study. The 
discussions lay the foundation for broader debates with which the study engages and which 
are articulated in Chapter 8. 
1.1 Governance, towards a working definition 
Governance has been analysed through a number of different frameworks (e.g. Stoker, 1998; 
Weiss, 2000; Katerere, 2002; Rival, 2003; Brinkerhoff, 2005; Bartley et al., 2008; Kooiman et 
al., 2008; Hara et al., 2009; Sowman & Wynberg, 2014; Wiersum et al., 2014). The various 
discourses on governance are a reflection of its complexity. A common definition of 
governance is that it relates to the interplay of institutions, actors, principles, policies, 
mechanisms and processes (Stoker, 1998; Kooiman et al., 2005; Treib et al., 2007) as 
individuals and groups express their interests, exercise their rights and obligations, and 
mediate their differences (Colfer et al., 2011). Initially, in the early 1980s, governance was 
defined only in binary terms, that is concerning the rules, institutions, and processes that 
formed the nexus of state-society relations where government and citizens interacted 
(Brinkerhoff, 2005). However, largely because of the state’s failure to discharge of its duty in 
the governance of natural resources, non-state actors have become increasingly involved in 
the resource governance arena (Kooiman et al., 2008). Therefore, governance is more than 
government and broadly involves several actors constantly interacting with one another with 
the ultimate aim to “steer the ship” towards desired destinations (Sowman & Wynberg, 2014) 
such as achieving greater efficiency in the production of public services (Stoker, 1998). 
Because of the interconnectedness of actors involved in governance and efforts to reconcile 
their various interests, governance is likely to be interactive, network-based or collaborative 
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(Kooiman et al., 2005). Above all, governance should balance economic, social and 
environmental objectives (Katerere, 2001) for it to be relevant. 
2.1.1 Typologies and characterisation of governance 
 Conceptually, three forms of natural resource governance are recognised in the literature, 
namely state centric, co-management and market based. State centric is where the state 
enjoys the privilege of dictating how natural resources are managed. The state is the sole 
regulator. To enforce rules, the state typically uses a command and control model, often 
putting it on a collision course with local people who may depend on the natural resources 
for survival (Murphree, 1993). Co-governance is an arrangement whereby the state and local 
people are jointly involved in the governance of natural resources. Examples include joint 
management arrangements around state forests (Matose, 2002; Kepe, 2008; Hara et al., 
2009). Lastly market based governance is where market forces dictate how the natural 
resources are used, usually with the active participation of the private sector (Treib et al., 
2007). The continuum explained above is ideal but not actual as it conceals a lot of detail 
about the level of arrangements which occur among actors involved within each genre of 
governance. 
Western scholars such as Hirschmann (1970), Treib et al. (2007), Kooiman et al. (2005), and 
Baldwin (2011b, 2015), have typically explained governance in terms of the administration of 
rural areas, paying little attention to customary practices and laws. At best, customary 
practices have been used to regulate access to low value natural resources (Ros-Tonen & 
Kusters, 2011). In the process, this has created a theoretical blind spot in terms of 
understanding why resource degradation continues unabated despite a myriad of formal 
rules by the state (World Bank, 2007). 
Governance has also been used, often by funders, in the normative sense, and has been 
qualified in terms of its quality and effectiveness. The Overseas Development Institute (ODA, 
2006) for example lists the attributes that can be used to assess whether governance is good 
or bad, viz: 
• Participation (involvement and ownership by stakeholders) 
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• Fairness (do rules apply equally to everyone in society) 
• Decency (rules are implemented without harming people) 
• Accountability (political actors are responsible for actions) 
• Transparency (clarity and openness of decision making) 
• Efficiency (use of limited resources for greatest outputs) 
To local people, however, governance is about supporting livelihoods and sustainable use of 
resources (Bennet & Dearden, 2014). The typology presented above appears to put an 
emphasis on process rather than outcomes. Its suitability is thus questionable in the context 
of developing countries where natural resources are central to local livelihoods, where 
customary practices and laws are often intermingled with statutory systems, and where 
complex negotiations and interaction occur at the local level. To understand these 
complexities, one needs to use a framework that captures the nuances that happen at that 
level. 
There has been growing consensus among scholars that governance is the most significant 
obstacle to the sustainable use of natural resources (CIFOR, 2003; Kooiman et al., 2005; World 
Bank, 2008; Sowman & Wynberg, 2014; Sunde, 2014). In rural Africa and Zimbabwe in 
particular, the governance of natural resources is critical because communally-owned natural 
resources drive the local economy and livelihoods (Cavendish, 2000; Frost et al., 2007; SAFIRE, 
2010; Jagger et al, 2014). Weakly governed resources may result in what Hardin (1968) 
termed the “tragedy of the commons” as every stakeholder tries to maximise the benefits 
they get from the commons without due care of the resource base. When that happens, local 
livelihoods are compromised. Although Hardin’s projection was based on open access 
resources regimes with no regulatory mechanisms or local management practices in place, if 
not properly regulated, communally-owned resources could slide into open access regimes 
and suffer the tragedy that Hardin projected (Ostrom, 1999). It is therefore not an 
overstatement to say that an enabling governance framework is a priority for the sustainable 
use of natural resources and the sustenance of livelihoods. 
Increasingly, the call to consider both customary and statutory practices in the governance of 
natural resources in rural areas across Africa has been made (Kowero et al., 2003; Baldwin 
2011a, 2015; Nuesiri, 2014). As observed by Marfo (2010), meshing customary and statutory 
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forms of governance results in nested institutions whereby both forms are ingrained within 
each other. But melding the two forms of governance represents a significant challenge. This 
arises from the long history of interaction between customary and statutory forms of 
governance. 
2.2 The state’s role in natural resource governance 
To regulate resource use in rural areas, the state depends on a range of legal instruments. 
These include moratoria, permits, bylaws, policies, fencing off areas of ecological importance, 
and co-management arrangements (Matose, 1994 & 2002; Ndoye & Awono, 2010; Kozanayi 
et al., 2014). In the majority of cases, the state uses command and control to regulate natural 
resources. These rule-based practices have been criticised for concealing the complexities of 
contested and overlapping rights (Nhira, 1998; Campbell et al., 2001). As noted by Cleaver 
(2012), there is oversimplification of local complex realities that make local practices resilient. 
In much of the developing world the state has its own weaknesses such as insufficient funding 
of forestry departments, poor working conditions which lead staff to engage in corruption, 
and inadequate enforcement of policies and laws (Ndoye & Awono, 2010). 
The state’s drive to participate in the governance of natural resources is typically motivated 
by many factors, including fulfilment of a legal mandate (Mandondo, 2006) and the need to 
ensure ecological sustainability (Kozanayi et al, 2014). Other factors may include revenue 
generation, ecological concerns and the need to be in line with decentralisation initiatives 
(Kaimowitz & Shiel, 2007; Laird et al., 2010). Critics argue that resource governance in states 
that were colonised has largely been unsuccessful during and after the colonial period. As 
Murphree (1993:4) remarks “management by the state has demonstrably been ineffective in 
both the colonial and post-colonial eras”. The reasons for the failure suggest inappropriate 
forms of governance being used to regulate resource use. As noted by Kooiman et al. (2008:7), 
“In the designing of natural resource management structures, in the majority of cases in many 
developing countries, organisational structures have been copied from developed countries, 
not considering the completely different task they are confronted with”. 
The reality is that in rural African communities, daily life, especially in places that are far away 
from the central state, is almost entirely governed by customary practices (IIED, 2009) or 
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operate side by side with the formal laws resulting in a state of “legal pluralism”6 (Tamanaha, 
2008; Clarke & Jupiter, 2010)7. Traditional authorities who are the enforcers of customary 
practices are ubiquitous in the administration of much of rural Africa (Economic Commission 
for Africa (ECA), 2007; Hara et al., 2009). They have operated alongside elected statutory 
bodies since the colonial era and there are many debates surrounding their roles. Key debates 
within the discourse of traditional authorities are engaged with below. 
2.3 The state and encounters with traditional authorities 
2.3.1 Mamdani’s thesis on bifurcation 
The history of African rural areas is littered with episodes of the empowerment and 
disempowerment of traditional authorities (TAs) and the rising and waning of customary 
practices. To establish empires in Africa, the British colonialists either destroyed existing 
customary practices or allowed such systems to operate side by side with imposed statutory 
systems under what Mamdani (1996) has called bifurcation rule8. Mamdani hypothesised that 
in order to suppress the majority populace, the colonial powers had two sets of rules: 
customary practices enforced by traditional authorities for blacks (subjects), and statutory 
laws for whites (citizens). In Zimbabwe, the British colonial government adopted practices 
that relegated indigenous peoples and their social values to a separate set of rules rather than 
destroy these traditional systems completely.9 In South Africa, a study on the role of 
customary practices in water governance found a similar trend where the apartheid regime 
in that country used TAs to extend their influence (Kapfudzaruwa & Sowman, 2009). Despite 
criticisms regarding the adulteration of customary practices and traditional authorities by 
some regimes for political expedience, customary practices have played a key role in shaping 
the use of natural resources. 
                                                          
6 The co -existence of many forms of legal systems such as traditional and legal in a specific area. 
7 Scott (2009:13) called these places nonstate spaces, which are locations where, owing largely to geographical 
obstacles, the state has particular difficulty in establishing and maintaining its authority. 
8 Informed by the French philosopher Descartes who argued that to build a new city, in an area where another 
city already exists, one had to completely destroy the old city first (Chimuka, 2001). 
9 Reasons for retaining the traditional authorities were many, but were largely due to the convenience of 




 As part of the strategy to subjugate black people, colonial powers gave TAs a lot of power 
over their people to the extent that the TAs ended up being despotic and powerful. Mamdani 
used the allegory of a clenched fist to show how power was concentrated in the hands of the 
TAs. Using his thesis of indirect rule, Mamdani (1996) illustrated that repressive colonial 
regimes used TAs to oppress locals in the name of “enforcing” tradition. After gaining 
independence, most African states adopted the traditional authority, particularly chiefs after 
deracialising them (Mamdani, 1996). 
Despite the central role of natural resources in supporting rural livelihoods, and the influence 
of TAs over such resources, Mamdani (1996) is curiously silent on the impacts of the so-called 
despotic TAs on livelihoods and natural resources. Mamdani (1996) also places a focus on 
chiefs, which were the target of colonial systems, without necessarily recognising the multi-
tiered nature of traditional structures. Indeed, villages’ heads, the lowest tier, are those 
directly involved in the day-to-day processes of governing natural resources (Makumbe, 
2010). Such systems were not directly controlled by the colonial systems to the same extent 
as those of chiefs (Makumbe, 2010). 
Critics of contemporary forms of customary governance raise doubts about the authenticity 
of custom/tradition, caricaturing these as colonial constructs or invented traditions that the 
post-colonial governments simply “de-racialised” and replaced with a form of traditional 
system of governance that subscribed to the policies of the new regime (Ntsebeza, 2003, 
2005; Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983). Mukamuri (1995b) for example, argues that local belief 
systems are a means through which the TAs in societies impose their hegemony.  Chanock’s 
(1998) and Berry’s (1989, 1993) legal anthropology offers a balanced argument as they fuse 
criticism of the efficiency of customary practices (Mukamuri, 1995a) with the “invention of 
tradition” (Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983) narratives, and argue that there is no culture that can 
be considered ambient and canonical. They assert that change is an inherent feature of 
customary practices, and has made customary systems remain relevant and resilient over 
time. 
Whether or not one agrees with these views, TAs still remain a cornerstone of rural 
governance systems that define, redefine, safeguard and implement customary practices 
(McAuslan,2005; Mutimukuru et al., 2008; Hara et al., 2009). The research in this thesis draws 
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on the notion that customary practices are important in the governance of natural resources 
in the rural landscape and that such practices are changing or have changed to suit the 
prevailing context10. In Chapter 7 I use empirical evidence to illustrate how local customary 
practices changed in response to changing socio-economic factors.  Customary practices do 
not consist of static norms, they are indeterminate and adaptive. The notion of an unchanging 
customary system is a myth of the colonial era. Further, I argue after Nuesiri (2014) that as 
the trend on the broad topic of governance gains currency, so too does the re-emergence of 
TAs and use of customary practices to regulate access to natural resources across Africa. This 
is motivated by the observation that the last decade and a half has seen TAs becoming 
stronger and more prominent in the governance of rural areas (ECA, 2007; Nuesiri, 2014), 
including in Laten America (Cronkleton & Pacheco, 2010; FAO, 2015) and Nepal (FAO, 2015) 
2.3.2 Nuesiri scholarship on the re-emergence of traditional authorities across the African 
continent 
Nuesiri submits that as traditional authorities re-emerge in the administration of rural areas, 
their influence over the governance of natural resources is also increasing. I find the interplay 
between the state and TAs to be at the centre of governance as it reveals the outcomes of 
using customary practices as one of multiple governance approaches to regulate use of 
natural resources in developing countries. 
Nuesiri’s (2014) recent work on the re-emergence of TAs has been authoritative and has 
regenerated debate on the role of TAs within the framework of governance. Nuesiri’s work 
builds on that of post-structuralists, and presents a legal pluralistic view which celebrates the 
existence of both customary and statutory forms of governance. According to Nuesiri (2014), 
across much of Africa, TAs are regaining prominence in the administration of rural areas. 
These re-emerging TAs are overlaying existing statutory forms of governance. This creates 
challenges in the administration of rural areas as the TAs and elected structures fight for 
political space. The task of using both forms of governance is complex as aptly argued by 
Nuesiri (2014: 48): “Establishing democratic local government as the singular public decision-
                                                          
10 Practices are inclusive of tradition authorities, therefore there is divergence from Mamdani (1996) who 
focused only on the role chiefs play instead of the broader practices. 
21 
 
maker at the local level, where traditional authority is just one among a number of civic actors 
holding local government to account, is a formidable challenge”. 
The re-emergence of TAs has also been described by researchers focused on approaches to 
development in rural areas (Ubink, 2008; Baldwin, 2011a). Ubink (2008: 14) argues that the 
resurgence of TAs is facilitated by the state as a way to “strengthen the position of the 
government by integrating tradition into the space of governmental power as a symbolic, 
legitimising discourse”. Above all, TAs continue to enjoy legitimacy from both the state and 
traditional systems (Ubink, 2008). In fact, as noted by the ECA report (2007), chieftaincy in 
Africa is an integral part and a vital element of the social, political and cultural establishment 
of African communities. This makes TAs strategic players in the governance of rural areas and 
natural resources. 
In Zimbabwe, the Rukuni Land Commission (1998), set up by the government to assess 
appropriate land use models for communal areas in the country, unequivocally made the case 
for the management of communal areas and resources at village level by traditional 
institutions. Subsequent to this recommendation, the Traditional Leaders Act was 
promulgated, re-empowering previously disempowered TAs (Chapter 4). 
Nonetheless, there are mixed results from the overlaying of customary and statutory forms 
in the governance of natural resources across much of the developing world (Wynberg & 
Laird, 2007), including usurpation of roles of traditional authorities by the state (Mukamuri et 
al, 1998) and Nuesiri (2014) does not engage with this important aspect. Like Mamdani, 
Nuesiri tends to focus his analysis of TAs at the level of chiefs, ignoring the local level village 
heads and other authorities that are directly involved in the governance of natural resources. 
2.3.3 Traditional authorities as enforcers of customary practices 
Anthropological studies in Zimbabwe note that TAs have been the guardians of customary 
practices (Bourdillon, 1999)11. Ubink (2008: 7) concurs, offering a broader view of TAs vis a vis 
                                                          
11 I use traditional authorities to refer to the whole gamut of traditional institutions: village heads, headmen and 




natural resource management: “Traditional authorities are a characteristic feature in the 
landscape of many modern African states, and perform a variety of important functions 
including natural resource management, local development and are in various ways linked to 
modern state structures”. Other latter-day scholars have also averred the role of TAs and 
customary practices in the management of natural resources. Nyamnjoh (2002) argues that 
Africans are reluctant to giving up on chieftaincy and customary practices because these 
define who they are. According to Nuesiri (2014:41), “Chiefs ideological power stems from the 
shared cultural ideology with their subjects on how the world is structured. It is no exaggeration 
to state that rural Africa takes it ideological starting point as the world of the ancestors, and chiefs 
are viewed as the link to the ancestors”. 
The role of TAs in ensuring democracy and peace in Zimbabwe and across Africa is well 
documented (Boone, 2003; ECA, 2007; Makahamadze et al., 2009; Baldwin, 2011b, 2015; and 
Nuesiri, 2014). A fundamental difference between TAs and statutory authorities is in terms of 
the way the two forms of governance engage with the populace. Nuesiri (2014:18 ) notes that 
“customary (traditional) authority leadership relies on family and kinship ties in exercising its 
functions, while modern states rely on the public service and markets to deliver services”. 
This distinction is particularly important as familial ties are generally strong in rural areas and 
are used as a form of social capital to access natural resources, while the state institutions 
across much of Africa are weakening due to lack of funding, corruption, lack of credibility, 
capacity (Kowero et al., 2003; Ndoye & Awono, 2010; Biti, 2012). 
2.4 Debates on customary practices 
2.4.1 Customary practices 
 Customary practices are a traditional way of doing things, specific to a particular society and 
time. Custom itself is a way that societies operate in terms of laid down practices that regulate 
day-to-day behaviours of members of society (Katerere, 2001). Such practices might include 
taboos, language and idioms, epistemologies, cosmologies, use of social capital, sacredness 
and historical ties (Schoffeleers 1979; Bourdillon, 1999; Katerere, 2001). Oftentimes, these 
practices are not written down and are regarded as “rules of the heart” or civility and are not 




visible in public decision-making contexts. However, these need to be understood, “as they 
provide a way of ordering the social and natural world, of accommodating unpredictability 
and of defining proper responses to changes” (Cleaver, 2015: 9). Further, customary practices 
are important as they have been one of the foundational elements of the laws of all states in 
Africa (McAuslan, 2005; Wynberg & Laird 2007). 
A distinction between customary practices and customary law has to be made. Customary 
law as a state construct, means codified set of laws that are applicable to a certain class of 
people for example blacks during the colonial era in Zimbabwe (Katerere, 2001). Some 
authors use customary law to refer to customary practices, but for the purposes of this study 
I am talking about customary practices which portray the day-to-day arrangements around 
natural resources management. These “rules of the heart”, more than codified rules in books 
of statutes, shape the day-to-day governance of natural resources. 
2.4.2 Early debates: Trajectories of customary practices 
Early scholars of customary practices and traditions relating to natural resources romanticised 
or valorised them as “ritually directed ecosystems”, or religions with a logic informed by 
conservation objectives (Turner, 1967; Schoffeleers, 1979). These early scholars extolled the 
ecological virtue of indigenous knowledge systems in an uncritical manner (Anderson, 1996). 
While these have to be understood as researchers from an epoch when customary practices 
were often romanticised, more contemporary scholars still valorise the same customary 
practices, arguing that they are not only the cornerstone on which statutory laws are built, 
but are also adaptive to changing contexts (Matowanyika 1991; McAuslan, 2005). 
Anthropologists, sociologists, policy researchers and economists have also written extensively 
on customary practices (Hobsbawm & Ranger 1983; Berry, 1993; Chanock 1998; Piot 1999), 
as have complex system scholars who have stated that there is no system that exists on its 
own, making the case that what is considered customary at the local level might be a “hybrid” 
of different cultures resulting from the interface of the local with the outside world 
(Gunderson & Holling, 2002). If anything, every system is intertwined with a bigger and ever 
revolving system (Anderson, 1996). Poit (1999), using an example from West Africa, argues 
that some communities can have strong customs even if they are linked to the outside, global 
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world.  Anderson (2006), concurs, drawing insights form his work in China. Admittedly, there 
is no culture that is ambient and canonical (Berry, 1993; Chanock, 1998). This dynamism is a 
key feature which allows the system to adapt to changing contexts: social, economic or 
political. A common blind spot among the early scholars of customary practices has been the 
omission of the outcome of the interplay of the customary systems with statutory forms of 
governance. 
2.4.3 Customary practices in the realm of natural resource governance 
Overwhelming evidence shows that people living next to forests are de facto owners and 
usually use customary practices to manage such forests (Ingram et al., 2015). In Zimbabwe, 
Campbell et al. (2002a) conclude that even though considerable responsibility for resource 
governance is bestowed on statutory Rural District Councils, de facto rules and regulations 
are centred on TAs. Governance of natural resources in most rural areas is thus principally 
about local rules, far more than it is about statutory rules. To local users, customary systems 
are legitimate and the principles of customary practices which govern access, rights and use 
are well understood. However, they may not conform to statutory legal procedures (Pollard 
& Cousins, 2007). Cock et al (2012) argue that the gamut of literature that celebrates the 
governance of natural resources in rural areas tends to miss out on these important 
practices). For state policy makers, customary practices may pass as mundane without 
recognising their highly sophisticated norms. As a consequence, biodiversity conservation 
programs have often been implemented without due regard for local customary practices 
(Nianyong, 2011). Murombedzi (1998) makes a compelling argument that the state’s attempt 
to elbow out customary practices and usurp control over governance of natural resources has 
in fact resulted in resource degradation in communal areas. 
Though the resourcefulness of local people anchored on customary practices and rules has 
been acknowledged (Campbell et al., 2002b), it is important not to romanticise the ability of 
TAs to ensure ecological sustainability (Mandondo & Mapedza, 2003; Ohja et al., 2016)12. The 
                                                          
12 The sustainable utilisation of NTFPs can be defined as the level of harvest that does not impair the ability of 
the harvested population to replace itself, that is, the rate of harvest should not surpass the rate of regeneration 




juxtaposition of customary arrangements with statutory forms of governance raises questions 
about the effectiveness of such arrangements in ensuring ecological sustainability especially 
under use pressure (Cerutti et al., 2012). Also, as argued by Ubink and Quan (2008), local 
institutions are vulnerable to the power plays of elites, as well as to the politics of exclusion 
by powerful actors like the state in a modern and globalised world. 
2.5 Theoretical frameworks for understanding governance 
2.5.1 Kooiman’s model of interactive governance 
Several frameworks to understand governance have been suggested but most are general 
and not specific enough to capture complex interactions at the local level (Ostrom, 1990; 
Kooiman et al 2005; Sowman & Wynberg, 2014). Moreover, literature typically considers 
governance as separately involving the state or TAs, yet in reality, these two operate side by 
side or are overlaid upon each other. The added complexity of managing natural resources is 
seldom considered when analysing the interface between the two forms of governance. The 
main challenge is that governance is an ever-evolving, interactive phenomena which links the 
local with the national through various means. Understanding such a dynamic and adaptive 
phenomenon requires a theoretical approach that integrates elements of scale and 
dynamism. 
The model of interactive governance proposed by Kooiman at el (2005) is pertinent. This 
model recognises interactions between orders of governance. Interaction of actors takes 
place within institutionalised frameworks of rules, norms, interests, social connections, and 
knowledge of the systems and principles. As Figure 2 shows, structures of governance are 






Figure 2: Orders of governance (Kooiman et al., 2005) 
In this framework, first-order governance takes place wherever people/actors and their 
organisations interact in order to solve societal problems and create new opportunities 
(Kooiman et al., 2005). This order is largely focused on the identification of problems by 
societal actors. Conceptualisation of problems as well as the formulation of solutions is 
typically problematic due to the presence of many actors usually with different agendas 
and expectations. Identified solutions will eventually shape the day-to-day interactions of 
all the actors concerned. 
Second order governance in this model is about instruments and institutions that are used 
to effect responsive governance. Mahon et al., (2009: 318), states that second order 
governance focuses on “the actions and tools that implement governance”. There are 
several instruments used that include customary and statutory forms of governance. The 






Part  IV 








outcome of governance systems in place. Any mismatch between policy and reality on the 
ground will result in unintended consequences (Matowanyika, 1991; Wynberg et al., 
2015). Therefore, it is important to understand how the different instruments from the 
different institutions operate together. 
Third order governance relates to the principles guiding governance activities. Critical 
issues considered under this order try to avoid universalising issues rather than being 
sensitive to local contexts. Key questions guiding the framing of principles include those 
guiding resource use and their synergies or inconsistences, relevance, and divergencies in 
world views. These principles are important because they eventually inform the nature of 
the institutions put in place (Order 2) to enforce the agreed rules. Principles also shape 
the framing of problems and solutions (Order 1). 
Kooiman’s conceptual framework provides valuable insights into the study of governance 
especially when investigating interactions between the local, national and international 
levels. However, a key weakness of the model is that it is general and is based on European 
contexts which do not clearly capture local contexts in Africa. African contexts are unique 
and complex due to the history of heavy dependencies on natural resources by local 
people as well as conflicts between the state and TAs that date back to the colonial era. 
The model is also silent on livelihoods and ecology, key drivers of governance in the 
context of most developing countries. 
To understand the governance of natural resources in the context of the developing world, 
theories that embrace notions of complexity are relevant, including local level dynamics 
between customary and statutory forms of governance, both of which have shaped the 
governance of rural areas over a long time. It is argued, after de Koning (2014) that there 
is no direct and linear relationship between institutions and levels of governance. In 
particular, resource users use various means to access resources and to influence the 
structure of regulating institutions (Giddens, 1984; Ribot & Peluso, 2003). Below I engage 
with alternative and perhaps more appropriate concepts to use to understand natural 
resources governance in the context of rural Zimbabwe. 
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2.5.2 Access to natural resources as a key tenet of governance 
Access to natural resources is a key parameter in governance and is complex in the African 
context where it stands between impoverishment and survival for rural people (Ribot, 1998; 
Nemarundwe & Kozanayi, 2001; Ribot & Peluso, 2003; Cleaver, 2012). Broadly, access is about 
who gets (or does not get) what, how and when (Ostrom, 1990; Ribot & Peluso, 2003). Both 
statutory and customary practices may be used to regulate access (Ostrom, 1990; Schlager & 
Ostrom, 1992; de Soto, 2000). 
In mainstream institutional debates, property rights define access (de Soto, 2000) and have 
to be clearly defined in order to be enforceable (North, 1990; Ostrom, 1990; Schlager & 
Ostrom, 1992; de Soto, 2000). In their conceptualisation of property rights for natural 
resources, Schlager and Ostrom (1992: 250) conceived of access as, “the right to enter a 
defined physical property”. Such a conceptualisation embodies legal elements that bestow 
bundles of rights to resource users and a clearly mapped geographical space.13 While this 
conceptualisation has been used widely in the study of common property regimes, this is a 
limited view of access especially when considering communal areas in developing areas 
where property rights are poorly defined and locals enjoy usufruct rights to forestry 
resources. 
Tenure systems typically comprise four types: private, communal, state and open access 
(chapter 6). While this categorisation of tenure is appropriate to analyse rights and duties of 
resource users, property rights are more complex than portrayed by the four broad classes 
and in practice, natural resources are managed and used under a range of different property 
regimes that might be enfolded within each other (Hara et al., 2009). Bruce et al. (1993) offer 
a more detailed typology of tenure systems and note that tenures may be overlapping rather 
than discrete. Moreover, there are de facto land tenure systems that involve a multiplicity of 
actors engaged in struggles over property rights. An examination of the territory of a single 
community where land is governed by indigenous tenure, for example, might reveal that the 
landscape is divided into a mosaic of land under different uses and tenure systems. Each area 
or mosaic constitutes a tenure niche, that is a space in which access to and use of it is 
                                                          
13 In their typology of bundles of rights, Schlager and Ostrom (1992) identify five variants namely: access, 
withdrawal, management, exclusion, and alienation. 
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governed by a common set of rules. Property as a concept, therefore, is insufficient to 
delineate all the intricate pathways used by different actors to gain access to natural products, 
especially for a tree like the baobab that has multiple uses and users. These tenure systems 
are neither static nor simple – they change over time and under different management 
systems (Bruce et al., 1993). For example, with weak management systems in place, state 
property can become open access or communal property (Ostrom, 1990). Customary systems 
might be used across all tenure systems, although the degree of use differs and is often most 
pronounced in communal property and less so in state-owned property (Bruce et al., 1993). 
In theory, a positive relationship exists between the granting of tenure rights and access to 
benefits by the right holder. However, as Ribot and Peluso (2003) show, power and not access 
rights, may be the key in determining the volume and direction of benefit flows. A broader 
and nuanced notion of access has been given by Ribot and Peluso (2003), who considered 
access to include not just rights but the ability to gain access to a resource, stating “access is 
about all possible means by which a person is able to benefit from things” (Ribot & Peluso 
2003: 156). Ability is derived from many sources including power and adroit use of wealth, 
access to labour, use of power (legitimate and illicit), corruption, force, having access to 
individuals and institutions with authority to regulate and drawing from social capital (Berry, 
1989; Dasgupta, 2000; Ostrom, 2000; Ribot& Peluso, 2003; Kepe, 2008).14 This 
conceptualisation celebrates a gamut of means that are used to gain or deny access to 
resources, of which property is a subset of access relationships. Those with access to a 
resource can control the level and nature of benefits that others can derive to the resource 
(Mandondo, 2001). 
Generally, at societal level, excessively restrictive regulation of access to resources even by 
individuals is abhorred and fiercely resisted by resource users. Examples from three different 
districts in Zimbabwe are instructive: (1) villagers that boycotted a neighbour’s funeral 
because he did not allow his neighbours access to fire wood in his field (Mandondo & Kozanayi 
(2006); (2) a community in a dry area that threw a dead puppy in the well of a neighbour who 
                                                          
14 In some cases, social capital is considered as a double-edged sword, “it opens up some opportunities while 
restricting others” (Ostrom, 2000: 176). However, in this study, I witnessed the overwhelming use of it by rural 
people to gain access. Access is mediated through membership to a group such as community, religious, familial 




had fenced off and locked his well from his neighbours (Nemarundwe & Kozanayi (2002); and 
(3) communities around a state forest that used covert and overt ways to resist restricted 
access to forest resources (Matose, 2002). In all three examples, there was a revision of 
resource-sharing arrangements after the incidents. Thus, through various local actions, 
resource harvesters in communal areas are able to resist and influence the way that 
authorities regulate access to natural resources. Recognition of nuanced access arrangements 
is critical in a context where multiple actors mediate and negotiate access to common pool 
resources and natural resources are central to local livelihoods. These local level 
arrangements are normally overlooked in the study of governance, yet they shape the day-
to-day governance of natural resoucres. 
2.5.3 Agency and the concept of structuration 
Within the domain of natural resources, the discourse about resource governance has been 
greatly shaped by institutional theorists, particularly Douglass North (1990) and Elinor Ostrom 
(1990) on the premise that institutions regulate human behaviour. Ostrom’s design principles 
in particular have swayed thinking15. According to neo-institutionalism, people are disciplined 
by given rules, norms and beliefs in a society (North, 1990; Ostrom, 1990; Arts et al., 2012). 
Underlying Ostrom’s design principles is the need to get the institutions right by creating 
robust institutions as a precursor to the effective governance of natural resources (Ostrom, 
1990; Nemarundwe, 2003; de Koning, 2014). Getting the institutions right is viewed as critical 
to preventing degradation of natural resources through regulating the behaviours of 
harvesters. The functionalist notion of institutions implied by institutional theorists and 
Kooiman et al (2005), assumes that the relationship between the institutions and the people 
to be regulated is unidirectional; that is, human behaviour can be regulated by crafted 
institutions and institutional arrangements. 
However, because access to natural resources is a matter of life and death to people in rural 
areas, they are not passive recipients of policy from above. Rather, they actively engage with 
                                                          
15 Ostrom designed eight principles namely, 1. clearly defined boundaries, 2. congruence between appropriation 
and provision rules and local conditions, 3. collective choice arrangements, 4. monitoring, 5. graduated 
sanctions, 6. conflict resolution mechanisms,7.  minimal recognition of rights to organize, and finally, 8. nested 




the regulators whenever their livelihoods and environments are threatened. To be able to act 
in response to the actions of the regulators, actors have agency – a notion that is illustrated 
by Giddens’s (1984) seminal work on structuration. Unlike functionalist theory that portrays 
structures of society/ institutions as having the power to regulate and limit human behaviour 
(North, 1990; Ostrom, 1990) the structuration theory argues that the very harvesters whose 
behaviour institutions/structures try to regulate, are not powerless. Rather, they have agency 
which enables them to extricate themselves from unfavourable conditions and influence 
structure (Giddens, 1984). In sociology, human agency is celebrated as a liberating factor. 
Giddens (1984) and later on, Cleaver (2012), challenge the reductionist and connectedness 
model of institutions proposed by neo- institutionalists. In his important seminal work on 
agency and structuration, Giddens (1984) posits that relationship between the governed and 
the governing is complex. The influence of institutions is not unidirectional as espoused by 
mainstream institutional economic theory (North, 1990). Instead, so argues Giddens (1984), 
resource users exhibit agency to influence the form and functions of the structures that aim 
to regulate the behaviour of, for example, resource harvesters, in what Giddens (1984: xxi) 
calls the “duality of structure”. 16 This refers to, “Structure as the medium and outcome of 
the conduct it recursively organises; the structural properties of social systems do not exist 
outside of action but are chronically implicated in its production and reproduction”, (Giddens 
1984: 376). Through the iterative interaction between the regulators (structures) and the 
resource users (who have agency), the form of governance in place will ideally, improve. This 
theory helps to explain why resource harvesters are able to continue harvesting natural 
resources even in instances where strict rules and several regulatory institutions are in place. 
It also explains why regulatory authorities sometimes change their strategy when regulating 
access to natural resources. This understanding is particularly important in interactive 
governance where several actors are involved in regulating access to natural recourses. 
                                                          
16 See also Le Grand (2003) on the same, but looking at public administration in the United Kingdom. She argues 
that if people are unhappy with the form of governance or service delivery, they walk out rather than just be 
willing victims. Scott (1985) also gives a cocktail of actions so called weak people use to extricate themselves 
from oppressive situations. Other scholars have referred to this as “voting with their feet” (Nhira et al., 1998). 
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2.5.4 Bricolage scholarship, an emergent scholarship in resource governance 
Interactions of actors in the governance arena are complex and dynamic. In his structuration 
theory, Giddens (1984) did not explicitly explain how the actors involved interact with each 
other. Drawing on “post-institutionalist” perspectives, Cleaver rejects the over-formalised 
managerial approaches, preferring instead to embrace a variety of partial and contingent 
solutions that are more reflective of the ever-changing evolution of institutions. Building on 
Giddens’ agency and structuration theory, Cleaver (2012), postulates that the institutional 
landscape is more complex and messy than envisaged by most functional institutionalists. 
Cleaver argued that actors (regulators and harvesters/resource users alike) are constantly 
interacting and reconfiguring themselves in multiple and unpredictable ways that result in 
different desired outcomes, so that a neat institutional fit is elusive. Bricolage, a French word 
meaning making do with whatever is available, is described as the likely approach (Cleaver, 
2012). As Cleaver and de Koning (2015:4) explain, “Institutional bricolage is a process through 
which people, consciously and non-consciously, assemble or reshape institutional 
arrangements, drawing on whatever materials and resources are available, regardless of their 
original purpose”. In this process, old arrangements are modified and new ones are invented. 
Institutional components from different origins are continuously reused, reworked, or 
refashioned to perform new functions. Adapted configurations of rules, practices, norms and 
relationships are attributed meaning and authority.17 These refurbished arrangements are 
the necessary responses to everyday challenges, and are embedded in daily practice (Cleaver 
and de Koning, 2015: 4). By deduction, there is potential to facilitate melding of different 
forms of governance in order to come up with a form of governance that ensures economic 
and ecological sustainability. An extreme end of the management continuum that resonates 
well with Cleaver’s bricolage scholarship is Ruitenbeek and Cartier’s (2001) laissez faire hands 
off approach; this posits that left to themselves, institutions will have a way of organising 
themselves to solve local problems. 
Overall, bricolage can also be considered as an adaptive strategy to manage natural resources 
(Cleaver and de Koning, 2015) and as a way for dealing with fragmented or weak governance 
                                                          
17 Explaining the link between the bricolage scholarship and Giddens’s structuration theory, de Koning and 
Cleaver (2012: 281) noted that, “bricolage is an articulation of the dynamic relationship between social structure 
and individual agency”. It is not just an opportunistic amalgamation of pieces. 
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arrangements (Ingram et al., 2015). This makes the bricolage scholarship an appropriate 
theoretical lens through which to examine the governance of communally-owned resources, 
especially where a multiplicity of institutions (customary and statutory for example) are 
constantly changing and interacting. Furthermore, because of the ever-evolving nature 
espoused under institutional bricolage, institutional endurance and change can be better 
understood, enriching understanding of human agency and relations of authority across 
levels. Lastly, the concept of bricolage is relevant to understand governance issues in Africa 
in general, and Zimbabwe in particular, whose history is littered with numerous phases of 
conquest, disempowerment and re- empowerment of TAs (Kozanayi et al., 2014). A clear 
understanding of the intricate interface between the two forms of governance, beyond the 
work done by Mamdani (1996), thus helps to inform current and future policy directions. In 
the present study, an investigation of how the different actors involved in the governance and 
use of natural products interact with one another is pursued in an effort to come up with 
workable solutions to the problems they face individually and collectively. Such an 
understanding helps inform the creation of forms of governance that are relevant for the 
management of natural resources at the local level. 
2.5.5 Embeddedness of institutions with a bricolage 
Implicitly, bricolage scholarship celebrates the embeddedness of institutions in social 
relations as opposed to the discrete and fixed bodies implied in Ostrom’s (1990) design 
principles and Kooiman’s orders of governance. Peters (1984), Granovetter (1985), and 
more recently de Koning (2014) explain how the concept of embeddedness is relevant to 
the bricolage theory. Peters (1984:29) argues that,  
claims and control over resources, and authority over things and people, are 
premised on an ideology or a set of meanings. Struggles over resources or over 
power, then, necessarily take place in terms of such meanings. These meanings, 
are both shared and disputed: different categories or groups assign different 
meanings, different definitions or different emphases at different times to known 
concepts, events and acts. Hence one event, one institution or one concept may 




In the case of customary practices, these can be used to legitimise existing practices, or 
challenged as oppressive or be redefined to suit current situations. 
Granovetter’s (1985) theory of economic embeddedness resonates well with Peters’ 
proposition; he posits that social relations are embedded in economic systems which in turn 
are embedded in social systems. The two are intertwined and interdependent. 
Embeddedness has been used to analyse networks of relationships among individuals and 
other bodies to explain economic actions and outcomes. Thus, relations between actors go 
beyond economic interactions to include social interactions that in turn shape the economic 
interactions. 
In an attempt to explain how the different actors interact with the context of resource 
governance, de Koning (2014) takes further the theory of embeddedness, suggesting a 
framework that recognises three typologies. 
The first is aggregation which is the recombination of newly introduced institutions and 
locally embedded institutions and social characterisations such as culture, routines, 
traditions, social norms, needs, expectations and experience (De Koning & Cleaver, 2012). 
This results in a more or less harmonised arrangement. The second, alteration, is the 
adaptation of institutions. This can apply to both newly introduced institutions and locally 
embedded institutions where local actors might tweak forest or other regulations to make 
them better fit their livelihoods or identity. Lastly, articulation involves the claiming of 
traditional identities and culture and the rejection of newly introduced institutions. 
Articulation might occur when introduced institutions are in direct conflict with local 
identities (de Koning 2014: 360). Customary practices and statutory forms of governance 
have clearly permeated each other at different levels over time due to recurring 
interactions. As they interact, both forms of governance might strengthen and undermine 
each other’s performance (Van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal & Emile, 1996; Nemarundwe, 
2003; ECA, 2007; Meagher, 2007). De Koning’s framework, together with Peter’s 
embeddedness help to understand the intricate ways through which actors interact within 
the realm of governance. 
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The interaction of actors occurs at different scales, in a lateral and hierarchical fashion. 
Sometimes interaction occurs between local actors alone, and at times it might be 
between local and higher levels of governance. Ojha et al. (2016) use the concept of 
delocalisation to describe this important phenomenon. “Delocalisation means the process 
through which local communities become intimately connected to the actors outside of 
the local domain” (Ojha et al., 2016: 3). The concept of delocalisation is particularly 
important in cases where resource use transcends local spatial and institutional scales or 
in instances where local level and higher-level actors like the district engage in the 
governance of natural resources. Increasingly, as some natural resources become 
commercialised, district level actors are getting involved in the governance of natural 
resources at the village or ward level. In the case of the Kooiman model, delocalisation 
helps to understand the linkages between the different orders of governance. 
2.5.6 History as a negotiating tool 
To constitute and reconstitute resource-sharing arrangements, actors use current and 
historical knowledge of their circumstances (Cleaver, 2015). Overall, Cleaver and de Koning 
(2015: 6) concludes, “History is at the centre of the study of governance as colonial and post-
colonial governments have interacted with TAs in ways that have had profound impacts on 
the governance of natural resources in communal areas”. This resonates with observations 
made by Capistrano and Colfer (2005), that the day-to-day governance of natural resources 
is greatly dependent on historical context. That history assumes many dimensions, including 
the history of ethnic relations between members in a society or state-peasant’s relations over 
time. To understand current governance practices and dynamics, a historical overview and 
understanding of the relationship between actors is imperative especially for a country like 
Zimbabwe that has a long history of interface between the state and TAs. Despite this 
importance, history, just like livelihoods and ecology, is typically omitted in frameworks 





Review of the key debates, theories and frameworks used to analyse governance of natural 
resources in rural areas across Africa reveal that there is no one particular framework that 
can be used to understand the complexities involved. Each of the frameworks has 
weaknesses, largely arising from a disregard of the influence of history, actors’ trait of agency, 
or the role of natural resources in local livelihoods. As shown by Ribot and Peluso (2003) 
notions of access and institutional arrangements at the local level are complex and dynamic 
and cannot be captured using rigid concepts like property rights which are proposed in the 
understanding of resource governance. At best, arrangements are a bricolage (Cleaver, 2012). 
To understand natural resource governance in the African context requires a framework that 
imbues elements of dynamism, history, interaction and a broader understanding of access as 
a complex process. Empirical evidence will be used to test some of the theories engaged with 
above and build on them to propose a framework that is better suited to explain the 








CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH APPROACH, METHODOLOGY AND METHODS 
This chapter presents the research approach, methodology and methods that were 
employed. After Kershaw and Nicholson (2011), methodology is a systematic way to solve a 
research problem, while methods are the tools used to gather requisite data. Ethical and 
protocol issues that were followed as part of the research process are also presented. 
Annexes describing the tools used to collect data are presented at the end of this thesis. 
The field work was undertaken from February 2011 to November 2012.  During this time, I 
spent one month resident in the study site. Follow up interviews with key informants and a 
market survey were conducted in 2013. When doing field work in Jinga I stayed with my 
parents; in Nyanyadzi I rented a room from a local family.  
To fully understand complex governance and livelihood issues, I used a combination of 
qualitative and quantitative methods. The use of both has been advocated in social studies of 
the type undertaken in this thesis in order to improve scientific rigour (Brannen, 1992; Sithole 
et al., 2002; Marshall & Rossman, 2006).  The research also built on earlier research (1993 
and 1997/1998) that I did as part of a multi-disciplinary research project (Hot Springs Report, 
1995; Mukamuri & Kozanayi, 1999). Analysis of the qualitative data was informed by 
grounded theory. Grounded theory has been used widely in social studies. Data generates 
theory, as opposed to theory or other analytical constructs informing how data is generated 
(Corbin & Strauss, 1990; Glaser, 1992). Data coding and reflection on emerging threads for 
example through keeping an up to date diary of events is paramount when using the 
grounded theory. This gives objectivity to the researcher as he has to remove prejudices he 
may have about the issue under study. For me, doing research in an area in which I grew up, 
I found ground theory as a good tool to carry out my field work.  
3.1 Case study approach 
To get a deeper understanding of the issues, a case study approach was adopted. Detailed 
site-specific case studies have been found to provide greater insights into the governance of 
commercialised natural products (Yin, 1994; Wickens, 1991; Marshall et al., 2003; Basurto & 
Ostrom, 2009). The use of the case study approach to study non timber forest products 
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(NTFPs) and their governance is gaining popularity, with studies to date having focused on 
marula in South Africa and Namibia (Wynberg et al., 2002; Wynberg & Laird, 2007), devil’s 
claw (Wynberg, 2004), mopane worms (Gondo et al., 2010), and illala palm (Sola, 2004). 
Despite its strengths, the case study approach faces limitations because it can be difficult to 
generalise results from one case study to another area due to differences in contexts.  
3.2 Qualitative methods 
Qualitative methods included a number of Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) approaches. 
Although PRA methods were originally used as development planning tools, they have gained 
prominence in the social sciences (Namarundwe & Richards, 2002). The use of PRA has been 
hailed for ensuring the active participation of even semi-literate and illiterate people in a 
research process (Chambers, 1983). Although Zimbabwe has one of the highest literacy levels 
in sub-Saharan Africa18, in rural areas it is common to find a sizeable number of illiterate 
people, especially among older populations (CSO, 2012). 
3.2.1 Focus group discussion 
To get an initial overview of the issues, community meetings were held, followed by more 
focused discussions in interest-based groups (see Annex 2). Timelines, institutional mapping, 
resource maps, and ranking were developed and carried out in these focus groups. Some of 
the issues discussed in the groups were later followed up with key informant interviews. A 
checklist of questions prepared beforehand was used to guide the focus group discussions.  
The choice of semi-structured rather than structured interviews offered flexibility when 
conducting interviews. 
The focus group interactions allowed group members to challenge, support, clarify, and 
discuss their views, providing a rich source of information.  One disadvantage was that in 
some cases, the views of newcomers were discounted by the locals because they were 
considered not to know the history of the area. As a result, some people kept quiet during 
discussions. Frequently in such encounters, the voices of those who have long been resident 
in the area prevail over the opinions of newcomers (Ochs & Capps, 2002; Weinberg, 2002). 
                                                          
18 Over 90% of the population is literate (CSO, 2012). 
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As aptly noted by Adichie (2009), this gives rise to calls of the “dangers of a single story” where 
one view overrides others. As a pragmatic and methodological solution to the problem that 
men tend to be domineering in public discussions, men and women were separated during 
community meetings in order to get the views of the two groups (Sithole, 2000). Soliciting the 
views of the non-dominant community members provided different views to those of the 
dominant groups.  
In addition, participants who did not actively participate during group discussions were 
targeted with follow-up interviews. This was in accordance with recommendations by 
MacLure et al., (2010) who submit that the silence of subordinate people agitates the 
researcher and requires a deliberation of the meanings imbued in the silence. Follow-up 
interviews were organised with the silent informants, yielding insightful information 
especially regarding the inequalities in access to natural products between newcomers and 
locals.   
3.2.2 Key informant interviews 
At the local level, baobab product harvesters, craft weavers, traders, Ward Environmental 
Management Committee members, Ward Councillors, traditional leaders, and those who had 
been arrested for violating local rules were interviewed as key informants (see Annex 1). 
Process movers were also identified and interviewed19. 
Staff from the Department of Agricultural Extension and Technical Services (Agritex) were 
interviewed as they help to manage the environment through their responsibility for crop 
production. Representatives from institutions at district, provincial, and national levels that 
are directly responsible for managing natural resources were interviewed to get an 
impression of policy issues. To get insight into the state’s efforts to promote customary 
practices, the District Officer for Culture in the Ministry of Education and Culture was 
interviewed.  At the national level, staff from the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, and buyers of 
baobab products provided useful information on the baobab value chain. 
                                                          
19The concept of process movers is used in community based conservation and development projects. It refers 
to leaders who are at the forefront of initiating development (Meffe et al, 2002). 
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3.2.3 Resource maps 
Resource maps were drawn separately by men and by women to show the distribution of 
natural resources such as baobabs, and complementary trees such as Berchemia spp and 
Acacia spp from which dye is extracted. The maps were developed into tenure maps that 
showed the ownership of baobab trees located in the study site. The resource and tenure 
maps later helped in the sampling of trees for the ecological survey. Tenure maps have been 
known to provide useful information that can be used for ecological surveys (Nemarundwe & 
Richards, 2002).  
3.2.4 Timelines 
Timelines were used to show temporal trends in the use, rules, and actors involved in using 
baobab products. The year 1980 – the year of Zimbabwe’s independence – was used as a 
benchmark as most people remembered it clearly. Ten-year time periods were used to 
analyse the changes. Each decade was characterized by a phenomenon that most informants 
were familiar with i.e., 1980-1990 (makore erusununguko – independence); 1990-2000 (the 
period when the country adopted the World Bank supported Economic Structural Adjustment 
Program); 2000-2010 (Hondo yemindanema Bearer cheques – land reform and use of bearer 
cheques20); and 2010 onwards (makore ema USA – years when the country started using the 
US dollar as a currency of trade). The year 2022 (ten years after the survey was carried out) 
was used to depict the future.  Information gathered from timelines was further corroborated 
with oral testimonies taken from elderly people in the study site. This was done to remove an 
inherent weakness of timelines which arises from informants providing inaccurate accounts 
or distorting them for ulterior motives (Nemarundwe & Richards, 2002).   
3.2.5 Oral histories 
Oral histories were used as a basis for understanding historical trends in natural resource use 
in the study area. They showed changes in resource use and critical decision-making paths 
over time. Related to this was the documentation of songs, folklore, idioms, and proverbs 
                                                          
20Due to hyperinflation in Zimbabwe from the mid-2000s, the country started to use high denomination bearer 
cheques which had expiry dates instead of the normal currency. The highest denomination ever used this time 
was a $100 trillion note. 
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that relate to the baobab-human nexus, to capture cultural practices and values related to 
baobab use and management. A key feature of the Shona people of which the Ndaus and 
Garwes are subsets is the figurative use of language and folklore (Nemarundwe, 2000).  
People who are deemed knowledgeable about the area, and about the history of settlement 
and the use of baobab products, were interviewed to generate case histories. This included 
headmen, village heads and their aides (makota), and village elders.  A noted limitation was 
that informants could deliberately or unintentionally distort historical facts. Triangulation of 
stories with other methods, such as the review of historical records at the National Archives, 
was carried out to address this potential problem.  
3.2.6 Institutional mapping 
To understand the institutions21 that are involved in regulating use of baobab products, Venn 
diagrams were used. Circles were used to depict the perceived influence of the different 
institutions. The bigger the circle, the more influential the institution. The nature of the 
relationships between institutions was shown by the closeness and degree of overlap of the 
circles. The Venn diagrams gave a visual impression of the relationship between institutions 
responsible for the governance of natural resources in the study site.  
3.2.7 Ranking and scoring 
A process of scoring was carried out in order to determine informants’ perceptions about the 
relative importance of different livelihood options and natural resources. Scoring enables 
natural resource evaluation and encourages informants to make choices and then evaluate 
them (Hot Springs Report, 1995; Nemarundwe & Richards, 2002). Counters (stones) were 
used to depict the perceived relative importance of each of the variables under study (Tables 
16, 17, 18, and 19). The stones were placed against each variable after group members had 
reached consensus on their relative weight. Reasons given for the weighting pattern were 
captured. After scoring, the variables were ranked according to the weight attributed to each 
one. For scoring and ranking, mixed groups of men and women were used. This was informed 
                                                          
21 Institutions denote stakeholders or bodies that regulate access as opposed to institutional arrangements 
which are the rules of the game (after Uphoff, 1986).  
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by the observation of Nemarundwe and Richards (2002) that mixed groups usually result in 
more informed relative ordering. 
3.2.8 Participant observation 
Participant observation was used to understand people’s lives and circumstances first hand 
(Weinberg, 2002). Having grown up in the area, I was also able to draw on insights from my 
own knowledge of the study site22. Participant observation can prove to be more reliable than 
interviews as informants can leave out sensitive information during discussions. In my case, 
because I had first-hand experience and knowledge of the study site, I knew things that were 
important for the study that were regarded as the dullest of platitudes to informants. Some 
informants treated some of their practices as mundane and therefore did not bother to report 
on them – “iwe hauzvizivi here zvatagaratichiita (surely you know about this common 
practice, you are from around).”  
Time in the forest was spent with resource harvesters, observing their harvesting trends and 
preferences for fruits and fibre, the main baobab products. I also attended traditional village 
courts (dare), funerals, social gatherings, environmental and agriculture subcommittee 
meetings, and meetings of the full Chimanimani District Council, in order to appreciate how 
baobab-related issues were articulated in those arenas. Impromptu spaces such as barbeque 
venues at shopping centres also yielded very useful information, especially regarding illegal 
activities like the harvesting of bark from trees in sacred areas. It was at these informal 
gatherings that I learned a good deal about the leadership feuds among the Gudyanga family. 
Earlier attempts to engage concerned parties about the issue had yielded very little 
information.   
Yet some of these practices were shrouded in secrecy, only known to those in the business of 
harvesting and selling baobab products like fibre. As remarked Mr. J - a renowned bark 
harvester from Nyanyadzi, “you might be familiar with this area but when it comes to the 
finer details of how we do our trade, we will have to explain things to you. You are like a 
learned medical doctor who has to ask his uneducated patient about the illness in order to 
                                                          
22 Participant observation is a term used to refer to a situation where the researcher is also a participant in the 
process under study Sadomba, (2008). 
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come up with the correct prescription”. Being referred to as an “outsider” by some informants 
because I now spend most of my time in Harare, was a constant reminder for me to view 
things through my researcher lens in order to remain objective. As argued by Pollner and 
Emerson (1988), even though the researcher is enmeshed in the local matrix of meanings of 
the researched, a ‘tap” on the back will always remind the researcher that s/he is an outsider 
who has to learn from the locals!  
3.2.9 Documentary evidence 
Documentary evidence served as a method of cross triangulating information gathered from 
interviews and observations. Grey literature was also reviewed to get a historical overview of 
governance issues in Zimbabwe. Official and unofficial documents and records pertaining to 
governance systems in Zimbabwe and baobab use were analysed. Such documents included 
letters, memoranda, agendas, study reports, or any items that could add to the data base 
(Tellis, 1997).  In this study, most of the above were relevant and available, since some work 
had already been done in the area on the ecology (Moyo, 1995; Mudavanhu, 1998), marketing 
(Hot Springs working group, 1995; Kwaramba, 1995; Mutasa, 2008), and institutional 
arrangements for bark products (Mukamuri & Kozanayi, 1999; Chibisa & Rwizi, 2009).  
Chimanimani was one of the first districts of present day Zimbabwe to be settled by whites 
and the history of the area is well documented (Latham, 1966; Sinclair, 1971; Meredith, 1976; 
Mapira, 2006; MacGonagle, 2007; Perman, 2008).  Newspaper clippings were also collected, 
mainly from the provincial tabloid, Manica Post, in order to get insights into how the media 
reported on the baobab value chain.  The National Archives of Zimbabwe and the Mutare 
Museum also had significant collections of documents on the history of the study sites. 
Another important source of data was levy and fines records at the Chimanimani District 
Council. These records provided insights into how compliant residents were with the state’s 
tax regimes and other regulatory frameworks.  
For the purpose of the study a review of policy documents, Acts of Parliament, political party 
manifestoes, and pronouncements by politicians, especially in newspapers was carried out. 
In Zimbabwe, it is characteristic for political leaders to announce policy statements in 
newspapers before they are officially gazetted (Sithole et al., 2001). It was important for the 
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research to monitor national policy and opinion on the relevant issues, since national 
institutions have an influence at local level.  
3.2.10 Snowball sampling 
Informants involved in illegal activities such as the harvesting of baobab fibre in sacred areas, 
were understandably reluctant to discuss their operations with me. Locating these informants 
was a challenge, yet they provided valuable insights into how local customary practices had 
broken down. In this case the snowball sampling method was used.  Snowball sampling 
(Biernacki & Waldorf, 1981), also known as chain referral sampling or rhizome sampling 
(Stehlik, 1999), is used to reach informants whose formal or informal network connections 
make them elusive. The key was to identify the gatekeepers of the trade23. These gatekeepers 
were able to identify key members of their group who could help to identify other members. 
Members of a secret group felt confident to discuss their trade with me if I had been referred 
by a fellow group member.  The snowball method was also used to identify key informants. 
For example, one cross border craft trader gave me contact numbers for other cross border 
traders, and I was able to interview one of these members. 
3.3 Quantitative methods 
Household and ecological surveys were carried out using quantitative methods. Enumerators 
helped to administer both surveys. 
3.3.1 Household surveys 
A household questionnaire survey (Annex 9) was administered to capture the quantities of 
products harvested by household members. The survey followed the group meetings. The 
profiles of various resource users were also captured in the survey, as well as resource users’ 
knowledge of and adherence to customary systems.  
                                                          
23 These are people who occupy important positions within qualitative social work research and their 
engagement with research is crucial to the ongoing development of a useable knowledge base (Clark, 2010). 





The selection of villages for the survey in Nyanyadzi and Gudyanga wards was done on the 
basis of the level of baobab activity and the accessibility of the villages. A community meeting 
with local residents helped rank the villages in terms of the level of baobab harvesting 
activities.   
The village of Jinga was chosen for two reasons: first, to build on earlier work done in the area 
in 1993/94 and 1997/98; and second because of the conspicuous absence of the commercial 
use of baobab despite there being many baobab trees in the area.  
3.3.2 Sampling of households 
Three hundred and thirty-six households were sampled for the survey, using stratified 
random sampling. The village heads’ (masabhuku – the book keepers) household registers 
were used. However, the registers had some names that did not qualify to be proper 
households. These were households created for the purpose of receiving free handouts from 
the government or from humanitarian organisations. Such people included newly married 
couples still staying with the groom’s parents and single mothers still staying with their 
parents. Both types not only get most of their provisions from their parents, but also pool 
their efforts into the parents’ portfolio of livelihoods options.  Thus, the “Christian Care village 
registers”24 had to be reviewed before identifying names for the household survey.  
Reviewing the registers was done by going through them with village elders who knew the 
households in each particular village. A household is generally defined as people who cook 
and eat under the same roof and pool their resources for the benefit of all members.  
According to local custom, a couple qualifies as an independent household if the couple:  
has observed the ritual of kubikiswa (performed by an aunt of the husband to officially wean 
the couple into an independent household); and is paying head tax to the government, has 
been allocated their own residential place by the village head, and has brewed beer (doro 
rechiutsi) to signal that they are now entitled to start their own cooking fire. 
                                                          
24 Most village registers and some of the emerging village heads are colloquially termed Christian Care registers 
or village heads to denote that they are created solely for purposes of accessing free handouts from this NGO. 
Christian Care is one of the NGOs that distribute free food hand outs in the study area.  
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 I used the customary definition of household and disregarded anyone who did not meet the 
above criteria. Cavendish (1997) used a similar approach in a household survey in south 
eastern Zimbabwe. This definition resonates well with that used in most livelihood surveys 
(Ellis, 1998a; Campbell et al., 2001).  
The formula by Krejcie and Morgan, (1970) was used to determine sample size. A total of 336 











Where n = sample size; N = Total population size; d = Precision level (margin of error); Z = 
Number of standard deviation units of the sampling distribution corresponding to the desired 
confidence level; and P = Population proportion.  
When considering the size of the representative sample, the level of precision was also taken 
into consideration. The standard for precision level (d) and the standard deviation units (Z) 
desired are 5% and 1.96 respectively. The precision level corresponds to the margin of error 
of the results while the standard deviation corresponds to a 95% confidence level. The 
population proportion should be set at 0.5.   
Household names were recorded in a random manner before sampling. The systematic 
random sampling method was used with households selected from each of the villages in 
proportion to the total number of households. A household was randomly picked near the 
top of the list, and then every Xth name was selected after that – X being the 3rd, 5th, 9th, or 
whatever number was needed to get the correct sample size. Table 1 shows the sample size 




Table 1: Number of sampled households 
Village Name Village No Sample Population 
Jinga 1 118 1322 
Gudyanga 2 13 122 
Dirikwe 3 54 509 
Masasi 4 22 207 
Nechikwira 5 14 132 
Chishakwe 6 7 66 
Makotamo 7 12 113 
Muzviziyi 8 38 358 
Ngaazwane 9 18 170 
Muchandinesa 10 27 254 




                                              Source: Field data and village registers 
At household level, the target was the household head because s/he would be knowledgeable 
about the activities of the household. However, if the household head or spouse was away, 
any member of the household who was over 18 years of age was eligible to be a respondent. 
To answer some of the questions that required recall - for example, the amount of products 
harvested during the previous year - the respondent could ask other members of the 
household to assist. 
3.3.3 Stratification of wealth classes 
The stratification of households into wealth classes is usually done as part of the analysis of 
household data gathered in conventional surveys (Scoones, 1995). Households were stratified 
into wealth classes using the quantitative method of principle component analysis (Campbell 
et al., 2002b). To create wealth classes I considered ownership of such assets as livestock, 
income from formal and informal employment, as well as the type of house owned. Access to 
a plot in the irrigation scheme was also considered. Ownership of such a plot guarantees food 
security for a household, as well as providing surplus produce that can be sold to generate 
income. The inclusion of these variables in allocating households to specific wealth classes is 
informed by the fact that the rural economy is based on access to a range of assets and 
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resources, unlike the urban economy which is usually based on income from formal economic 
activity. According to Scoones (2009), the rural economy is made up of many aspects – it is a 
bricolage.25 
A separate wealth ranking was done through a qualitative method in group meetings by local 
residents. Variables considered for differentiating the households included ownership of 
livestock, employment status, and type of houses (Annex 6). Wealth ranking provides an 
accurate indicator of relative wealth among community members (Scoones, 1995).   
3.3.4 Market survey 
A market survey was carried out along a section of highway to get a deeper understanding of 
the typology of people involved in selling baobab products at the roadside. A total of 37 
traders selling crafts and fruits along the Mutare-Birchenough Bridge highway between the 
Rufaro Business Centre in Nyanyadzi and Changadzi River (the southern boundary of 
Gudyanga) were interviewed in June 2013. June is the peak of the market for fruit and fibre 
products as all agricultural activities are over by this time, except for people with plots in the 
irrigation schemes. A checklist of questions was used for this interview (Annex 5). The results 
were analysed using Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS). 
3.4 Ecological survey 
To assess the level and pattern of bark and fruit harvesting from trees under different 
property rights regimes, an ecological survey was done. The tree tenure survey was carried 
out from April to May 2011. Samples were randomly chosen from a list of identified tenure 
systems. Transects were 0.5 km long, perpendicular to the main highway that passes through 
the study site. Harvesters of baobab products participated in the initial phase of the survey. 
Their main role was to indicate the different dates on which trees were harvested so that 
estimates could be made of the age of a bark scar.  
                                                          
25 French term which means “making do with whatever is available” and denotes the multiplicity of livelihood 
options adopted by local people. A distinction is made between economic and institutional bricolage (Section 
2.5.4, page 31) in that the former means various economic activities pursed while the later relates to the gamut 




The frequency of debarking, the extent of debarking (for example rings around and up the 
tree), the impact of debarking on the trees, and the capacity of the trees to produce fruit were 
measured. Tree physiology in terms of girth and height was also measured (Annexes 3 and 4). 
The occurrence of black soot disease was understood to indicate that the affected tree had 
been stressed due to the overharvesting of bark which predisposed it to infection. Specific 
details on how the different measurements were done are given below. 
3.4.1 Fruit count and other variables 
Fruit and bark are the two main consumable products of the baobab tree that are harvested 
for domestic and commercial use. Fruit count was estimated to the nearest 10th. Fruits on 
the tree as well as those on the ground were counted. Fruit counting was done at a time when 
harvesting was just starting.  
A health index and the impact of harvesting were measured using a visual assessment. A 
score, based on pre-determined classes, was allocated for each variable.  Table 2 gives a 












Table 2: Codes for ecological tree survey 
Indicator Scale Justification 
Index of 
health 
1. Good – no black soot diseases 
2. Poor – early signs of black soot 
3. Very poor – the whole tree has 
black soot disease 
Black soot is an indication of excessive 
stress partly attributable to extensive 
debarking26 
Diseased trees do not produce usable 




1. Good – provides good quality, 
first-cut fibre (mutanguro) 
2. Poor – second--cut fibre 
(mupindwa) 
3. Tree cannot be used for fibre 
for example diseased, hollow 
or rugged surface. 
Bark fibre is an important product used 
in craft production, therefore its 
availability sustains the craft industry 
Heavily debarked trees produce 






1. Nil – not debarked at all 
2. Mild – not debarked all round 
3. Severe – debarked all around 
4. Very severe – debarked more 
than one rung 
Debarked portions require two years 
healing time 
Severely debarked trees can 
potentially succumb to black soot 
disease  
Intensity of debarking is an indication 




1. Privately owned – at and 
around homesteads 
2. Sacred sites – sites for 
graveyards, rituals, and 
worshipping 
3. Communally owned – crop 
fields, grazing areas, 
mountains, and forests 
4. State – along main road, 
college, Zimbabwe Republic 
Police Camp 
Tenure defines access 
Sacred sites are worth studying on 
account of the centrality of sacredness 
in the belief systems and natural 
resource management systems of the 
people in the study areas. 
Additionally, this tenure system merits 
investigation on account of the fact 
that it can be proxy for the 
effectiveness of customary systems. 
                                                          
26 To assess tree health, the occurrence of black soot disease was considered as an indication that the affected 




3.4.2 Tree height and circumference 
The circumference of each tree was measured at Breast Height (DBH) (1.3m) using a 50m 
tape. The height of each tree was estimated to the closest 1m using a graduated 14m pole. 
For baobabs that were more than 14m tall, the heights were visually estimated. This method 
of measuring has been used in similar situations (Mpofu et al., 2012).   
3.4.3 Number of trees sampled by tenure 
A total of 245 trees (Table 3) were surveyed, of which 23.3% were from Jinga and 76.7% were 
from the Nyanyadzi cluster. In terms of tenure, the bulk of the trees were from privately-
owned land (40.8%), followed by communal areas (35.1%), and 24.1% were from state owned 
land, while only two trees were found in sacred areas. The number of sacred trees was 
numerically insignificant and they were therefore disregarded in the tenurial analysis.   
Table 3:  Number of surveyed trees by tenure 
Tenure type No. of sampled trees % 
Private 100 40.8 
Communal 86 35.1 
State 59 24.1 
Sacred 2 (left out of analysis) 
Total 245 100 
Source: Field data 
3.5 Analysis of quantitative and ecological data 
3.5.1 ANOVA 
For all variables of sustainability, mean values and their standard deviations were calculated 
(see Tables 3 and 4). In order to test for differences in tree height, DBH, number of fruits, 
number of harvests, area harvested, and years since the last harvest, one-way analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) was performed. Tukey´s post-hoc tests were computed to determine 
specific characteristics of each tenure system and how these different tenure systems 
compared with one another.  A similar process was done for Jinga village and the Nyanyadzi 
clusters to ascertain cross-site differences. Transformations were used where necessary in 
order to improve normality of error and homogeneity of variance. Normality of error was 
checked graphically and homogeneity of variance was checked both graphically and using a 
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Levene test. Statistical analyses were carried out using Statistica (Statistica 7, Stat Soft Inc., 
Tulsa, USA). 
T-test 
Unpaired T-tests were used to determine the effect of a cluster (village) on tree characteristics 
(height, DBH, and black soot disease).  Differences between Jinga village and Nyanyadzi 
clusters were assessed using student T-tests.  
Chi² test  
To test the relationship between the type of land tenure and use pattern across the Jinga 
village and Nyanyadzi clusters, a Chi² test was carried out with Statistica (Statistica 7, Stat Soft 
Inc., Tulsa, USA). Additionally, the corrected contingency coefficient (Ccorr) was calculated 
after Köhler et al. (2007) as an estimate for the strength of the relationship: 
 
Ccorr = weighted measure for the strength of the relationship between parameter A 
and B 
Χ² = unweighted measure for the strength of the relationship between parameter A and 
B 
m = number of categories in the parameter with less categories 
N = sample size (total) 
The coefficient ranges from 0.0 to 1.0 (i.e., no to maximum relationship between the two 
factors). 
Χ² also measures the strength of the relationship between the two parameters but it is 
unweighted, i.e., its maximum value depends on the sample size and group distributions. 
Therefore, one cannot say how strong the relationship is by looking at the Χ² value only, or by 
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comparing different test results (for example the effect of tenureship on the impact on stems 
and branches, respectively). In contrast, Ccorr can be compared between different analyses 
and works in a way that is similar to a percentage value (for example, 0.8 being equivalent to 
an 80% relationship between tenure and the impact on the stems). An assessment of the 
impact of harvesting on stems, branches, and fibre provision, as well as tree health within the 
three land tenure systems, was carried out using a Chi2 analysis.  
Spearman's rank correlation coefficient was used to identify whether two variables relate in 
a monotonic function (that is an increase in one variable results in a decrease in another, or 
vice-versa). Examples included the number of bark harvests and the impact of this on 
branches.  
3.5.2 Analysis of data from the household and market questionnaires 
Household survey data was captured in Microsoft Access and analysed using Statistical 
Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) version 16. T tests for comparisons between two sites and 
groups were done.  
3.5.3 Analysis of qualitative data 
Data analysis involves a search for patterns in data-recurrent behaviours, objects, or a body 
of knowledge. Once a pattern is identified, it is interpreted in terms of social theory or the 
setting in which it occurs (Neumann, 1997). A body of data, especially from qualitative 
research, was gathered in this study and needed careful analysis.   
For qualitative data, matrices, tabulation of frequencies, temporal schemes, and mind maps 
were used to initiate the analysis and draw out common themes. The research used a 
grounded theory approach to build up a theoretical framework of baobab governance based 
on findings emerging from the data. Data analysis itself started with data coding. Codes are 
tags or labels for assigning meaning to the descriptive or inferential information compiled 
during a study. Coding entailed organising data into categories on the basis of themes, 
concepts, or shared features.  
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3.6 Community entry and observing protocol 
“To the Jews I became a Jew, in order to win Jews. To those under the law I became like one 
under the law (though I myself not under the law), so as to win those under the law” – 1 
Corinthians 9:20 
3.6.1 Seeking approval 
Although I originate from the study area, getting accepted by the community was not 
automatic. Certain protocols had to be observed to meet the expectations of the traditional 
leadership and political authorities.  
For the traditional system, the protocol entailed presenting my proposal to a council of 
traditional leaders in both Nyanyadzi and Jinga. In Nyanyadzi, at the end of the introductory 
deliberations, headman K motivated that my study be supported, “Saka vanaMutape, mwana 
arikuti taurirai varidzivenzvimbo kuti abate imbwadzawo kutimwanaaone kuhambe 
chakanaka mubasa rake” (so, village heads, supplicate for the spirits of the land so that they 
do not lead the researcher in harm’s way). A “research permit" fee in the form of groceries 
was paid to the headmen. Even after being granted permission to do field work from the 
traditional leaders I was still expected to pay homage to the village heads. This involved doing 
the rhythmic clapping of hands (kukwidzemaoko kudare) as per tradition before giving them 
updates on my field work.  
With government, approval to carry out research was first sought at the Chimanimani Rural 
District Council (CRDC) and then at ward level. In addition, in view of the political upheaval 
that had taken place in the country in 2008, the security forces had to be kept informed of 
field research activities. Upon notifying the police at Nyanyadzi that I had verbal permission 
from the CRDC as the responsible authority for the district to carry out my research, I was 
advised that I had to go back to the CRDC and get a stamped letter of authorisation. Even 
after lodging a copy of my proposal, the permit from the CRDC, and an official letter from the 
University of Cape Town (see Annexes 7 and 8) at the Nyanyadzi police station, personnel 
from the Police Internal Security Intelligence (PISI) would not allow me to go ahead with the 
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research before submitting the same documents to them.  PISI is an arm of the police force 
and is also stationed at the Nyanyadzi Police station. 
Throughout the research process, the security police notified all key stakeholders, including 
politicians, of any fieldwork activity well in advance. Despite my strict adherence to the 
required protocol, PISI remained mistrustful.  On one occasion I was asked by a security officer 
about the significance of an open palm (symbol for the opposition Movement for Democratic 
Change) on the logo on my letter from the Environmental Evaluation Unit at the University of 
Cape Town! 
3.6.2 Selection of enumerators 
A total of five enumerators were selected to administer the household questionnaire and take 
ecological measurements. All had attained at least four years of secondary school education. 
The case for the involvement of local people as co-researchers in environmental research has 
long been advocated by some scholars (e.g. Sithole, 2000; Gearheard & Shirley, 2007; Garnett 
et al., 2009). Inter alia, the involvement of locals as paid core researchers ensures knowledge 
transfer, an increased likelihood that recommendations will be adopted, and is an investment 
in local intellectual property (Garnett et al., 2009).  
In Nyanyadzi, all the enumerators were once active craft makers and therefore were 
conversant with some of the baobab activities under study. Additionally, one of the field 
assistants had participated in previous baobab research surveys carried out in the area. This 
prior knowledge about the value chain proved useful as the enumerators were quick to 
comprehend the contents of the survey. In Jinga, both enumerators were men, one of them 
a grandson of the village head and the other a trainee primary school teacher who was the 
son of a retired school head teacher. The involvement of enumerators from such respected 
households in Jinga resulted in positive responses from informants, while in Nyanyadzi the 




3.6.3 Ethics and feedback 
The research project applied the Code of Ethics of the International Society of Ethnobiology 
(ISE), 2006 (http://ise.arts.ubc.ca/global_coalition/ethics.php, accessed 23rd June 2009). This 
code recognises the importance of traditional and customary laws, protocols, and 
methodologies within communities where collaborative research is proposed. This is in line 
with the philosophy of PRA techniques proposed for data collection. 
The field work was also guided by ethical processes required by the University of Cape Town, 
which, like the ISE, require the researcher to respect local traditions and seek consent from 
the informants before collecting any data.  Prior consent had to be sought from the 
informants before any photographs were taken. The purpose of the study was explained to 
informants, first at community meetings as part of the entry process, and second before each 
discussion or interview. Informants were also guaranteed the confidentiality of their 
responses and identity.  
With prior consent of informants, a tape recorder was used to record discussions. Use of a 
tape recorder ensured the smooth flow of discussions because it did not interrupt either the 
researcher or the respondent. The tape recorder was used in instances when interviews were 
conducted and writing notes was impossible, for example when walking in the forest. Some 
researchers (e.g. Kohn, 1997; Tellis, 1997) have used tape recorders successfully where 
respondents had to give detailed accounts of events or an expression of their views and 
feelings. Otherwise, discussions were captured verbatim in order to correctly capture the 
words and emotions of the informants.   
I attended meetings of the environmental and agricultural subcommittee meetings in 
Chimanimani in order to give feedback on my study. Routine feedback was also given to 
relevant government offices at Chimanimani District, notably the FC, EMA, and RDC natural 
resources. At the local level, traditional leaders, ward councillors, the police, and resource 
harvesters were always appraised of my research activities. 
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Feedback or recap meetings to validate collected data were carried out before the next 
episode of field activity27.  
3.7 Limitations and challenges faced during field work 
At the time of the fieldwork, there was a leadership feud in Nyanyadzi, and there were 
accusations and counter-accusations about witchcraft within the ruling Gudyanga clan. This 
affected my research in that there were times when I could not bring local leaders together 
for group discussions. At the beginning of the fieldwork there was also a lot of censure by the 
local police. 
In Jinga, the challenge was that of recent newcomers (vanhuvekuuya) having their 
contributions at group meetings being discounted by the locals (agariemuno) who claimed 
that the former could not talk with authority about governance issues in the area due to their 
lack of historical depth.    
District level officials were reluctant to open up during discussions especially when issues 
involved politicians for fear of reprisals and victimization. I always reminded myself, 
“UrimuGarwe iwewe, unozviziya zvinoitikamuno” – you are from the Garwe people so you 
know how sensitive it is to discuss these things. Therefore, officials became “reluctant 
respondents” for fear of reprisals by the government. This was consistent with what Gokah 
(2006) observed in sub-Saharan Africa, that policy officers shy away from policy issues for fear 
of political repercussions, and of being labelled as anti-government. I circumvented this 
problem by engaging with the officials individually outside their offices. 
A problem that arose from doing research in a community that I grew up in is what Neumann 
(1997) called social desirability bias. Neumann noted that respondents can experience social 
pressure (that is being a neighbour’s research subject), and may end up over-reporting or 
under-reporting the true situation as they try to present a positive image of themselves. To 
                                                          
27 In Nyanyadzi, one village head used information from the National Archives I shared with him about the 
genealogy of the ruling family to build a case to be installed as the next headman after the death of the 
incumbent headman in the area. This adversely affected my research as other village heads’ view was that I was 
getting entangled in the local leadership feud and taking sides. So, I had to share the same information with the 
rest of the village heads in order to ensure transparency.  
58 
 
deal with this problem, I spent time explaining the purpose of the research programme, and 
that I had carried out research on baobab products earlier on (1993 and 1998/1999). 
New evidence on research methodologies questions Neumann’s notion of social desirability 
pressure.  According to Monahan and Fisher (2010: 357), informants’ performances, whether 
“staged or self-censored for, or influenced by the observer, often reveal profound truths 
about social and/or cultural phenomena”. Being an insider in the research has advantages 
(Unluer, 2012) can be capitalized on. In my case, due to the tense political situation at the 
time of the field work, I drew on my social capital. For example, I share the same totem (Moyo-
heart) with the Gumbu of Nyanyadzi so they considered me to be one of their family members 
and it allayed any fear they had about my studies28. Further, as someone who grew up in the 
study site, I was able to understand local metaphors and nuances, so I did not lose the 
meaning of responses from informants.  I also knew how to ask sensitive questions without 
being offensive.  
As for me, having grown up in the area, the likelihood of being judgmental rather than 
objective was high. As aptly captured by Mamdani (1999: 859), “my origin would betray my 
views”. Remaining objective while doing field work was at times a challenge, especially in 
Jinga village due to my familiarity with the informants and the local context. First, even though 
I had been working in Harare for 20 years, I grew up in the area so I had some knowledge, 
perceptions, and biases about some of the things I was researching. Second, I had worked for 
the Southern Africa For Indigenous Resources (SAFIRE), an NGO that had provided leadership 
capacity training for some of the local traditional leaders. I had also interacted with district 
and national level policy makers in previous deliberations on governance and natural resource 
governance. For example, I had written and presented a policy brief on the 
“Commercialization of Non Timber Forest Products” to legislators from the Environment and 
                                                          
28For example, headman K used his own car to attend most of my meetings with traditional leaders in order to 
support another of the Gumbu member. That local people were ready to support me was consistent with Borkert 
and De Tona’s (2006) work that informants are usually more willing to share information with someone they 
readily identify with.  
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Natural Resources portfolio29. From these experiences, I had generated my own views from 
development work. 
To deal with these challenges, I spent long periods living among respondents in order to gain 
their trust. In addition, I used the concept of reflexivity (Ahern, 1999) as a quality control 
measure in qualitative research (Berger, 2013). It entails a critical reflection on the 
researcher’s own position and views and how this affects his or her interpretation of the 
research results (Berger, 2013). As part of the reflexive method, I kept a diary of daily plans 
and reflections on what happened. Any presuppositions I had before carrying out fieldwork 
were written down in advance. Feedback sessions with informants also helped to correct any 
biases I might have had. In addition, phases where I stepped out of field work to compile data 
helped me reflect more critically about the way I was carrying out my research. Lastly, using 
a theoretical framework to understand my findings helped me to construct and restructure 
views in a more detached manner. 
3.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the research methodology and methods that were used to 
generate data and interrogate the research problem.  A case study approach was used in 
order to get an in-depth understanding of the issues being researched. Qualitative and 
quantitative methods were used to gather data. The choice of research methods was 
informed by the study objectives and its grounded theory approach. An analysis of historical 
records from the National Archives and newspapers, participant observations, and key 
informant interviews were other methods used to gather data. Key informants interviewed 
included users of the different baobab products, traditional and government leaders, and 
members of staff of NGOs working in the area (Annex 1). 
Quantitative methods included an ecological survey to examine the relationship between 
different indicators of ecological sustainability and different tenure regimes. A total of 245 
trees was examined.  A detailed household survey to determine the socio-economic status of 
                                                          
29Presentations were made to the Natural Resources Portfolio Committee at the Meikles hotel and then at the 
Parliament of Zimbabwe. The then Member of Parliament from Chimanimani was part of the Portfolio 
Committee (SAFIRE, 2010). 
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the resource harvesters as well harvesters’ knowledge and observations of both customary 
and statutory systems of governance, was also administered. A total of 336 household survey 
questionnaires was administered. The researcher also drew insights from his own experience 
after having grown up in the study area and having carried out research in the area more than 
a decade ago.   
The use of multiple qualitative and quantitative research methods added rigor to the study. 
It also helped with interdisciplinary dimensions, given the focus on governance, livelihoods 
and ecology. Time spent in the field helped me understand nuances about the issues but what 
helped more were the reflection sessions I had away from the field. Taking breaks from field 
work enabled me to critically reflect on my research methodology and emerging results.  
Lastly, building good rapport with informants, drawing on my own social and totemic 












                                                          
30 Makamure and Vengesai (2015:9) Relations based on a mystical or ritual bond of unity within the group. The 
totem serves as the emblem of the family or clan. In prehistoric societies, totems were key symbols of religion 
and social cohesion; they were also important tools for cultural and educational transmission. 
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CHAPTER 4: NATURAL RESOURCE GOVERNANCE IN ZIMBABWE 
This chapter provides an overview of the trajectory of natural resource management regimes 
in Zimbabwe, from precolonial times to the present day, highlighting the impact of statutory 
forms of governance on customary practices in the management of natural resources in 
communal areas. A review is provided of the use of customary practices in the management 
of natural resources during three identified time periods: pre-colonial, colonial, and post-
colonial. National policies and programmes that have had a bearing on the use and 
management of natural resources are also discussed. This overview serves as a bedrock to 
understanding the interplay between customary and statutory forms of resource governance 
at the local level. By looking at nationwide governance processes, I locate the interaction of 
local practices and macro level processes to ascertain the overall effect on governance at the 
local level.  I pick up on this debate in Chapter 7 where I use empirical evidence to show how 
the interplay between customary and statutory forms of governance has played out in the 
management of the baobab tree.  
4.1 Historical overview of customary practices 
A historical discussion of the interaction between traditional authorities (TAs) and the state 
in Zimbabwe is appropriate to understand the changing roles of customary practices in the 
governance of natural resources in communal areas. The interaction between the state and 
traditional authorities has a knock-on effect on customary practices over which the traditional 
authorities preside. Such customary practices have been used to manage natural resources 
since the pre-colonial period. 
4.1.1 Pre-colonial period 
Prior to colonial rule in Zimbabwe in 1890, villages and chiefdoms with clearly defined 
boundaries existed as political entities presided over by traditional authorities (Moyana, 
1984). At the time, in the African cosmology, important natural resources were viewed as 
God-given and had no marketable value (Moyana, 1984). The prevailing land tenure system 
vested land rights in a community and superseded the rights of any individual. The chief 
served as a trustee who allocated land to newcomers and locals and ensured that these 
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allocations were in harmony with the traditional land tenure system (Moyana, 1984; Mawere, 
2013). Other natural resources found on the land were shared communally, for the 
sustenance of life. It was the duty of every community member to manage the resources 
found on the land (Moyana, 1984).It was on this basis that traditional rules and customary 
practices on the governance of natural resources were framed. Traditional authorities as 
guardians of customary practices have remained part of the cultural heritage of the African 
people. The rootedness of traditional authorities in the pre-colonial past gives them 
legitimacy that is more readily recognised by local people than is modern state power (Dore, 
2001; Gondo et al., 2010; Mawere et al., 2014).   
 A myriad of customary practices based on taboos, folklore, sacredness, and totemism were 
used to manage natural resources in pre-colonial times (Mawere, 2013). These practices have 
been passed on from generation to generation as part of the African cultural identity. Through 
the passage of time, due to the interaction with western conservation practices, such 
customary practices have changed. The arrival of whites in 1890 in Zimbabwe, and the 
subsequent establishment of the British colonial system of governance, marked the first 
phase in the reshaping of such practices. 
4.1.2 Colonial period 
The formalisation of traditional forms of governance started in earnest in 1923 when a 
Department of Native Affairs (DNA) was set up by the colonial government.  The department 
specifically dealt with issues affecting Africans31. Notably, it became responsible for 
maintaining law and order among Africans, collecting taxes on behalf of the government, and 
recruiting rural Africans for labour in the emerging mining and farming economy (Chimuka, 
2001).   
The role of TAs as key elements in the execution of the role of the Department of Native 
Affairs created a fundamental paradigm shift in their role in the politics of the country. 
Henceforth, TAs had to serve two constituencies – the people they represented and the 
central colonial government. As will be shown later, that system which was established in the 
                                                          
31 According to Mamdani (1996), this marked the genesis of indirect rule and creation of a dual system of rules 
governing Africans (subjects) and Europeans (citizens). 
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colonial period was abolished at independence in 1980 but was then adopted and 
resuscitated in 1998 through the enactment of the Traditional Leaders’ Act (TLA) (Dore, 2001).  
Conquest and integration of the TAs was not an easy feat for the colonial and later 
independent State. For example, during the 1960s when the nationalist uprising gained 
support and popularity, the then Rhodesian government had to court the support of 
traditional chiefs in order give the government some degree of legitimacy - locally, and in the 
international community (Weinrich, 1971). The same was noted in independent Zimbabwe, 
this being a demonstration of the indispensability of TAs. A summary of the regulations that 




Table 4. Summary of the development of the traditional leadership 
Year Development Purpose 
1898 The southern Rhodesia 
Native Regulations 18 of 
1898 abolished the 
hereditary apportionment 
of chiefs. Instead, the 
District Administrator was 
empowered to appoint, 
demote or elect chiefs. 
Henceforth, a chief held office at the pleasure of the Administrator 
and contingent upon “good behaviour” and general fitness (Nuesiri, 
2014)32.  
1923 Establishment of the 
Department of Native 
Affairs 
Collected taxes on behalf of the government, maintained law and 
order among the Africans. 
The Department of Native Affairs was organized on a territorial 
basis with chiefs presiding over huge areas in each Province run by 
the DNA. 
Even though Native Commissioners despised traditional leaders as 
unprogressive, they always administered the district after consulting 
the traditional leaders. 
1931 Establishment of Native 
Boards 
Dealt with the “restless Africans” by giving them a platform to air 
their views. 
The chiefs and headmen were made ex-officio members, while 
provision was also made for elected representatives.  
1937 Establishment of Native 
Councils  
Dealt with African issues, making a distinction between Europeans 
and African legal rights-citizens and subjects according to Mamdani 
(1996).  
Had more clearly defined roles but lacked enforcement capacity.  
1941 Natural Resources Act Empowered state authorities to make use of coercive conservation 
methods such as destocking of livestock and digging of contour 
ridges (makandiwa) in crop fields to arrest alleged rampant soil 
erosion. Restrictions on tree cutting were also imposed.33 
1951 Native Land Husbandry 
Act34 
Enforced state-based conservation practices on land owned by 
Africans. 
1967 Tribal Trust Land Act Replaced the Native Husbandry Act and transferred the role of land 
distribution from colonial district commissioners to traditional 
leaders. 
1969 Land Tenure Act Repealed the Land Apportionment Act (1931) 
Allowed Africans to buy and own land. This resulted in private 
ownership of land by indigenous people. 
The Forestry Commission still exercised oversight on the cutting 
down of trees on this private land. 
                                                          
32This was perpetuated after independence by the independent government through the enactment of the 
Headmen and Chiefs Act.  The state’s principle of electing traditional authorities was counter intuitive to the 
traditional way of electing leaders which was centred on lineage seniority e.g. Mutambara case (Latham, 1966).  
33Forceful adoption of contour ridges later became a rallying point for the liberation war in the late 1970s to 
1980. Nemarundwe et al. (1998), reported how some communities in Zimbabwe destroyed the contour ridges 
in their crop fields at independence in 1980 as part of obliterating colonial policies.  
34 The NRA (1941) and NLHA (1951) were promulgated in response to two commissions which were launched 
by the colonial state namely the Natural Resources Commission of 1938 and the Godlonton Commission of 
1941 respectively. Both Commissions were necessitated by ecological concerns in the over-populated African 
communal lands (Chigwenya & Manatsa, 2007). 
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These pieces of legislation had the net effect of empowering and disempowering traditional 
authorities in a seesaw fashion. The Native Husbandry Act (NHA) and Tribal Trust Land Act 
were two important pieces of legislation that shaped natural resource management during 
the colonial period. The displacement of Africans as a result of these two laws and the 
expropriation of their land by the colonial government was the genesis of Africans losing 
control of, and access to, land, including sacred areas that were part of their cultural systems 
(Maradze, 2003). Nonetheless, after being sidelined by the infamous Native Land Husbandry 
Act of 1951, traditional leaders regained their political space to enforce customary practices 
in the use and management of natural resources in communal areas through the Tribal Trust 
Lands Act of 1967. This Act marked a watershed in the re-empowerment of traditional 
authority to allocate land and manage natural resources in communal areas.  
The Forestry Commission, Natural Resources Board (NRB) (later renamed the Environmental 
Management Agency), and to a certain extent the Agricultural and Technical and Extension 
Services Department (Agritex), were mandated to oversee the management of natural 
resources in communal areas (Nyambara, 2001). In defiance of the repressive laws, local 
people embarked on activities of subversion, in the form of an unsanctioned harvesting of 
forest products or settling in undesignated areas.35  On the other hand, white land owners 
enjoyed discretionary powers to manage natural resources on their farms. In sum, the colonial 
forest policy and laws were dualistic. The laws allowed for self- monitoring on white-owned 
lands aided by massive financial support and incentives in contrast to command and control 
by the state in communal areas (Mandondo, 2000).   
4.1.3 Post-colonial legislative landscape 
Zimbabwe gained its independence in 1980 after a protracted war of liberation against 
colonial authorities. Independence saw some colonial laws repealed, others amended, and 
new legislation was crafted and passed in line with the agenda and ideology of the nationalist 
government.  The new nationalist government embarked on a programme to neutralise and 
dismantle the traditional authorities that had been used as part of the extension of the 
                                                          
35 Scholarly views on the impacts of the Act differ with some, particularly Kwashirai (2006), and Nyambara 




colonial government (Ncube, 2011).  Scholarly opinion suggests that the independent states 
inherited some of the colonial legislation that stifled traditional authorities in the governance 
of natural resources (Scoones & Matose 1993; Dore, 2001). This was part of a state strategy 
to perpetuate central government control over communal lands (Mamdani, 1996). As will be 
shown later, that co-option was not successful as traditional authorities used subtle ways to 
resist such practices.  
One of the most important dimensions of rural development policy in Zimbabwe since 
independence has been local government reform, in particular the government’s 
decentralisation policy in the mid-1990s (Mangiza, 1990).  This resulted in the state 
superimposing elected local governance structures over traditional authorities. In 1984 the 
Prime Minister gave a directive to devolve power to democratically-elected lower tier 
structures with the intention of spearheading development and resource management 
planning at the grassroots level.36 The Rural District Councils Act (1988), Communal Lands Act 
(1982), and the Communal Forestry Produce Act (1987) are some of the pieces of legislation 
that were passed in line with the decentralisation effort, and had profound impacts on the 
use of customary practices in the management of natural resources in communal areas.  
These Acts have had varied effect on the governance of natural resources and customary 
practices in particular. The Communal Lands Forest Produce Act criminalised commercial 
trading in natural resources and gave Rural District Councils powers (and usurped that power 
from traditional authorities) to protect important trees by gazetting them and being the 
authority over all natural resources in the district (Kozanayi et al., 2014).37 
For eighteen years after independence, the government ignored and sidelined traditional 
authorities in the governance of communal areas. Traditional authorities were viewed as 
despotic and not democratic enough to articulate democratic development processes at 
grassroots level in line with the nationalist government’s decentralisation model (Ncube, 
                                                          
36Such decentralisation efforts were not without challenges. For a scholarly critique of the decentralisation in 
Zimbabwe, see Murphree (1991) who observed that there was a tendency in bureaucratic hierarchies to seek 
power from levels above and a general reluctance to devolve such power to levels below. Conyers (2003), 
Murombedzi (1991) and Hughes (2001), averred that higher level actors appeared to decentralise service-type 
activities while abrogating to themselves fiscal and production-oriented activities. Lack of incentives to provide 
services by the elected officials was also noted as a challenge (Mandondo, 2000). 




2011). To that end, the Communal Lands Act, and the Rural District Council (RDC) Act were 
passed. Effectively, village heads were replaced by village development committees (VIDCOs), 
while headmen were replaced by Ward Development Committees (WADCOs) as provided for 
under the RDC Act.  The above Acts replaced the Tribal Trust Lands Act of 1967 which had 
bestowed authority over communal lands on traditional leaders. Other supportive Acts that 
governed communal areas were enacted and are discussed below. 
Communal Lands Act   
The Communal Lands Act (1982), Chapter 20:04, which replaced the Tribal Trust Land Act 
(1967) had the effect of disempowering traditional leaders as it withdrew the land and 
resource-allocation powers vested in the chiefs by the colonial government. Instead, the Act 
vested control over land in the president and devolved its administration to RDCs.  Rural 
District Councils therefore became de jure land authorities. The Act also empowered RDCs to 
create Village Development Committees and Ward Development Committees. The two 
institutions were intended to coordinate development plans at the village and ward levels 
respectively. Overall, the rural district development planning was premised on the 
understanding that community participation in development planning would result in buy-in 
from local people when it came to implementation of the plans (Mandondo, 2001). Further, 
it was intended to facilitate an equitable distribution of natural resources as everyone in the 
community could become involved in the planning of the governance of natural resources 
(Manhokwe, 2010). The planning is such that village level plans are coalesced into ward plans 
which are then forwarded to the district and finally provincial levels. The local level plans are 
then reconciled with national development plans for implementation.38 The process of 
implementing this participatory bottom-up approach to natural resource conservation has 
been difficult. For example, the election of the VIDCOs and WADCOs was fraught with many 
challenges, not least of which was infiltration of the supposedly democratic posts by ruling 
party activists which led to the committees serving as an extension of the ZANU PF 
commissariat (Makumbe, 1998). 
                                                          
38 See Mandondo (2001) for a detailed account of how the planning process is carried out.  
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The VIDCOs and WADCOs effectively usurped the roles of the traditional structures that used 
to deliberate on many issues, not least of which was the governance of natural resources. The 
District Council and its ancillaries – the WADCOs and VIDCOs – became the influential modern 
political authorities that implemented development and conservation plans, bypassing 
traditional leaders (Derman, 1996).  
As in the colonial period, the disempowerment of TAs was not easy. The TAs continued to 
exercise their power in communal areas. Thus, the ensuing years saw feuding for legitimacy 
and influence between the traditional structures and the VIDCOs and WADCO, the newly 
elected structures of governance. In particular, traditional leaders felt that their roles were 
being trivialised, and reacted by taking up some of the positions in the VIDCOs or WADCOs in 
order to fight to regain their space (Makumbe, 1998).  The clashing resulted in resource 
degradation as each warring group asserted its power through populist policies such as 
absolving offenders of natural resource-related crimes. Cases of rampant resource 
degradation during this era have been reported (Campbell et al., 2001).  
The Rural District Councils (RDC) Act  
The RDC Act is another important piece of legislation that regulates the use of natural 
resources in communal areas. Through the Act, Rural District Councils (RDCs) are granted 
permission to constitute village and ward environment management committees that would 
oversee the use and management of local resources. While the idea is noble, a number of 
problems have faced the committees, not least of which is the lack of incentive to operate 
(Mandondo, 2000) and a lack of legitimacy (Kozanayi et al., 2014).  
Councils are also mandated to raise revenue from levies, taxes, and tariffs. Levy collection by 
the RDC should translate into service provision, while with certain revenues e.g. from 
CAMPFIRE programmes, 50% of the proceeds should be ploughed back into communities 
(Dzingirayi, 2004. This has not typically taken place because RDCs have been underfunded 
and therefore end up allocating to themselves the community’s share of the project’s revenue 
(Murphree, 2001). This has set RDCs on a collision course with traditional leaders when it 
comes to the collection of fines from environment-related crimes. Traditional leaders usually 
collect fines from guilty parties in environment-related cases. The use of this money is 
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determined by the traditional leader presiding over the case, but typically part of the fine is 
shared among the court assessors, and the rest is taken by the traditional leader.  
This Act also empowers the Minister of Local Government to appoint three chiefs per district 
who can participate in all RDC planning meetings as ex officio members. As such, the chiefs 
have no voting rights, but because they command a lot of respect, their suggestions usually 
influence decisions. Thus, in theory, the inclusion of chiefs in the RDC ensures that customary 
issues are articulated at this level.  
The RDC Act also stipulates that every District Council should have an environmental 
management subcommittee. It is headed by a chairperson and is supported by technocrats, 
particularly from the Forestry Commission, EMA, Agritex, the RDC, and elected ward 
councillors. Ordinary residents can be co-opted onto this committee on the basis of their 
knowledge and interest in environmental issues (Mandondo, 2000). In theory, this Act 
provides for the incorporation of local people in the governance of natural resources. 
However, like all well-intentioned legislation, its application needs further interrogation.  
The RDC Act has also allowed local relevant bylaws to be established with the participation of 
residents in the district, or to adopt ministerial model bylaws crafted by the government39. 
The liberty of RDCs to institute their own bylaws has given local people space to participate 
in the governance of natural resources through involvement in policy formulation. This has 
been critical in ensuring compliance with the laws (Gumbo, 2005; Keeley & Scoones, 2003). 
However, the process of crafting the bylaws is a long one and, as a result, not more than two 
RDCs out of the total 58 in the country have adopted their own bylaws. Moreover, the 
participation by residents in the formulation of these bylaws is cosmetic at best (Mandondo 
& Kozanayi, 2006). 
The bylaws have been criticised for, among other things, not taking cognisance of coping 
strategies for peasant communities (Scoones et al., 1996). A question that needs critical 
analysis is, “to what extent do these by-laws affect utilisation and customary practices in the 
                                                          
39 Generic legal framework that gives RDCs guidance on how they can manage natural resources and do land 
use planning in the areas under their jurisdiction. Local by laws on the other resource sharing arrangements 
crafted by the RDC with the participation of the local people. These are endorsed by the RDC for them to be 
legally binding (Mandondo, 2001).  
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governance of previously considered low value natural products?” This question will be 
engaged further in chapter 7. 
 Communal Lands Forest Produce Act  
The Communal Lands Forest Produce Act (CLFPA), Chapter 19:04, spells out the rights to 
forests of people residing in communal areas regarding forests. First, the Act takes away such 
rights by stating that all rights in communal lands are vested in the minister. However, Section 
19 calls for the devolution of authority to local level in order to promote sustainable 
management by local residents through elected bodies such as Ward Environmental 
Management Committees (WEMECs). Section 17 of the CLFPA only allows designated officers 
to arrest offenders, namely the Forestry Commission (FC), Environmental Management 
Agency (EMA), Rural District Council (RDC) and any other designated officers. Since WEMECs 
constitute part of the RDC at local level, they can arrest offenders by issuing tickets stating 
the offence committed, but they cannot collect fines. This authority is reserved for the RDC.  
The CLFPA limits the use of forest products to local own use. The Act also criminalises 
commercial trading in communally owned natural resources.  There is a fundamental 
challenge with this Act in that the concept of community is open to misinterpretation, and 
therefore contestation.40 Further, there is usually a mismatch between administrative and 
traditional boundaries. This complicates regulating resource access for the state, because 
trans-district and ward resource harvesting are both possible where traditional boundaries 
overlap with administrative boundaries (Mandondo 2000; Nemarundwe, 2003). Commercial 
harvesting of natural resources is allowed, but only after following a laborious permit 
application process. The RDC Act also provides for the RDCs to charge levies that are 
commensurate with harvested resources. Such permits for the commercial use of natural 
resources include charges for concession to harvest hard timber. In sum, the Act appears to 
have questionable benefits for communities, giving user rights to local people, but limiting 
that to subsistence level, and providing for the election of local resource managers in the form 
of WEMECs, while at the same time limiting their role to monitors of compliance to the set 
rules. The implications of this Act in practice are examined in chapter 7.  
                                                          
40For a scholarly problematisation of the concept of community see Mamimine & Mandivengerei (2001). 
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 Forest Act 
The Forest Act is the principal law regulating the management of forests. Together with the 
Communal Land Forest Produce Act (Chapter 19:04), it provides the general framework for 
forest use and management in Zimbabwe. In particular, Part VII of the Forest Act explains and 
provides for the regulation of trade in forest produce. The Forest Act mandates the Forestry 
Commission to take responsibility for the technical aspects of forest use, while the RDC must 
oversee the fiscal issues. An assigned Forestry Commission Officer provides technical advice 
to RDCs on all forestry issues in the district. The Forest Act also promotes forestry 
programmes such as reforestation projects. Because of the overlapping and complimentary 
roles of the Forestry Commission, the Environmental Management Agency (EMA) and the 
RDC, these institutions usually work closely as a troika.  
4.2 Contemporary traditional governance 
Traditional leadership in Zimbabwe is made up of a multi-tiered governance structure. At the 
top is the chief (mambo), under whom are headmen (madzishe or masadunhu). The lowest 
unit is the village head (sabhuku). Headmen preside over several villages. A sabhuku presides 
over a number of households ranging from tens to several hundred (Chigwata, 2016). The 
sabhuku (meaning book-keeper) is so called because during the colonial period, the primary 
responsibility of the village head was to keep the register (book) of all people under his/her 
jurisdiction for the purpose of tax collection (Nemarundwe, 2003). That role is now the 
responsibility of the RDC. In Chapter 7, I illustrate how some village heads have continued to 
carry out this function. 
4.2.1 Village heads: the first tier authority 
Village heads are largely responsible for the day-to-day management of natural resources in 
communal areas (Makumbe, 1998). They also enforce customary practices governing the use 
of natural resources. Traditional leaders also play a key role in the conservation of sacred 
sites. Most rituals at community level are undertaken under the direction of traditional 
leaders. Such rituals may include rain making (mupwa), and supplication prayers after a 
bumper harvest (Schoffeleers, 1979). Where new development programmes that will impact 
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on the environment are initiated in a sacred area, the traditional leaders preside over the 
cleansing of the area before the project is initiated.41 Village heads also facilitate the 
implementation of non-governmental organisation (NGO) and state environmental and 
developmental projects. Above all, they serve as adjudicators in social issues between 
members in their villages.   
4.2.2 Headmen and chiefs: second and third tier authorities 
A headman presides over a number of villages, the number being largely a function of the 
geographical and historical distribution of ethnic groups that the headman oversees.42 The 
area under the jurisdiction of a chief also depends on the distribution of the people he/she 
rules.43 Often, traditional boundaries do not coincide with administrative boundaries and this 
poses challenges when it comes to regulating access to natural resources using statutory 
regulations (Mandondo, 2000; Nemarundwe, 2003; Nemarundwe & Kozanayi 2001). On the 
other hand, resource users may use overlapping boundaries as an opportunity to access 
natural resources in areas which fall beyond administrative boundaries (Kozanayi et al., 2014) 
(see also Chapter 7 for nuances on this in the study site). 
At national level, the state recognises paramount chiefs, the Provincial Assembly and a Chiefs’ 
Council. Paramount chiefs oversee a number of chiefs. The Provincial Assembly is made up of 
all chiefs in a province and is convened by the Minister of Local Government to deliberate 
important cultural and development issues. The Chiefs’ Council is the apex of the modern day 
traditional leadership hierarchy as provided for in the Chiefs and Headmen Act.  It is headed 
by a Chiefs’ President.   
The president of the Council of Chiefs represents all the chiefs and sits in parliament as an 
appointed member of the legislature. Further, ten chiefs, representing the ten provinces in 
the country, are selected by the president to sit in parliament and articulate traditional issues 
                                                          
41 Examples are numerous, but one involves the engagement of traditional leaders at Tonhorai village in 
Chimanimani to lead a cleansing ceremony at a European Union funded irrigation scheme after the contracted 
civil engineering company experienced several mysterious accidents allegedly after felling sacred baobab trees 
and destroying graves of local leaders (Mukamuri & Kozanayi, 1999). 
42 Though it is possible to have headwomen, for purposes of this study, headmen will be used to denote both 
men and women occupying the position.  
43 Some chiefdoms even extend into neighbouring countries. For example, chief Mapungwana in Manicaland 
Province, Zimbabwe rules over people in Mozambique (MacGonagle, 2007). 
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in the legislative arm of government (Makumbe, 2010).  In theory, the Council of Chiefs is a 
powerful institution, because it reports directly to the minister responsible for local 
government and can also seek audience with the president. However, since inclusion in the 
council is through appointment, there has been a lot of speculation that the chiefs in the 
council owe their allegiance more to the president who appoints them than to the people 
they represent (Zimbabwe traditional chiefs: 2003).44 Mandondo and Mapedza (2003) and 
Gumbo (2005), argued that even elected leaders tend to be upwardly rather than downwardly 
accountable, this being a reflection of unequal power dynamics between the state and local 
resource users in communal areas. 
Nonetheless, the fusion of traditional structures within statutory structures represents a 
higher-level meshing of these two systems of governance. How that melded form of 
governance plays out at the local level in the governance of natural resources is an area that 
this research intends to assess.  
4.3 Justice delivery using traditional authorities 
Access to natural resources is regulated at the village level by the village head. Conflicts arising 
from resource use at the village level are deliberated at that level.45 Chiefs and headmen only 
give guidance to village heads where necessary or try cases referred to them by village heads. 
To effectively discharge their duties, traditional authorities have a group of aides who serve 
as court assessors (makota). Among the aides is a presiding officer (muchinda) whose duty it 
is to issue subpoenas, and to send suspects or accused persons to the traditional court for 
trial. Traditionally, people entrusted as aides are either from the ruling clan or those 
considered to be wise in the community (Beach, 1994). One of the aides serves as a secretary 
to the traditional leader and as such keeps minutes or writes correspondence on his behalf.  
Headmen and chiefs have messengers who assist them in the discharge of their duties. The 
headmen and chiefs’ messengers are entitled to monthly allowances from the government.  
                                                          
44 This is one of several cases covered by the print and electronic media, of chiefs who publicly declare their 
allegiance to the ruling party (Zimbabwe traditional chiefs: 2003) 
45This follows the principle of subsidiarity which envisages nesting of powers in any governance hierarchy (Ribot, 
2002) so that problems and issues are best addressed and discussed at the level at which they occur. 
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Referring cases to the chief or headman is a last option that village heads and litigants try to 
avoid. For the village head, referral of cases to a higher office suggests failure by the village 
head to stamp authority over the people that s/he leads. On the other hand, villagers’ cases 
referred to the chiefs are costly in terms of the fines and convenience fees for the chief’s 
court. The fines that can be imposed by chiefs are much higher than those charged by village 
heads. That is not to say that cases are never referred to higher levels for adjudication. 
Habitual offenders are usually referred to either the headman or the chief for trial, and 
complainants unhappy with a judgment by the village head have a right to appeal to the 
headman or chief. Complainants can also seek justice from judiciary courts.  
Furthermore, district magistrates superintendent the chiefs in the chiefs discharge of duty as 
para legal institutions (Chipinge magistrate, personal communication, 12/10/13). Routinely, 
the chiefs submit summaries of the cases they would have tried and the judgments made. 
The magistrate acts as a moderator, for example if a chief imposes an excessive fine according 
to the parameters of the local customary practices, the magistrate will reverse the fine. While 
the involvement of the magistrate serves to balance the power of the chiefs, it has a negative 
impact in that if a chief’s judgment is reversed, it erodes the integrity of that chief in the eyes 
of the perpetrator and the residents.   
4.4 Interface of customary and statutory forms of governance 
Both the colonial and independent states made efforts to harmonise statutory and customary 
practices through formalising traditional structures (for example through Council of Chiefs) 
and deliberately enacting laws that recognised the role of traditional leaders in the 
management of natural resources. Two such laws are the Traditional Leaders Act and the 
Chiefs and Headmen Act. These are discussed below.  
4.4.1 Traditional Leaders Act 
The enactment of the Traditional Leaders Act (TLA) Chapter 29:17 in 1998, which bestows 
authority on traditional leaders in rural areas, was a watershed moment in the re-
empowerment of traditional authorities. In executing their duties in natural resource 
management, traditional leaders are required to do so in compliance with the law. Section 5 
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(1) (i) of the TLA states that chiefs (and their subordinates) are expected to ensure that land 
and natural resources found in their area of jurisdiction, are used and exploited in terms of 
the law. For woodland resources, the pertinent Acts referred to include the CLFPA, RDCA, and 
the EMA. The EMA makes reference to the need to observe local customary practices and 
customs in the utilisation of natural resources. The TLA and EMA serve as a bridge between 
customary and statutory forms of resource governance.  
The TLA has helped to reconcile the VIDCO chair and village head roles. It designated the 
village head as the chair of the village assembly, which is the planning unit at village level. 
Anyone who is at least 18 years old can partake in proceedings - an agenda-setting platform 
for the village. Six village assemblies constitute a VIDCO and one of the six village heads in the 
VIDCO serves as chairperson. So, in essence, the TLA has helped village heads reclaim the 
political space over which they had run into conflict with the elected institutions like VIDCOs 
and WADCOs. However, the fact that elected structures such as ward councillors continue to 
exist side by side with traditional authorities, means that contestation for political space 
continues. 
As described, that contestation has been strongly apparent in the governance of natural 
resources. An interrogation of the interplay between the re-emerging TAs and the customary 
practices they use as tools to govern natural resources is apt in order to understand broader 
issues around the interplay between customary and statutory forms of governance in the 
governance of natural resources. 
4.4.2 The Chiefs and Headmen Act (1982) 
The Chiefs and Headmen Act (Chapter 29:01) defines the role of the executive in the 
appointment, remuneration, and dismissal of traditional leaders. An understanding of how 
traditional leaders are installed and rewarded in their duties is important, as this has a bearing 
on to whom they owe their allegiance. Using the principle of heliotropism, Elliot (1999) 
explains power dynamics using the metaphor of plants and the sun. Just as plants grow 
towards their energy source, so do organisations move towards that which gives them life 
and energy. Based on this principle, it has been argued that chiefs are likely to be accountable 
to the government from which they get their power, and less accountable to the people they 
76 
 
represent. However, this notion has been questioned in recent work that shows that 
traditional leaders have not necessarily been stooges of the central state (Boone 2003; ECA, 
2007; Nuesiri 2014; Baldwin, 2015). Chapter 7 further elaborates on this issue.  
A key provision of the Chiefs and Headmen Act (1982) is the empowerment of the president 
to appoint chiefs and their deputies.  The Minister of Local Government installs headmen 
while chiefs install village heads. The Act stipulates that in appointing a chief in terms of 
Subsection (1) the president shall give due consideration to any customary principles of 
succession applicable to the community over which such chief is to preside. A chief shall be 
paid such allowances as may from time to time be prescribed. Removal of chiefs is provided 
for in the constitution of Zimbabwe. To ensure that traditional leaders do not overstep their 
mark, the president is mandated to suspend or fire any chief who breaks the law. In short, 
statutory allocations of political authority solemnise and legitimise customary practices of 
hierarchical rule.   
Two issues arise from the above provisions. First, the reason for the dismissal of a chief or 
headmen does not have to be made known. The president can thus capitalise on this provision 
to purge all traditional leaders who do not support the ruling party.46 Second, payment of 
allowances to chiefs and headmen compromises their integrity as they pay allegiance to the 
state to protect their income (Makumbe, 2010). Parliament, as an integral arm in the balance 
of power in a democracy, is usually bypassed in determining the allowances for traditional 
leaders which gives credence to speculation that the allowances are given along partisan lines 
(Makumbe, 2010; Zimbabwe: traditional chiefs, 2003).47 However, recent research on 
traditional authorities in Chimanimani District showed that overall, traditional leaders are not 
much better off than the rest of the community members (Baldwin & Muyengwa, 2014). All 
the same though, it can be argued that the involvement of the executive is subject to political 
abuse by an incumbent president.  
                                                          
46 During the colonial period, Chief Mangwende was also dismissed for his defiance to colonial rule (Manyukwe, 
2003).  
47 For example, after chiefs asked for a direct meeting with Mugabe, they had their conditions of service 
improved through being awarded loans for all terrain vehicles of their choice, an increase in allowances, 
bypassing parliament which should set these conditions according to S 4 Chiefs and Headmen Act No. 7, 1992. 
Trowess, (2013) gives a detailed account of how politicians can use financial inducements to traditional 
authorities in order to win political support. 
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4.5 National policies with impacts on traditional authorities and customary practices 
In the last fifteen years, the Zimbabwean government has instituted policies that have had an 
impact on the relations between traditional authorities and resource users. The state has used 
inducements such as vehicle loans, land allocations, and increases in allowances to win the 
allegiance of traditional leaders in the face of waning political support (Trowess, 2013). These 
benefits are given on a sliding scale with chiefs enjoying most perks (Bratton & Masunungure 
2006). Other than chiefs, the lower layers of the traditional authorities do not get much in 
terms of allowances from the government. Each registered village head gets a monthly 
allowance of $25 while chiefs get $300 each.  
A related point is the use of cronyism in power distribution by the state. Traditional leaders 
have been removed from office because of their political standing.48 On their part, traditional 
leaders – through the Chief’s President, Mr. Fortune Charumbira – justified their participation 
in partisan politics by citing the example of Chief Albert Luthuli of South Africa who was 
awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for fighting for the rights of his people under the apartheid 
regime49. Because, went the argument, the country was under siege from Western countries 
trying to “recolonise" it, it behooved the traditional leaders to stand up for their people by 
supporting the ruling ZANU PF government.50 
The creation of a “politician-ruler” has profoundly compromised the integrity of the chiefs 
who have come to enjoy disproportionate political power in relation to village heads 
(Makumbe, 2010). Oppressed and poor residents have started to regard the chiefs with 
disdain as an extension of the repressive government, just like they did during the colonial 
period (Bratton & Masungure, 2006). As noted by Makumbe (2010), the state has targeted 
                                                          
48 Notable examples are Chiefs Norman Chiadzwa in Marange, reportedly an ardent supporter of the opposition 
MDC party who was dismissed from his post by ZANU PF on frivolous grounds.   
49 Issue was extensively covered in the government owned daily, The Herald of the 12th of July, 2010. 
50 This resonated with ZANU PF’s rhetoric that Britain was trying to recolonise Zimbabwe using the MDC as its 
stooges, hence the “Zimbabwe-will-never-be-a-colony-again” slogan by the ruling ZANU PF party. Further, in 
2011 traditional leaders were coerced by the ruling party to sign a petition and demand an audience with the 
Queen of England for the unconditional removal of economic sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe by the West for 
human rights abuses. During the colonial period, the Smith Regime used the same tactic of sponsoring chiefs to 
go to Britain and “explain” to the Queen that as the true representatives of the Africans, they were happy with 
the Unilateral Declaration of Independence which had been passed by colonial regime. That passing of the UDI 
had brought down the wrath of international sanctions on the country (Weinrich, 1971). 
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chiefs and headmen for integration, leaving out village heads who are directly involved in the 
management of natural resources on a day to day basis.  
Despite the dented image of traditional leaders due to their allegiance to government, a 
clarion call for the inclusion of village level traditional leadership in the management of 
natural resources has been made in Zimbabwe. The Rukuni Commission of 1994 advocated 
that traditional leaders assume the role of land authorities in communal areas (Zimbabwe 
Government, 1994). A corpus of research also made similar recommendations. Murombedzi’s 
(1998) compelling research revealed that the state’s attempt to elbow out customary 
practices and usurp control over natural resources resulted in resource degradation in 
communal areas. Campbell et al. (2002b: ix), reached similar findings, concluding that 
although considerable responsibility for resource governance now resides with rural district 
councils (extension of government), de facto rules and regulations operative at the village 
level are centred on traditional authorities.” Empirical data from a study by Gondo et al. 
(2010) also shows that governance of natural resources in most rural areas is principally about 
local rules, far more than it is about prescriptive technical interventions from outside. 
Mutimukuru (2010) noted that due to massive resignation of staff in the Forestry Commission 
of Zimbabwe from 2000 up to 2010, there was a void in the implementation of forestry policy 
around state forests and traditional leaders filled up the void, a find that concurs with Hara 
et al. (2009).   
There are also some socio-economic and political developments that have taken place in 
Zimbabwe that have had a negative impact on the governance of natural resources and the 
livelihoods of forest-dependent people policies. These include the land reform programme, 
and the consequent economic challenges resulting in many people from annexed farms or 
closed down companies settling in communal areas, where they challenged traditional 
authorities and existing customary practices. While it does not fall within the purview of this 
thesis to look at the economic and political landscape of Zimbabwe in detail, I highlight these 
for purposes of giving context in relation to the implications for my studies.  
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Economic challenges experienced since the 1990s have led to political unrest in Zimbabwe. 
To deal with civil disobedience, the state has used oppression and force.51 The examples are 
many but the modus operandi remains the same – in all cases, the operations were ruthless 
and carried out by the military.52 
Noteworthy in this regard is the colossal land reform programme and the ensuing 
unprecedented economic meltdown. There was loss of employment due to the economic 
collapse associated with the fast track land reform leading to many returnees in communal 
areas. Operation Murambatsvina epitomized the ruthlessness of the state towards its 
citizens. The operation impacted negatively on the business of some woodcraft vendors who 
were operating in urban areas and along major highways. Murambatsvina was a hugely 
unpopular national programme initiated by the Government in 2005 to destroy all illegal 
settlements, initially in urban areas and then along major highways. Urban markets for many 
products were destroyed as part of this operation (Bratton & Masunungure, 2006). 
Murambatsvina had a far-reaching impact on the governance of natural resources and the 
effectiveness of customary practices. The operation resulted in over 700 000 people being 
displaced from urban areas (Tibaijuka, 2005). Some of the evicted urban residents went back 
to their communal areas without jobs. They started exploiting the environment, including 
harvesting and processing of baobab products, in order to earn a living (Chibiza & Rwizi, 2009).  
At the same time, there had been reduced funding of the forestry sector from treasury since 
2000 (Mapedza, 2006). Reduced budgetary support means that government departments 
responsible for managing the environment lose their capacity to effectively discharge their 
duties. 
The land reform in the 2000s ostensibly to redress historical imbalances in land ownership 
(Masiiwa & Chigejo, 2003; Masiiwa, 2004) is yet another important policy intervention by the 
government that has had far reaching impacts on the governance of natural resources. The 
programme had profound impacts on the ownership of natural resources as previously 
privately-owned resources were now communally owned (Chigumira, 2010). Ownership of a 
                                                          
51 See also work by Paul Richards (2005) about force and oppression as a policy option in Sierra Leone during 
the civil war period (1994, and 2002).  




total of over 8 million hectares changed from private to communal and freehold, which result 
in the greatest transfer of property rights in southern Africa in recent times (Mamdani, 2008). 
Use patterns of forest resources under the new regime also changed, with resource use 
becoming indiscriminate (Chigumira, 2010). Land is critical in the politics of access to natural 
resources because once people have access to land, they usually also have access to a range 
of resources found on that land (Matowanyika, 1991; Bruce et al., 1993). Gondo et al. (2010) 
reported changes in access to mopane worms, a high value NTFP traded mainly by poor 
households in newly resettled farms. In some cases, indigenous people invaded state land to 
farm or harvest natural products leveraging on the lawlessness that characterised the land 
reform program (Mubvami, 2004). 
In 2007, diamonds were discovered in Marange, near the study site. There was a huge influx 
of people coming to mine alluvial diamonds in both Jinga and Nyanyadzi (Nyamunda et al., 
2012). Criminal activities resulted, often influencing the way baobab products were accessed, 
such as over harvesting of baobab bark. This issue is discussed further in chapter 7. 
4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented a historical overview of the interaction of the state and traditional 
authorities in the management of natural resources. This has implications for the interplay 
between customary and statutory forms of governance which the two forms of power use to 
regulate use of natural resources. While most literature portrays the relationship in 
dichotomous terms - that is a subjugating state and the subservient traditional authority, the 
relationship is complex. Traditional authorities have agency and have re-asserted their 
authority in the political domain. Using empirical evidence in Chapters 6, 7 and 8, I illustrate 
how constant interactions between customary and statutory forms of governance play out in 
regulating access to natural resources in communal areas. The next chapter provides back 






CHAPTER 5: EXPLORING LIVELIHOODS IN NYANYADZI AND JINGA 
This chapter provides contextual background to the research and describes the demographics 
and livelihoods pursued in each of the study sites. Two areas, Nyanyadzi and Jinga were 
selected on account of the significant differences in their use pattern of baobab products 
despite their proximity to each other (20 km apart), as well as their similarity in natural 
resources endowments.  
In this chapter, the biophysical characteristics and agricultural potential of the two areas are 
described, these being key drivers of local livelihoods. The role of baobab products within 
broader livelihoods are also presented, including their harvest and use by different 
households and income patterns.  
5.1 Location and administration of the study sites 
The study was carried out in the Chimanimani District, Manicaland Province Zimbabwe.  
Manicaland is 36,459km2 in size. At 1,755,000 people (Central Statistical Office (CSO), 2012), 
Manicaland’s population is 13.5% of the national total. The province is made up of eight 
districts; at 3,353km2, Chimanimani District is the smallest. The Chimanimani District is 
located at latitude 19.75 degrees and longitude 32.67 degrees.  It has a population of 133,810 
people (CSO, 2012) - 7.6% of Manicaland.  Chimanimani town, the administrative centre, was 
established by Thomas Moodie in 1892, who named it Melsetter (Sinclair, 1971). European 
traders had already been active in the area, making it one of the first places to be colonised 
by the whites (Mapira, 2006). By the time colonialists came in 1890, the ethnic groups found 
in Jinga and Nyanyadzi, the Garwe of Mutambara and Gumbu of Gudyanga lineages 
respectively, were already settled there (Bruce, 1892;  Mapira, 2006).  
The research was carried out in three wards - Chakohwa (ward 3), Nyanyadzi (ward 8), and 
Gudyanga (ward 20). Chakohwa Ward, located about 20km north of Nyanyadzi, is made up of 
eight villages, of which Jinga is one. This ward falls under Chief Mutambara of the Garwe clan.  
The average household size in all three wards is 4.2 people (CSO, 2012). Jinga has a population 
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of 283 households, representing 1 300 people. Table 5 shows the demography of the three 
wards53. 
Table 5: Population size for study sites 
Ward No. No. of households No. of males No. of females 
3 –Jinga (Chakohwa)  1322 2554 2934 
8 -Nyanyadzi 2066 4085 4665 
20 -Gudyanga 1715 3304 3895 
Total 5103 9943 11494 
Source: CSO, 2012 
Gudyanga and Nyanyadzi wards are adjacent to each other and comprise the Gumbu clan, 
under Chief Muusha. These two areas are referred to as Nyanyadzi in this study. The choice 
of study site was influenced by the fact that the area has one of the highest density of baobab 
trees in Zimbabwe (Mudavanhu, 1998). In the case of Nyanyadzi, the area has a long history 
of baobab product use, dating back to the 15thcentury (Bruce, 1892), with both customary 
and statutory forms of governance used to regulate access.  
Jinga Village was included to give insights into customary practices of baobab governance 
with minimal state intervention, unlike Nyanyadzi where both customary and statutory 
practices are used simultaneously. Use of negative evidence (non-activity) has been 
recommended in social studies. According to Neumann (1997), the non-appearance of 
something can reveal a great deal and provide valuable insights about an issue under study 
elsewhere.  
5.2 Ethnicities in the study sites 
The Chimanimani people are mainly from the Ndau tribe which is a composite group of which 
Garwe and Gumbu are subsets (Mapira, 2006; MacGonagle, 2007). According to oral and 
written accounts, the ethno-history of tribes occupying Chimanimani traces their origins to 
                                                          
53 The number of households in Nyanyadzi and Chakohwa has increased by 446% and 189% respectively since 
1965 (Latham, 1966; CSO, 2012). 
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the area known as Mbire (Wedza District). They appear to be an offshoot of the Varozvi who 
migrated eastwards and have a common history with the Mutema and Garahwa in Chipinge 
(Latham, 1966). Settlement of the Bantu people, now known as Ndau, started around the 
mid-17th century. Preceding the arrival of white settlers in the area in the 1890s, the Ndau 
chiefs and their people were subjected to Nguni raids during the Umfcane uprising and 
northward migration from South Africa (Beach, 1994). During these raids, the Nguni took 
women and cattle and subsequently incorporated the Ndau into the Gaza state which the 
Nguni had established in 1830 (MacGonagale, 2007; Perman, 2008). There have been 
immigrants settling among the indigenous people but overall, the indigenous people still 
dominate the local politics.  
There were many explanations as to why people in the study site are called Ndau. One 
prominent version is that the name arose from the way people greet each other, “Ndauwe” 
which is a polite way to say, “We salute you” (MacGonagle, 2007).  Whatever differences 
there are about the origins of the name there is unanimity among researchers that relative to 
other tribes, the Ndau people are generally regarded as culturally conservative (Sinclair, 1971; 
Beach, 1994; MacGonagle, 2007; Perman, 2008). Central to their social cohesion is the use of 
totems as an enduring identity maker in social structures and group membership 
(MacGonagale, 2007).  
5.2.1 The Garwe of Mutambara 
People of Mutambara, including of Jinga, are of the Garwe-crocodile clan (Sinclair, 1971). This 
term arose after they reportedly crossed the flooded Odzi River on the backs of crocodiles 
while fleeing from their adversaries (Beach, 1994; Hot Springs report, 1995).   
Only one line of chieftaincy succession is recognised in Mutambara – from father to sons in 
order of seniority (Latham, 1966). This pattern is also observed in Jinga. This is in contrast to 
the Muusha chieftaincy that was shared between several sub clans, creating leadership 
problems, sometimes with implications for the governance of natural resources (Chapter 7).   
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5.2.2 The Gumbu of Nyanyadzi 
According to oral history, Garamanhuwa was the founding ancestor of the Gudyanga family 
of Nyanyadzi. He emigrated from Mbire and had three sons, in order of seniority: Muwusha, 
Nechiora, and Gudyanga who settled in different areas. Muwusha decided to go up the 
escarpment, Nechiora went just below the escarpment, while Gudyanga decided to settle in 
the valley (Latham, 1966; Sinclair, 1971).  Gudyanga went on to have a large family. Two of 
his sons, Chiadzwa and Chamutsa, crossed the Odzi and Save rivers to establish their own 
chiefdoms in Buhera and Bocha respectively (Beach, 1994). During the time of the study, 
Chiadzwa and Chamutsa were instrumental in the provision of baobab products to Gumbu 
people from Nyanyadzi.  
Muririrwa, the leader of the Gudyanga people who settled in Nyanyadzi, became a proficient 
salt maker (Latham, 1966). He supplied this commodity to the chief, carrying it in a gumbu54 
(soft beaten bark container). Hence the residents of Nyanyadzi came to be called Gumbu – 
those who carry salt in a fibre bag. The making of gumbu seems to have been the starting 
point of what was later to become a lifeline mat-making business for the locals. It also put to 
test local customary practices regulating baobab bark use over two centuries later. The 
Gumbu people also had a long history of making fibre blankets (gudza), with earliest accounts 
dating back to 1758 when St. Vincent Erskine, a European explorer, described the use of gudza 
- made from baobab bark by the Ndau (MacGonagle, 2007). At the time of this study the 
Gumbu weavers and their relatives at Biriwiri, some 80 km away, were still actively weaving 
such blankets from the bark of Brachystegia spp for the domestic and export market (Bongo & 
Bourdillon, 2001). 
5.3 Socio-political status  
The emergence of a strong political opposition to the Zimbabwe African National Union –
Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) government in this region is also noteworthy. A key similarity 
between Nyanyadzi and Jinga was that during the time of the study, both areas were in the 
hands of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) – the national opposition political 
                                                          
54 A distinction is made between gumbu, bag made from fibre and Gumbu, the people who derive their name 
from making the gumbu bags. 
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party. The change in the political landscape is important in shaping the roles played by 
traditional leaders who are regarded as the interlocutors of customary values and rules. Some 
political parties have been known to coerce traditional leaders to become appendages of their 
parties and be partisan in their governance (We don’t belong, 2011). Central for this study, is 
that repressive policies of the ruling ZANU PF party made locals develop a deep seated disdain 
for government, taking the party to be synonymous with the state. As this thesis explains, this 
had wide ramifications for resource governance. 
5.4 Biophysical conditions 
The study site falls into Natural Region 5 of the agro-ecological zones in Zimbabwe, an area 
which is dry and prone to droughts (Moyo et al., 1991).  The average annual rainfall ranges 
from 1,114 mm in Chimanimani to 500 mm in Nyanyadzi (Hot Springs report, 1995; Bolding, 
2004). In both Jinga and Nyanyadzi the rainfall was poorly distributed, with recurrent mid-
season droughts.  Average monthly maximum temperatures are 25.9°C in July and 36°C in 
January. Average monthly minimum temperatures range between 9°C in June and 24°C in 
January (Moyo et al., 1991). The predominantly dry weather with low and poorly distributed 
rainfall, punctuated by mid-season droughts, has made dryland agriculture very risky.  
Vegetation types range from deciduous trees in the uplands, to miombo species (Brachystegia 
spp) in the middle level areas, and Mopane (Colophospermum mopane) woodlands in the 
valley (Moyo et al., 1991; Bongo & Bourdillon, 2001). The climax vegetation is mopane 
woodland characterized by sparse vegetation that is dominated by Adansonia digitata, 
Terminalia sericea, Berchemia discolor and Acacia nilotica (Mudavanhu, 1998; Bolding, 2004).  
Soil type ranges from sodic to deep alluvial soils (Moyo et al, 1991; Nyamapfene, 1991). 
5.5 An overview of livelihood options in Nyanyadzi and Jinga 
Households in Nyanyadzi and Jinga pursue a range of farm and non-farm activities in order to 
spread the risk associated with unstable production systems in the dry savannah. Income 
levels differed across households and sources. 
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5.5.1 Annual income  
Most (73.3% of the households in Jinga earned at least $500 per year while in Nyanyadzi, 
45.6% of the households earned the same amount for the same time period. Less than 5.0% 
people earned above $5000 a year in both communities (Table 6).  
 
Table 6: Household annual income for Nyanyadzi and Jinga 
Annual Income level ($)  % of households Nyanyadzi 
(n=218) 
 % of households Jinga 
(n=118) 
Less than 500 54.4 26.7 
500-2000 28.6 51.7 
2001-5000 13.3 16.4 
Above 5000 3.7 5.2 
Total 100.0 100.0 
N=336 
Of all the households in the study site 12.7% obtained income from livestock, 1.5% from the 
sale of crops from a local irrigation scheme, and 1.5% from working on the diamond mines. 
Remittances contributed 0.8% to the households. Only 23.8% of the households had at least 
one member in full-time employment, while 13.7% had at least one member engaged in 
temporary employment.55 Employment at the newly opened diamond fields, was ranked low, 
reportedly because only a few, politically connected people were employed at the mines.  
Despite similarities between Jinga and Nyanyadzi, there were some important differences in 
terms of the economic pathways they pursued. These are presented in the ensuing sections.  
5.5.2 Livelihoods options in Nyanyadzi 
Table 7 presents livelihood activities pursued in Nyanyadzi, ranked according to their 
contribution to local livelihoods. 
                                                          
55 At the time of the survey in 2011/2012, the national economy was in a downward spiral with national 
unemployment at 85 percent. See Cross (2009), for details. 
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Table 7:  Ranking of livelihoods options in Nyanyadzi 
Income source Score56 Rank57 Remarks 
Livestock 24 1 A major source of income and food for most 
households. 
Demand for meat at the diamond mines pushed 
up the price of livestock. 
Baobab products: 
fruit and fibre 
20 2 Many people from the community are involved 
There was a ready market for products. 
Horticultural 
gardens 
17 3 Popular activity with women and had better 
returns if production was done out of season.  
“Piece jobs” 12 4 These were opportunistic jobs, for example 
constructing houses or cattle pens.  
Irrigated 
agriculture 




6 6 Bad weather had written off crops over the 
preceding 12 years, with depleted soil fertility 
and yield. 
Working at the 
diamond mines 
5 7 Very few people were employed at the mines. 
Working on sugar 
cane estates-
Green Fuels 
3 8 The ethanol producing company intermittently 
hired casual labourers from Nyanyadzi58  
Wood carving 2 9 Specialised skills were required so only a few 
people benefitted. 
Fishing in Save 
River 
1 10 A few people had fishing nets and baskets with 
nets prohibited by the Department of National 
Parks. 
Total 100   
Source: Field notes: Group meeting with residents from Nyanyadzi, 12/3/11 
The rearing of livestock, notably goats and cattle, was a source of income and nutrition, with 
ownership by 67.0% of households and their sale locally to households and butcheries. 
Commercial use of baobab products was ranked second in terms of its contribution to the 
local household economy on account of many (over 60.0%) households involved. There was 
                                                          
56 This was the perceived contribution of the option to local livelihoods. Importance was illustrated by the 
number of counters allocated to each option. 
57 This was prioritisation of the options according to their perceived weighting by local informants. 
58 Production at the Ethanol Plant was disrupted on many occasions due to political haggling over the legality of 
the project (End of Chisumbanje: 2013). 
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also a long history of using baobab fibre to make crafts in the area. The baobab tree has clearly 
played a central role in the local cultural history.   
Despite the importance of agricultural food in this dry area, irrigated crop production was 
ranked low. Only 21.7% of the households had plots in the irrigation schemes. Further, 
production at the irrigation schemes had been low since early 2000 due to poor maintenance 
of irrigation infrastructure. 
Employment at the diamond fields and sugarcane estates was ranked low on account of there 
being few local people working in these two areas. Corruption and nepotism were cited as 
hindrances for locals to secure employment at both Green Fuels and diamond mines at 
Marange.  
5.5.3 Livelihoods options in Jinga 
Table 8 presents the range of livelihood options pursued at Jinga, ranked according to their 













Table 8: Ranking of livelihoods options in Jinga village 
Livelihood option Score Rank Remarks 
Livestock 21 1 A ready market existed, provided by workers at the 
diamond mines. 
Lucrative prices were offered due to high demand. 
Beekeeping 18 2 Honey was mainly sold to bulk buyers from urban areas. 
Women and children sold bottled honey to motorists 
along the highway. 
Vegetable 
production 
15 3 This was a mostly female activity carried out seasonally 
from May to November. 
Vegetables were sold to neighbouring areas and 
diamond mines.  
Illegal diamond 
mining  
12 4 This was an opportunistic activity for many people 
before government declared it illegal. 
 
Dry land cropping 10 5 Crops often failed due to poor rainfall distribution. 
Trading 9 6 Merchandise included second-hand clothes  
Working at the 
diamond mines 
6 7 Just a few “politically” connected individuals employed.  
Brick moulding 4 8 Bricks sold at $30/ 1000 and there was a ready market. 
This was done by a few, usually poor, households. 
Selling quelea 
birds 
3 9 Birds were caught by men from March to July. 
They were sold locally or in Mutare at $1 for 7 birds. 
Selling baobab 
fruits 
2 10 Insignificant contribution because few people are 
involved in selling of fruits.  
Total 100   
Source: Group discussion with men and women in Jinga, 15/3/11 
Like in Nyanyadzi, livestock played an important role as a source of income. In both Jinga and 
Nyanyadzi, cattle were also used as a source of draft power and were a symbol of status59. 
Livestock was ranked highly after the price of goats and cattle went up around 2008 in 
response to high demand from magweja60 and later on, from workers at the diamond mines.  
Most male residents in Jinga ranked beekeeping as their main source of livelihood. Honey was 
sold to bulk buyers at between $2 and $3 per kilogram. 
                                                          
59 Cattle play a central role in the lives of the indigenous people as they provide multiple uses such as draft 
power, milk, manure, hides and are used to pay the price of a bride when marrying. Therefore, owning cattle is 
viewed as a source of wealth and status. 
60 Colloquial for illegal artisanal diamond miners. There was a huge influx into the area by illegal miners when 
diamonds were discovered in Marange area. 
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Illegal diamond mining was considered important despite the government sending in the 
army and police to flush out artisanal miners in 2009. Also important is riverine horticultural 
production.  
The selling of baobab products was ranked last as it was not perceived to be lucrative 
“because baobab fruits are ubiquitous” and no one would buy them. Selling of fruits was 
limited to isolated bulk fruit sales in urban areas (Box 1) and opportunistic sales to local ice 
lolly makers (Box 2).  
5.5.4 Comparison of livelihoods between Nyanyadzi and Jinga 
For both Nyanyadzi and Jinga, livestock were considered to be a main contributor to local 
livelihoods, partly due to high levels of ownership. More than 90.0 % of households in both 
areas owned chickens and goats and there was a ready market locally and in neighbouring 
areas. For example, at the time of the survey a Dutch based NGO was buying indigenous goats 
and chicken in both areas with the intention of using the livestock as genetic material in other 
rural areas.  
Residents in both areas also engaged in dryland and (limited) irrigated agriculture and had 
high unemployment rates, epitomising the dire economic situation in the country which had 
over 90.0% employment at the time of the survey. Both sites had a high density of baobab 
trees (Mudavanhu, 1998). 
Livelihoods for men were different between areas. The Garwe of Jinga had a long history of 
beekeeping which had become part of the local culture; this was missing in Nyanyadzi61. To 
the contrary, craft making was a key cultural activity in Nyanyadzi. These differences were 
reflected in the ranking patterns of local livelihoods. 
 
 
                                                          
61 The bee keeping industry in Jinga started before the colonial period with locals using traditional bark hives 
and barter trading honey in neighbouring communities. Later, commercial buyers started buying honey from 
the area and this boosted production with many more people getting involved (Hot Springs Report, 1995). 
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Box 1: Bulk trading of fruits in Jinga 
Fifty-one-year-old Mrs. A had traded baobab fruits in Mutare city since the 1990s. She was 
born in Jinga village but got married in neighbouring Marange District. Initially, she harvested 
the baobab fruits from Marange and used scotch carts to transport the fruits to the main 
highway in Jinga. She would transport an average of 50 bags to Mutare and Harare, 80 and 
350 km away respectively for sale at open markets. Later on, to cut down on her costs, she 
started collecting the fruits from Jinga while staying with her parents. Soon after the village 
head banned her for cultural reasons. She was also banned from using Jinga village as a 
loading bay for her baobab fruits. So, Mrs. A moved to nearby Nemutenzi village. She hired 
local people to collect the fruits and paid them in electrical gadgets or clothes bought in 
Harare. 
In the 1990s, a bag of baobab fruits earned her US$3. The baobab selling season ran from 
June to October and she made an average of four trips per year, each trip earning her an 
average of US$150. She was actively involved in this trade for a decade from the 1990s after 
which she stopped due to ill health. During that period, she was able to raise enough money 
to build a brick and asbestos house and furnish it.    
5.6 The importance of baobab as a natural resource  
When compared with nine other natural resources in Nyanyadzi, baobab was ranked as the 
most important (Table 9). Water was rated second, largely due to the fact that it supports 
every facet of life. Berchemia discolor, a fruit tree whose bark was used to colour crafts, was 
ranked fourth, indicating its important role in the craft industry. Fruit of Berchemia spp was 










Table 9: Ranking of local natural resources in order of their perceived contribution to local 
livelihoods in Nyanyadzi 
Resource Score Rank Remarks 
Baobab products 24 1 Used by “everyone” in the area 
It is ubiquitous 
Water 15 2 Critical for watering livestock, crops and for brick 
moulding 
Grass 13 3 Browse for livestock  
Making courier baskets 
Controls soil erosion 
Berchemia discolour 11 4 Fruits were consumed or sold 
Bark from trunk or roots used to dye crafts from 
baobab fibre 
Soil 10 5 Sustenance of crops and trees  
Clay was used to make artefacts 
Produced salt in riverine areas62 
Reeds 8 6 Making mats and baskets  
Thatching houses 
Browse for cattle in the dry season 
Securinecra spp 7 7 Fruits are eaten and bark is dye for fibre crafts 
Tsopotwe-runner 
plant 
5 8 Craft making 
Afzelia quansensis 4 9 Furniture making by skilful people 
Fish 3 10 Fish was caught by men in the Save river  
Source of food and income 
Total score 100   
Source: Group meeting with residents from Nyanyadzi 2/3/ 2012 
In Jinga, water was rated as the most important natural resource (Table 10). This came against 
a backdrop of increasing irrigated vegetable plots in the area. 
Women were actively involved in horticultural production with the preceding five years 
seeing an expansion in irrigated plots opening up along the Odzi and Murare Rivers in the 
village. While the majority of households used head buckets to irrigate their crops, 
increasingly households were investing in water pumps which enabled them to irrigate bigger 
plots. German Agro Action, a German NGO was also establishing community nutrition gardens 
in the village.  
                                                          
62 Salt making occupies an integral part in the history and development of the Gumbu people  
(see chapter 3) 
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Table 10: Ranking of local natural resources in order of their perceived contribution to 
local livelihoods in Jinga   
Resource Score Rank Remarks 
Water 22 1 Supported people and animals 
Crop production 
Soil 19 2 Crop production 
Moulding bricks for construction and sale  
Trees 16 3 Flowers provided nectar to bees for honey 
production 
Firewood for domestic use and firing bricks 
Grass 14 4 Browse for livestock  
Thatch for houses 
Quelia birds 10 5 Source of proteins and income as the birds were sold  
Berchemia 
discolour 
7 6 Fruits were eaten and sold locally and in urban areas 
Mopane worms-
Imbresia belina 
5 7 Source of proteins 
Could be sold for cash 
Reeds 4 8 Making mats  
Browse for cattle in the dry season 
Baobab tree 3 9 Fruits for local use 
Fruits were ubiquitous and therefore “valueless” 
Total score 100   
Source: Community meeting on 11/3/12 
The baobab tree was ranked the lowest because fruits are readily available to anyone in the 
village. No ready market for baobab products existed in the area. By way of contrast men in 
Jinga were bee keepers and also sold Quelia birds which they trapped in the wild using stone 
traps and nets. 
5.7 Uses of baobab products 
A myriad of consumptive and non-consumptive uses of the baobab tree were identified in 
Jinga and Nyanyadzi (Table 11). Where uses were dissimilar between Nyanyadzi and Jinga, 













Bulk collectors who sell in towns, 
Local ice lolly makers, 
Companies, namely: Kaite,  
Speciality Food for Africa, Mutare 
Ice Creams63,  
Local entrepreneurs such as 
Muuyu Enterprises, SAFIRE 
“Everyone” has use for baobab fruits”. 
Pulp made into porridge mixed with mealie 
meal. 
The baobab fruit was likened to the diamond 
of the Valley. 
 
SAFIRE trains harvesters in sustainable 
harvesting and good business practices. 
 Jinga: 
Local households 
Use limited to domestic purposes with few 
cases of sales.  
Seed Nyanyadzi: 
Mainly women  
Private buyers e.g. Kaite 
Seeds can be eaten raw if soft or after being 
boiled and salted (njoko) or made into 
“coffee.” 
Seed pressed into oil by companies.  
Jinga: 
Local households 
Seeds are eaten raw if soft or after being 
boiled and salted.  
Shells Women  
Craft makers 
Burnt shells can be used as a soda. Shells can 
be made in kitchen scoops and shakers used in 




Traditional mid wives 
Used to treat stomach ailments and in rituals 
to widen birth canal in pregnant women. 
Roots used for baby “fattening.”64  
Leaves Women 
Livestock farmers 
Cooked and saved as a vegetable. 
Provide browse for cattle. 
Tubers All but mainly young boys Eaten as a snack. 
Non consumptives uses 
Bark Nyanyadzi: 
Craft weavers 
“Everyone” as twine for tying 
purposes. 
Poor households are the main 
harvesters. 
Both men and women are involved  
Fibre sold at $0.1/bundle in Nyanyadzi. 




Use limited to domestic purposes-for cordage.  
                                                          
63 Mutare Ice Creams used to buy baobab pulp from Nyanyadzi around 2004-2006. 
64 Young babies are immersed in a concoction of baobab roots and other herbs in a ritual that is believed to 











Cemetery “resting” places for the spirits of the 
dead (e.g. sacredness on page 160). 
Territory marking and publicity65 
Sites for rain making purposes 
Zvitumba-guard houses in the field 
The tree gives identity and aesthetic value to 
the local people (e.g. Gumbu people page 82). 
Source: Group discussions held with residents from Nyanyadzi and Jinga village, 11/2/12 and 
14/2/12 
Views on the value of baobab products differed between locals and technical government 
staff. One District Forestry officer remarked, “We are overwhelmed with requests from NGOs 
that want to commercialise baobab fruits in in the Valley. How lucrative is that business, 
because when we consider the selling price for pulp we get the impression that the values are 
very low?” (Chimanimani RDC, 23/11/14).  
On the other hand, local harvesters in Nyanyadzi put a high value on the fruits and fibre. One 
old man in Gudyanga village observed, “Since time immemorial, people in the Valley have 
survived on baobab fruits”.  Rituals were conducted under some of the big trees by traditional 
leaders and leaders of some churches. Such trees were revered by the local people.   
5.8 Harvesting patterns 
5.8.1 Seasonality of harvesting 
In total (53.8 %) of households surveyed in Jinga and Nyanyadzi harvested baobab products.   
In Nyanyadzi most baobab products were harvested during the dry season from April to 
September, covering a critical food and income gap. A common practice among households 
was to stock fruits in granaries for use later in the year. Year-round harvesting was common 
for bark fibre. This was a recent phenomenon due to economic hardships. Leaves and tubers 
were normally harvested during the rainy season (November to April).  
                                                          
65 Local informants claimed that members of the opposition political party were responsible for the graffiti on 
big baobab trees canvasing for votes or territory marking in a society where democratic space was controlled by 
the ruling political party. Historical markings on baobab trees by early European explorers have also been 




In Jinga, fruits were harvested between April and August. The fruit season was said to be short 
due to foraging by baboons. Fibre and roots were also harvested by residents.  
5.8.2 Quantities of baobab products harvested 
The quantities of the different products harvested in 2011 as well as average income per 
household from each product are presented in Table 12.  Fruits and fibre were the main 
products that were harvested in large quantities either for domestic use or for sale. 
5.8.3 Generating a wealth index from which wealth classes were derived 
I distinguished households’ use and management of baobabs according to their wealth 
classes. The wealth classes were derived by classifying a wealth index of all study households 
into quintiles (five classes). The wealth index was created using Principal Components Analysis 
(PCA). This technique involves combining several original variables into a few derived 
variables. In this case, there is a single derived variable, which is interpreted as a wealth index. 
Original variables investigated included paid employment status of household head and other 
household members, household livestock endowments (numbers of cattle, goats and sheep), 
productive equipment (ox-carts, ploughs, hoes, axes), other asset endowments (bicycles, 
cars), ownership of plots in irrigation scheme and type of shelter. 
A number of analyses were conducted in creating the wealth index. In the initial analysis, the 
first principal component (the derived variable) accounted for 28.0 % of the variation in the 
original variables. I reasoned that numbers of hammers and axes probably had a greater 
bearing on household size than wealth, so these variables were removed from the second 
analysis. Variables identified to have loadings less or equal to 0.30 were also removed in the 
third analysis. 
In the third analysis, the first principal component (that was adopted as the wealth index) 
accounted for 33.0 % of the variation in the original variables. The original variables that 
strongly defined the wealth index by being strongly loaded on the first principal component 
included employment status of household head (0.54) employment status of other household 
members (0.65), ownership of irrigation plots (0.37) and numbers of bicycles (0.73), ox-carts 
(0.74) and radios (0.74).  Other variables included in the analysis but with weaker loadings 
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were ownership of cattle (-0.60), goats (-0.42) and shelter type (-0.42).  Even though Scoones 
(1995) identifies the latter set of variables as wealth related, this may not apply to the study 
area because most households may be investing income realized from employment and 
irrigation plots in these assets. The wealth index was classified into five equal percentiles, 
each of which represents a wealth class on a scale spanning from very poor, poor, coping, 
managing and managing well.  
Table 12: Quantities of products harvested and income realised from product sales 
disaggregated by wealth quintiles in Nyanyadzi and Jinga 
Wealth 
quintiles 
Fibre (bundles) Fruits (buckets) Pulp (buckets) Income ($) 
Nyanyadzi 
First    0 (+0) 
Second 230 (+466) 26 (+ 31) 28(+30) 126(+343) 
Middle 160 (+179) 29(+ 78) 54(+73) 72(+ 166) 
Fourth 77 (+ 80) 21(+ 27) 21(+46) 172(+ 590) 
Top 20% 142(+ 270) 16(+ 19) 13(+19) 73(+ 208) 
Total 167 (+335) 22(+ 36) 23(+37) 103(+322) 
Mean value 74.72 63.70 12.13 3.55 
S.D 85.46 44.00 4.92 3.54 
Jinga 
First  4 (+3) 0 (+ 0) 0 (+0) 
Second 36 (+53) 8 (+8) 19 (+7) 9(+31) 
Middle 177 (+199) 6 (+7) 0 (+O) 21(+76) 
Fourth 20.5 (+23) 11 (+19) 19 (+9) 34(+131) 
Top 20% 15 (+9) 5 (+ 4)          (+0) 0.4(+1) 
Total 51 (+94) 8 (+10) 12 (+9) 15(+71) 
Mean value 12.61 8.32 6.41 1.61 
S.D 13.76 6.88 5.10 3.42 
     
t-value 1.76 3.05 1.98 0.97 
F- value 2.9 33.39 0.00 0.22 
Significance + ***   
N=336 
+ significant at 0.12% 





5.8.4 Harvest for domestic use 
Baobab fruits still played an important role as a food source. Fruits were eaten throughout 
the year. Households stored fruits in secure places away from the rain, for example in 
granaries to increase the shelf life of the fruits. The quantities of the different products 
harvested in 2011 for subsistence use are presented in Table 13. 
Table 13:  Quantities of baobab products harvested and by products and income made per 
household in Jinga and Nyanyadzi, 2011.  
Product Total for own use 
(mean) (std) 
Fruit (buckets) 5.16 (+4.54)66 
Pulp (buckets) 0.00 
Oil (litres) 2.83 (+3.97) 
Leaves (bundles) 15.68 (+31.04) 
Tubers (dozens) 1.71 (+0.92) 
Ice lollies 18.94 (+16.80) 
Coffee (cups) 6.61(+6.65) 
5.9 Characterisation of harvesters 
5.9.1 Education of harvesters 
Quantities of fibre, fruits, and pulp harvested were tallied against the highest level of 
education of the harvester (Table 14). Education levels of villagers clearly determined their 
level of involvement in the harvest and trade of baobab products. The general trend showed 
that collection of baobab fibre, pulp, and fruits was mostly done by villagers with low 
education levels.  
There was a linear relationship between education levels and fibre collected (p value of fibre 
is significant at 0.01%). Much of the fibre was harvested by less educated residents. The same 
was true for fruit harvesting (p value of fruits was significant at 0.01%).  
                                                          
66 A bucket weighs about 7.5kg of pulp and seed.  
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The pulp value was highly significant at 1 % and showed a very strong positive relationship 
between education level and amount of pulp collected. The higher the level of education, the 
less involvement in pulp collection. Value addition, as reflected by buckets of pulp processed, 
suggested that the lower the level of education, the more likely the collector was to process 
the baobab fruits (Table 14). Buyers like Kaite offered a premium price for pulp ($0.20/kg).  
With regards to annual income from the sale of baobab products, in Nyanyadzi, those with 
incomplete “O” levels earned the highest amounts of money per year ($234). In Jinga, a 
similar trend was noted though the annual total income from the sale of baobab products 
was small ($33) compared to Nyanyadzi. 
Table 14: Level of education and annual means of quantities of fibre, fruit and pulp 
produced and income earned for Nyanyadzi and Jinga. 
Highest level of 
education 
Income ($) Fibre (bundles) Fruits (buckets) Pulp 
(buckets) 
Nyanyadzi 
No education 78.1 119.7 13.0 9.1 
Grade 7 
 
71.1 86.2 16.6 4.9 
Incomplete “O” 
level 233.6 35.5 16.7 5.2 
“O” level 65.6 100.7 13.0 2.1 
“A” level 0.0 25.0 3.5 0.0 
Technical Diploma 0.0 15.0 10.0 0.0 
Jinga 
No education 0.5 10.7 1.7 0.0 
Grade 7 23.4 9.0 6.8 1.1 
Incomplete “O” 
level 34.5 15.0 8.3 8.5 
“O” level 11.3 15.2 5.6 0.0 
“A” level 6.0 0.0 15.0 0.0 




Education was also used to analyse craft sellers sampled along a 5km stretch in Nyanyadzi in 
2013 (Figure 3).  
 
Figure 3: Level of education of craft traders along the highway in Nyanyadzi 
N=37. Field data, 2012. 
In total 67.6% of the traders had attained secondary level education (51.4% “O” levels, and 
16.2% junior secondary level). The least number of traders (8.1%) had not been to school. 
Thus, those with secondary level education were mainly involved in the trading of crafts along 
the highway. To sell crafts along the road, the trader had to negotiate prices with buyers some 
of who were tourists from outside the country so the trader had to know English. This was 
different from bark and fruit harvesting which was mainly done by those with low levels of 
education.  
5.9.2 Wealth of harvesters 
Based on wealth classes created with the assistance of the informants during group 
discussions (Annex 6), the level of use of baobab products by households in each wealth class 




















Highest level of education
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Table 15: Perceived % of households in each wealth class involved in baobab product use 
in Nyanyadzi and Jinga. 
Wealth 
class 






1-Richest 10% Bought fruits for making ice lollies for sale. 
Bought finished mats for sale in urban areas or in South Africa. They could 
employ someone to do the selling for them. 
Consumed fruits as a snack, and preferred the sweet type which they 
bought from collectors. 
2 21% Wove crafts and also bought from other weavers. Most of the best 
weavers were found in this class. 
 Might export crafts to South Africa but not bulk traders. Instead, sold 
crafts along the highway 
Some of them bought fruits to make ice lollies for sale. 
Hardly involved in direct debarking of fibre. 
Collected fruits for own consumption. 
3 40% Collected fruits for own use, sell along the highway and sold to bulk buyers. 
Stored some fruits in granaries for consumption during the off season. 
Did bark harvesting for own use and sale 
Wove attractive mats.  
4-Poorest 29% Harvested bark and fruit. 
Consumed a lot of fruits all year round and consumption increased during 
drought periods. 
Sold fruits along the highway, and also to bulk buyers like Kaite. 
Sold fibre to crafters. 
Might make small mats, not very immaculate designs. 
Total 100%  
Jinga 
1-Richest 16% Occasionally ate fruits. 
Picked or bought fruits for sending to relatives in urban areas. 
2 19% More like class 1 but ate a little bit more especially during drought periods. 
Used pulp in porridge. 
 
3 20% Harvested fruits mainly for own use and increased consumption of baobab 
fruits during drought periods. 
Sold some fruits to business people who made ice lollies. 
 
4 22% Ate a lot of baobab pulp in their porridge all year round. 
5 –
Poorest 
23% Consumed baobab fruits throughout the year, so they stock fruits at home. 
Sold sweet fruits to families in classes 1 and 2. 
Total 100%  





For Nyanyadzi there was active involvement of almost all the households, though wealth 
classes 3 and 4 (poor) were more prominent. However, during drought periods, classes 3 and 
4 consumed the most fruit in the form of mutandabota.67 For Jinga, five wealth classes were 
identified. Use in all classes was limited to fruit use for domestic use. Residents only harvested 
fibre when the need arose. Craftsmen were singled out as the only group that harvested 
baobab fibre which they spun into twine used to knit reeds together to make mats.   
5.10 Marketing of baobab products 
There are a number of ways in which baobab products were sold. Below is an account of how 
the products were sold, and a typology of the main actors involved.  
5.10.1 Fibre harvesting and marketing 
Fibre harvesting was a low-skill activity that required low cost technology; poor households 
were mainly involved in this activity (see Annex 6). To harvest fibre, an axe and hammer68 
were the main tools required.  Harvested fibre was sun dried after which it was dyed by boiling 
it with bark from either Berchemia discolour, Trichilia emetic, Securinecra spp, Acacia pods, 
or carbon paper. Dyeing was done by the weaver who decided on the hue of the fibre in 
accordance with the design of the craft to be made.  
Fibre harvesting was mainly done by men between April and November and was a laborious 
process. Most (65.2%), of the fibre harvesters used it themselves to weave crafts while the 
remainder (34.8%) was sold it to craftspeople at $.1/ bundle. The bark harvesters were 
typically learner crafters who made rudimentary and usually small mats sold along the 
highway.  Established expert weavers, Maduka, who were the originators of new craft designs 
and made excellent crafts for the urban and export market were usually the buyers of the 
fibre. Mhare - the entrepreneurial craft weavers who melded craftsmanship with business 
acumen to earn a lot of money from the craft trade were also known buyers of fibre.  
                                                          
67 This is a tangy porridge which can be eaten with little or no sugar or honey.  
68 Household ownership of axes and hammers is 88.6 % and 65.6 % respectively. 
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Fibre harvesting was prominent in Nyanyadzi where there was a booming crafts business. In 
Jinga it was limited to domestic use. 
5.10.2 Fruits on the local markets 
Sweet fruits were highly priced. They cost $1 for five or six fruits in both Jinga and Nyanyadzi. 
Marketing was opportunistic, reliant on travellers and tourists passing by. For craft traders, 
selling fruits was a form of diversification and could last until November as sellers drew on 
their strategic reserves in granaries. Ice lolly makers also provided a market for pulp (Box 2). 
Box 2 Value addition of baobab fruits in Jinga 
Mr. B, a teacher by profession, owned a general dealership shop at Jinga business centre. He 
bought baobab fruits from local residents and processed them into ice lollies. Ms. C, a widow 
who looked after three orphans from her late brother and sister, was one of Mr. B’s regular 
suppliers of baobab fruits. Mr. B usually paid Ms. C in kind, for example food, and also helped 
her with money to cover emergencies. Mr. B sold the ice lollies locally. There was a high 
demand for the ice lollies during the hot season which sold at $.10 each. Per month Mr. B got 
$60. He sold the ice lollies from August to November which earned him about $260.  
Equipment needed to make the ice lollies were a deep freezer, moulding trays, and scoops 
for holding the ice cone. Ms. C got permission to harvest baobab fruit for sale from Mrs. D, 
the village head’s sister. 
5.10.3 Fruit sales on the open markets in urban areas  
Bulk fruit traders from Nyanyadzi sold their fruit at open markets in cities, particularly in 
Mutare, Bulawayo, and Harare. In Mutare, crushed baobab fruits sold at $1 for a 5 litre gallon 
while uncrushed fruits sold at $3 per 20 litre bucket. To secure a vending site, the seller was 
supposed to have a hawkers licence or pay a daily charge of $1 to the Mutare City Council. 
ZANU PF party activists could also demand “protection fees” from the traders.69 
5.10.4 Fruit sales to Private companies 
Kaite Private Company also bought fruits from Nyanyadzi. Another company, Specialty Food 
Africa, used to buy pulp from Nyanyadzi but stopped in 2008.  Kaite set up a processing plant 
at Birchenough Bridge, some 10km away and paid $0.1/kg uncrushed fruit and $0.2/kg 
                                                          
69 This was a prevalent problem in all the cities in the country. The activists were allegedly runners for powerful 
land barons (see for example Legal matters: vendors, 2015). 
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crushed fruits.70 The company had a mobile truck that purchased baobab fruits from fruit 
collectors in Nyanyadzi and provided sacks for packing. The company trained collectors on 
basic hygiene when processing the fruits and encouraged marginalized groups such as women 
to participate. To coordinate the marketing of the fruits at collector level, Kaite recruited local 
agents who were paid a commission.  
5.10.5 Craft marketing 
Crafts were sold along the highway, in shops, and in some permanent vending stalls, in cities 
and neighbouring countries. Selling of crafts along the highway had less transaction costs and 
were usually the entry point for novices (Box 3). Salaried staff also supplemented income 
using income from baobab products (Box 4). 
Box 3:  Importance of the local market 
Mrs. E lived in Gudyanga village but she was originally from Bulawayo. She got married to Mr. 
D in 1995. At the time of her marriage, her husband was a general hand at a construction 
company in Bulawayo. However, three years after their marriage, the husband was 
retrenched. Mrs. E had to relocate to Nyanyadzi while her husband stayed behind to find 
another job. Meanwhile, Mrs. E started harvesting baobab fruits and bark for sale locally to 
fend for herself and their child. “I had never done it before but I had to do it. Life was tough.”  
Soon, she learned from her Gumbu neighbour how to weave crafts from baobab bark and she 
switched from selling raw fibre to selling finished crafts along the highway. That brought her 
more money. On average, per year she sold $250 worth of crafts.  Later on, Mr. D, having 
failed to secure a job, came back home and joined her to weave and sell crafts and baobab 
fruits.  At the age of 15, the E’s first-born child, joined his parents in the baobab trade. As a 
family, they now sold baobab products throughout the year. In 2012, the child was doing his 
final year of ordinary level education at a nearby Council school – his tuition being paid largely 
from income from the sale of baobab products.  The family were able to buy sufficient food 




                                                          
70 The percentage of fruit pulp is normally 16.5 percent. The shell constitutes about 45.5 percent of the weight 




Box 4: Civil servants in baobab craft trade 
Mr. F was a civil servant from Nyanyadzi, working at the Irrigation Scheme in the Department 
of AGRITEX. In 2008/2009, due to hyperinflation, his salary could hardly meet basic needs for 
his family. He embarked on marketing crafts made from baobab bark. He had never done that 
commercially before. To get started, together with his wife, he hired people to harvest bark 
from trees around their homestead.  
He shared the harvested bark in half with the harvesters. The first time Mr. F wove 19 mats 
and took them to South Africa for sale. In total, he got a gross income of $450. He used $270 
to buy basic groceries that were then in critical shortage in Zimbabwe. In Nyanyadzi, the 
family exchanged groceries with finished crafts. From this barter trade, they were able to buy 
over 25 mats. They went to South Africa on another selling expedition. On their second trip 
selling was much easier because they had already made contacts. They used their contacts as 
agents for selling the crafts. In return, the agents got paid with mats. After the second trip, 
the family went to South Africa every month end. What started as a desperate effort to eke 
out a living became a reliable lifeline. Soon they were able to buy household goods and then 
building material. By 2010 the young couple had built a brick house under an asbestos roof. 
Though the Zimbabwe economy stabilised after February 2009, the family continued to trade 
in baobab crafts with the wife undertaking most of the trips as Mr. F was now busy at work. 
With reliable cash income from baobab sales, Mr. F’s wife supplemented her “Ordinary” level 
subjects and she passed and enrolled at a Teachers’ training college.  
5.10.6 Cross-border craft traders 
Cross-border trade of fibre crafts started in the early 1990s. Since then it has been regarded 
as a key source of income with both men and women involved. Reportedly, there has been 
an increase in the number of young men and women involved while married women have 
focused on the local market. This increase has been partly due to the easing of visa 
requirements by the government of South Africa and also the ease of getting a Zimbabwean 
passport. From September 2010, it became cheaper ($57) and quicker to get a passport. 
Previously, a passport cost $140 and took about 3 months to be processed. With women, 
there were mixed sentiments about the merits of cross-border trading. Some had misgivings 
about cross-border trading based on moral and economic considerations.  
5.11 Use of income from baobab products 
Much of the income from baobab products was used to ensure a family’s welfare with 87.3% 
used to buy food, and 10.1% to pay school fees (Figure 4). A small percentage (0.6%) of the 
income was invested in agriculture, a reflection of how risk averse and rational residents are 




Figure 4: Use of income from baobab products 
Source: Field survey, 2012 
To make maximum benefit of the income from the sale of baobab products and circumvent 
the liquidity crunch in Zimbabwe, traders embarked on an innovative revolving fund scheme, 
called mukando (Box 5). 
Box 5:  Investment of income from baobab products-the case of mukando  
Women dominate membership in these groups. Traders of baobab products form groups 
between five and ten members. Members agree on a periodic amount of money they each 
contribute to a group pool fund which is given to a group member on a rotational basis. When 
a member gets the money, it acts as a seed fund which the member can use to start up a 
business or expand an existing one. Over and above this revolving fund, groups can have a 
reserve fund. The money from the reserve fund can be loaned to group members and 
trustworthy members of the community at an interest of between 10-15 % per month. At the 
end of the financial year, group members equitably share profits from the interest generated. 
The motive of this revolving fund was aptly captured by Ms G., a member of a revolving fund 
in Nyanyadzi, who equated it to a very innovative crippled person who leans against the wall 
in order to dance. “If a woman earns a dollar she works so hard that she graduates from 
limping to spinning,” she concluded.  Investments from proceeds of mukando are modest and 
varied. Members have been able to refurbish houses, buy furniture, and start new businesses 
like broiler production.  
Income from baobab products also served as a “launch pad” for some harvesters who 
switched to other livelihood options after acquiring some assets using income from baobab 
products (Boxes 4 and 7). 
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Box 6:  Baobab income as a stepping stone. 
Mr. H was one of the prominent craft weavers in Nyanyadzi. He rose to fame in 1998 after a 
provincial tabloid covered his success story as a talented craft weaver. In 1998, the Institute 
of Environmental Studies at the University of Zimbabwe invited Mr. H to Harare to attend an 
international workshop on the use of baobab. This opened up Mr. H’s understanding of the 
potential of the baobab crafts. He scaled up weaving and because of the publicity he got, he 
was weaving for suave buyers from Harare and Mutare who paid him well for his crafts.  To 
focus on weaving, he hired other villagers to supply him with fibre. Every month, he bought 
$20 worth of fibre. His wife helped with the dyeing of the fibre. In return, his monthly sales 
were over $150. 
By local standards, his life improved remarkably.  He built a modern big brick and asbestos 
house. But before he could finish the construction, the economic and political challenges 
began in the early 2000s. He couldn’t get enough clients and he stopped weaving. He became 
a local agent for cattle buyers and sellers for which he got a commission. He has considered 
embarking on selling fruits to companies buying fruits but for now the cattle business is paying 
him well enough to survive.  
5.12 Discussion 
This chapter has highlighted the use patterns of baobab products in Jinga and Nyanyadzi.  
Jinga provides far fewer economic outcomes than Nyanyadzi, despite the abundance of 
baobab trees in the area and the proximity of the village to Nyanyadzi where a flourishing 
business in baobab fruit and crafts exists. Reasons for this difference are analysed in Chapter 
7, within the context of existing customary practices and statutory forms of governance 
operating in the area.   
Households in both Jinga and Nyanyadzi adopted a range of livelihoods strategies. This was a 
risk reduction strategy, especially as it hedged producer communities against risks associated 
with rain-fed crop production in this dry area. This was consistent with patterns for 
households in similar dry areas. According to Scoones (2009), households in dry areas adopt 
several livelihood strategies, or economic bricolage,71 in order to reduce risks.  
Natural resources, particularly water and forests, were of unequivocal importance in both 
Jinga and Nyanyadzi. The potential contribution of baobab products to local livelihoods can 
best be discerned by looking at results from Nyanyadzi where use of fibre and fruits has been 
happening for a long time (since the 15th century). Increasingly, more households in 
                                                          
71 French term “making do with whatever is available”. 
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Nyanyadzi now harvest or process baobab products throughout the year as shown by over 54 
% of the households reporting harvesting baobab fibre throughout the year in 2011. To put 
this into perspective, earlier research in Nyanyadzi recorded that only one family was involved 
in the marketing of fibre crafts throughout the year (Mukamuri & Kozanayi, 1999). The 
increase in the number of households harvesting baobab products throughout the year is 
confirmation that the sale of baobab products provides crucial income.  Within the baobab 
value chain, stakeholders exhibited multi- dimensional and complex livelihood activities that 
included selling of crafts, fruits, crop production, involvement in cash revolving fund clubs 
(mukando), and three-point trading (Box 4). Put together, these activities guarantee cash 
income to many residents. Two questions that arise relate to the roles of statutory and 
customary forms of governance in influencing the level of produce harvested, and resultant 
the ecological impacts? These two questions are further elaborated in Chapters 6 and 7.  
5.12.1 Income from baobab products 
 Dependence on baobab products in the study site was high with over 53 % of households 
reporting harvesting in 2012. With the average annual income from baobab products per 
household in Nyanyadzi at $233, it means that baobab products alone contributed 40 % of 
the total income of the lowest annual household income ($500). 72   
In Jinga, the average revenue per household from baobab products in 2011 was $33. To 
contextualise this, in 2014, the average total annual income was $114 for a rural household 
in Manicaland Province (ZimVAC, 2014). Thus, households in Nyanyadzi secured more than 
the average income per household in the province in 2014. These results compare well to 
results from other studies. For example, a global survey by Angelsen et al., (2014) on forest 
incomes found that environmental income accounts for 28% of total household income. 
Regionally, income from non-farm activities in sub-Saharan Africa ranges from 30-50 % of 
total income (Ellis, 1998b).  Wynberg & Laird (2007) found an annual income from Marula of 
between $15 and $166 per household while Shackleton and Shackleton (2004) suggest annual 
income of between $86 and $1, 034 as the total contribution of NTFPs to households in South 
Africa. In Zimbabwe, Sola (2004), reported an annual household income of $21 from NTFPs.  
                                                          
72 It was beyond the scope of this study to look at the total income from all forest related products as other 
surveys have done (Cavendish, 2000; Campbell et al.,2002b). 
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The income from the sale of natural products such as baobab products is thus clearly a 
significant supplementary source of cash to meet diverse needs (Campbell et al., 2002b; 
Shackleton, 2015). A look at the expenditure patterns of income from baobab products in 
Nyanyadzi clearly showed this - as much as 87.3% of the income is spent on food, and 10.1 % 
is spent on tuition for children. Investments in immovable assets have also been noted (Boxes 
4 and 7). This gives currency to Welford and Breton’s (2008) assertion that the utilisation of 
baobab products has potential to stimulate local and national economies in producer 
communities.  
Dependence on NTFPs in the dry regions like Nyanyadzi is expected to rise in the study site as 
climate change is projected to increase the severity and frequency of droughts in low-lying 
areas of Zimbabwe where baobab trees are found (Sanchez et al., 2010). In the face of climate 
change, NTFPs have been recognised as a mechanism to cope with crop failure.  
5.12.2 Subsistence use of baobab products 
In the same vein, local consumption needs consideration especially insofar as it meets the 
nutritional requirements of the harvesters who live in the dry areas where most baobab trees 
are located. While NTFPs have been looked at largely as economic resources (Jagger et al., 
2014), Wynberg et al. (2015) argue that NTFPs contribute to local livelihoods through local 
use and trade. Baobab fruits, for example have been valorised as a superfruit for the Western 
markets which has given rise to questions of their impact on subsistence activities in producer 
communities. Results from both Jinga and Nyanyadzi, show that households do a sizeable 
amount 5.2 (+4.5) buckets of fruits per year for home consumption. In Jinga, households also 
keep a sizeable amount of baobab fruits for household consumption. This is in contrast to 
South Africa where Welford et al. (2015) noted that the domestic use of baobab fruits is on 
the decline due to the modernization of food products. Woittiez, et al. (2013) estimated that 
indigenous fruits contributed to 20.0 % of the energy intake of wealthier farmers in Zimbabwe 
and to some 40.0 % of the energy intake of poor farmers in years of inadequate rainfall.  
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5.12.3 Who is harvesting baobab products? 
Evidence from this study shows that both the poor and those better off rely on baobab 
products.  A diversity of people from Nyanyadzi are using baobab products. Some harvesters 
were formally employed while others were retrenchees. Furthermore, some households and 
individuals used trade of baobab products as a stepping stone to better opportunities. For 
example, Messers. F and H, both ended up pursuing other livelihood opportunities after 
raising start-up capital from the sale of baobab products. Results from this study support the 
popular view that NTFPs are a safety net for the poor and suggest that households use forests 
as a source of income (Angelsen & Wunder, 2003; Shackleton & Shackleton, 2004; Fisher & 
Shively, 2005). 
When education, a variable that has been noted to influence NTFP use patterns (Ellis, 2000), 
was considered, it was noted that it does not seem to have a strong influence on harvesting 
patterns of baobab products. However, the more educated people were more likely to 
participate and benefit from the marketing of baobab products.  It is postulated that this 
development is informed by the absence of the middle class in Zimbabwe at the time of the 
research, due to hyperinflation. Jones (2010), aptly characterised the Zimbabwean economy 
at the time of the survey as the “kukiya kiya economy” to denote the various “making do” 
activities that everyone, including the middle class, embarked on in order to survive. This 
contradicts the strong evidence in literature that points to the trend that the poor are 
disproportionately depend on forests (Belcher & Hogarth, 2005; Cavendish, 1997; 2000; 
Campbell et al., 2001; Belcher & Hogarth, 2013). Recent research in China by Belcher & 
Hogarth (2013) on the commercial harvesting of bamboo, revealed that high-income 
households had the highest absolute bamboo income, but low-income households had the 
highest dependence on bamboo income.  Cavendish (2000) came to a similar conclusion after 
carrying out a detailed household survey in Zimbabwe.   
The harvesting of baobab products is unique in that little investment is needed by poor 
households to enter the fruit and fibre markets.  Thus, chances of elite capture, which is of 
concern when communally-owned resources are commercialised (Dovie, 2003; Buchmann et 
al., 2010), has not been a serious problem in Nyanyadzi despite years of commercial 
harvesting. The deliberate targeting of marginalised groups like women and the poor as 
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suppliers of baobab fruits by buyers, and the fortuitous location of baobab trees around 
homesteads which gives owners exclusive rights, has helped curb elite capture.   Furthermore, 
the accessibility of the study site (a major highway passes through the area), means even poor 
people can easily access the market for both fruits and crafts. In the case of fruit selling, the 
fact that Kaite, the main buyer, buys the produce at farm gate and has a processing plant less 
than 15km away, means reduced transactional costs to the fruit harvesters. The use of ethnic 
ties (Kozanayi et al., 2014) even by the poor who are normally disadvantaged (Wynberg & 
Laird, 2007; Cerutti et al., 2012) when communally-owned products are commercialised, 
helps to ensure an equitable distribution of benefits.  
Nevertheless, evidence in Nyanyadzi of the adroit use of financial and physical assets and 
political connections to access more natural resources and cheap labour by the rich were 
noted. Those who have been involved in the craft sector, for example expert weavers 
(maduka and mhare), capitalise on their social connections with buyers and their ability to 
weave beautiful crafts to earn more money than others. The nuances on how the various 
resource harvesters negotiate their ways in harvesting and marketing baobab products and 
how existing forms of governance inform these strategies is further elaborated in subsequent 
chapters.  
In Jinga, largely due to local rules that do not allow for the commercial selling of baobab fruits, 
as well as the Garwe’s own preferential tastes for other livelihood options like beekeeping, 
income from baobab products is low relative to Nyanyadzi. In that sense, Jinga portrays a case 
of customary systems and cultural preferences making local people pursue certain economic 
activities and not others.   
5.13 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented background information about the study, highlighting the socio-
economic characteristics of the area. The chapter has also presented results on the use 
pattern for baobab products in the study in terms of the quantities and value of harvested 
products. The expenditure pattern for the income from baobab products is also explained, 
with the major finding being that most households spend their income on food and education. 
Chapter 6 describes the ecological impact of harvesting different baobab products while 
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Chapter 7 will engage with the nuances used in both Nyanyadzi and Jinga to regulate access 




CHAPTER 6: THE ECOLOGICAL IMPACT AND SUSTAINABILITY OF BAOBAB BARK 
HARVESTING WITHIN DIFFERENT LAND TENURE SYSTEMS IN THE CHIMANIMANI DISTRICT 
OF ZIMBABWE 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter interrogates synergies and discords between customary and statutory forms of 
governance, and the consequences of that interface with regard to baobab use and ecological 
sustainability. Ecological sustainability is understood to mean that the resource is able to 
sustain pressure in perpetuity at the current rate of harvesting (Venter, 2012). Sustainable 
utilisation is the level of harvesting that does not impair the ability of the harvested 
population to replace itself - that is, the rate of harvest should not surpass the rate of 
regeneration (Mutenje et al., 2010). The ecological sustainability of natural resources may 
depend on the tenure of the resource and the land on which it is found (Bruce et al., 1993). 
The three property regimes identified by Shlager and Ostrom (1992), namely private, 
communal, and state, were used as the basis for analysis. Baobab trees are found in all three 
tenure systems and customary practices are used to regulate their use in all three systems, 
although the degree of use differs and is typically most pronounced in communal property 
(Bruce et al.,1993) and less so in state-owned property.  
The key question addressed in this chapter is how sustainable are the harvesting practices 
under different tenure systems in the study site? The research question was underpinned by 
the following more detailed questions for each of the three tenure systems: 
1. What are the fruit and bark production levels of the trees? 
2. What are the harvesting patterns? 
3. What is the prevalence of black soot disease?  
4. What factors affect the fruit and bark production of trees? 
To answer the above research questions, a number of variables that impinge on ecological 
sustainability were analysed, including fruiting patterns and bark collection trends. This 
chapter also draws on product users’ and experts’ perceptions regarding the sustainable use 
of baobab trees. 
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6.1.1 Non- Timber Forest Products (NTFPs) and governance 
Use of NTFPs is gaining momentum with the emergence of markets for natural products in 
the global West. Drawing on Neumann and Hirsch’s (2000) extensive work on NTFP 
commercialization, there are three responses to commercialization that can be discerned. 
These include (1) intervention by the state and its takeover of local management roles; (2) 
improved management as actors are incentivised to manage a resource from which they draw 
benefits and; (3) resource degradation if existing rules weaken. While the need to govern 
natural resources is imperative, the question of what governance model to use remains a 
challenge.   
6.1.2 The role of NTFPs in driving livelihoods in Southern Africa 
Southern Africa is predominately arid or semi-arid, with mostly infertile soils (Frost & 
Mandondo, 1999). While this limits agricultural potential, agriculture is still the main source 
of livelihood for the more than 200 million peasant farmers living in rural areas in the region 
(Mubaiwa, 2004; World Bank, 2007).  Consequently, the majority of rural people harvest 
forest resources for subsistence and commercial purposes (Cavendish, 2000; Campbell et al., 
2001). NTFPs are extensively used by local communities in southern Africa (Campbell & 
Luckert, 2002; Shackleton & Shackleton, 2004; Wynberg, 2004; Shackleton, 2015; Musemwa 
et al., 2017), and include all biological materials other than timber, extracted from natural 
forests or savannahs for human use. These include parts of individual plants such as leaves, 
bark, fruits, and latexes, or parts of the populations’ life cycle, such as seeds, flowers, 
caterpillars and eggs (Mudavanhu, 1998; Belcher, 2003). Low-income farmers may earn 10 to 
25 % of their household income from NTFPs (Cavendish, 2000; Campbell et al., 2002b; Scherr 
et al., 2002; Belcher et al., 2005). At a global level, the contribution of NTFPs is massive. In 
2003, for example, the global market of herbal medicines stood at US$60 billion per year 
(WHO, 2003). FAO (2014) indicated that the global trade in forest products per year is $225 
billion of which NTFPs contribute about $77 billion. 
Local people have harvested and used NTFPs over hundreds of years, although contemporary 
harvesting appears to be driven by economic considerations (Jagger et al., 2014; Cavendish, 
2000; Sola, 2004; Shackleton & Shackleton, 2004; Shackleton et al., 2007). NTFPs also fulfil an 
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important cultural and health needs for many populations (Barany et al, 2004; Cocks et al., 
2006; Cocks et al., 2012; Cocks et al., 2016). 
While most people in rural areas harvest NTFPs, this share decreases as total income rises, 
suggesting that it is poorer people who are most involved in NTFP activities (Schreckenberg 
et al., 2006).  It has also been argued that that households are poor because they harvest 
NTFPs (Neumann & Hirsch, 2000: 35-36). As stated by Neumann and Hirsch (2000:37), poor 
households embark on NTFPs, “not in order to accumulate, but merely to survive”, and that 
given an opportunity, people involved in NTFP extraction will opt for other income generating 
activities (Neumann & Hirsch, 2000). In that sense, it is argued that NTFPs serve as a stepping 
stone for households as they embark on other more lucrative livelihood options.  
6.1.3 Ecological impacts of using NTFPs 
 The baobab is an interesting case because of the growing demand for its products which 
might result in over exploitation of the resource base and marginalization of more vulnerable 
groups in society (Welford and le Breton, 2008).  NTFP Harvesting for subsistence use has 
generally been considered ecologically sustainable due to the perceived benign impact of 
harvesting on the species and ecosystem (Schreckenberg et al., 2000). However recent 
studies show otherwise (Dhillion & Gustad, 2004; Ticktin, 2004). In particular, Ticktin’s (2015) 
review of 70 studies shows that harvesting can indeed have profound effects. Commercial 
harvesting of medicinal plants (Sunderland et al, 2004), palms in southern Africa (Cunningham 
& Terry, 1993), as well as charcoal (Ribot, 1998) have been found to have a significant impact 
on the resource’s ability to reproduce. However, little is known about the ecological 
consequences of harvesting plant exudates such as gums, barks, roots and bulbs, as well as 
fruits which represent a large proportion of commercial, wild-harvested species (Ticktin, 
2004). Some studies have however been done on medicinal plants (Peters, 1994; 
Cunningham, 1993).  
6.1.4 The Baobab tree as an emerging NTFP 
NTFPs have recently started to play a key role in national and global economies with the last 
three decades seeing local people, NGOs and the private sector embarking on a concerted 
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effort to commercialise NTFP use (Mutasa, 2008), to enhance rural development 
(Schreckenberg et al., 2006).  Such commercialization is also seen as an incentive to promote 
conservation due to the perceived benign ecological impacts of NTFP extraction (SAFIRE, 
2007). At a regional level, the SADC Protocol on Forestry, through the Forestry Sector 
Technical Coordination Unit, recommends commercial utilisation of natural products in the 
region on the premise that, “promotion of innovative forest resource utilisation technologies 
will generate income for small holder farmers and reduce forest destruction” (Mubaiwa, 
2004: 31). Among its target NTFPs, the SADC Protocol on Forestry cites and promotes baobab 
fruit juice production as an example of a successful commercialised NTFP (Mubaiwa, 2004). 
With reference to commercial use of the baobab, Mutasa (2008) proffers the existence of a 
ready market both locally and externally as the reason for the fast growth of the baobab 
products industry. The recent granting of Novel Foods status in the European Union (OJEU, 
2008) and the Generally Regarded As Safe (GRAS) (www.foodmanufacture.co.uk, accessed 
2/6/2010) status in the USA have opened up new and bigger markets for baobab products. 
The Overseas Development Institute (ODI), (2006), has projected that the European market 
could initially generate more than US$750 million annually for producer countries in southern 
Africa from baobab products per year, making it the highest earner of all traded NTFPs in 
southern Africa (RTFP, 2007). With increased volumes, this annual income could rise to an 
estimated $1 billion, benefiting over 2.6 million people along the marketing chain (RTFP, 
2007).  
6.1.5 The taxonomy and distribution of the baobab tree  
The baobab tree, known also as ‘the upside-down tree’, Senegal calabash, Cream of tartar, 
monkey bread tree, tree of life (Pettigrew et al., 2012) and Ethiopian sour gourd, is one of the 
most distinctive and useful trees in the African landscape (Sidibe & William, 2002). It belongs 
to the family Bombacaceae and genus Adansonia. The family has about 30 genera, and about 
250 species (Palgrave, 2002; Assogbadjo, 2006). The tree reportedly can survive up to 5 000 
years (Sidibe & William, 2002; NRC, 2008). The name Adansonia was given to this tree to 
commemorate the French surgeon Michel Adanson (1727-1806) who had been to Senegal in 
the 18th century and was the first to attempt to age the baobab and describe it (Adanson, 
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1771). The specific name, digitata meaning hand-like, is in reference to the shape of the 
leaves.  
There are seven species of baobab in the genus Adansonia, while a new diploid species, 
Adansonia kilima which co-exists with A. digitata has recently been discovered (Pettigrew et 
al, 2012). However, only one species, Adansonia digitata L. is found in Zimbabwe. The centre 
of origin for the genus is believed to be Madagascar where all seven species are found 
(Machingambi, 2007). Southern African Adansonia digitata is usually found in the dry parts of 
the savannah (Mudavanhu, 1998; Sidibe & William, 2002, Wickens & Lowe, 2008) although it 
also occurs in forest areas. Outside of mainland Africa, the species is primarily associated with 
human habitation (Sidibe & Williams, 2002; Pock Tsy et al., 2009).  In Zimbabwe, the trees are 
found in low potential agricultural areas (Mukamuri & Kozanayi, 1999; Mullin, 2003). The 
distributional pattern of the baobab in Africa and Zimbabwe is shown in Figures 5 and 6 
respectively.   
The International Centre for Underutilised Crops has identified Adansonia digitata as among 
the top ten agroforestry tree species to be conserved and domesticated in West Africa (Sidibé 
& Williams, 2002), while the National Research Council (USAID) has identified it as one of the 
“lost crops” of Africa on account of the tree’s promise for improving the quality of life in the 










Figure 5: Distribution of Adansonia digitata in Africa and neighbouring areas based on 1. 
Herbarium and flora records. 2. Specimens known to be cultivated or introduced. 3. 
Distribution based on published photographs.  4. Distribution based on KEW “baobab 
survey” information, 5. Records obtained from travel [literature, maps etc. Source: KEW 
Bulletin No. 37 (2)] 
 
 




A number of baobabs with historical importance exist in Zimbabwe (Mullin, 1997 & 2003). In 
Chimanimani, for example, these include Muuyu weburi-the hollow baobab near Biriwiri, and 
the Traveller’s Tree near Birchenough Bridge. Both trees were used in the early 1930s as 
resting places for travellers waiting for transport. Their hollow centres could accommodate 
up to 30 men. The magnificent Twin Gateway to Gazaland baobabs near Birchenough Bridge 
are also famous (Mullin, 2003). Nearby, in Devuri Range, is what is believed to be the biggest 
baobab tree in Zimbabwe with a girth of 27.61 m and a height of 21m (Wickens & Lowe, 2008).  
6.1.6 Black soot disease in baobab trees 
Black soot disease was a source of concern to conservationists and to local people (Matose & 
Clarke, 1993). The disease has been extensively researched by academics (de Villiers, 1951; 
Calvert & Sharp, 1991; Matose & Clarke, 1991; Piearce et al., 1994), and reported by the 
media (Baobab disease puzzles: 2004). Black soot is a fungal disease threatening the baobab 
tree, and consequently, livelihoods and economic opportunities. However, there was no 
consensus about its cause and effects. Some pathologists regarded it as a secondary 
opportunistic fungus infection arising from a physiological disorder (Sharp, 1993), while 
others claimed that it was an indication of trees succumbing to secondary infection due to 
various forms of stress, including excessive debarking (Matose & Clarke, 1993; Piearce et al., 
1994; Mudavanhu, 1998) or lengthy periods of below-average rainfall Piearce et al., (1994). 
Mudavanhu (1998) asserted that the soot causing pathogens can be spread by tools used to 
harvest fibre. Debates rage on about the fate of the affected trees with local people and the 
FC claiming that the trees will eventually succumb, though there is contrasting evidence of 
trees reportedly recovering after infection (Piearce, et al., 1994).  
Extensive research on the chemical and nutritional value of baobab products (Nour et al, 
1980; Ikemefuna & Amaechi, 1992; Ramadan et al., 1994) has also been undertaken. These 
analyses have shown that baobab fruits are highly nutritious. They contain six times as much 
vitamin C as oranges, twice as much calcium as milk, and plenty of B vitamins, magnesium, 
iron, phosphorous, and antioxidants (Chadare et al., 2009) 
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6.1.7 Governance of baobab tree and property rights 
In the majority of cases, baobab trees are found in communal grazing areas where their use 
is subject to contestation by resource users. Oftentimes, customary practices are used to 
regulate domestic use while, like most natural resources, the state tends to get involved when 
the tree is used commercially (Nemarundwe, 2003; IIED, 2009). For natural resource 
harvesters having access to the resource is critical. 
Access is about resource tenure (Bruce et al., 1939). As argued by Quan, (1998), secure access 
to the resource is a basis for sustainable ecology and livelihoods.  In the new ‘institutionalism’, 
common pool resources are goods which are used simultaneously by different users largely 
because of the difficulties in enforcing exclusion rights (Ostrom, 1990). When the rights and 
duties of the different resource users are clearly defined, they become communal property 
resources (Ostrom, 1990). Under this regime every member of a defined community has user 
rights.  Table 16 presents the four types of common property resources found under common 
pool resource use.  
Table 16: Types of property rights regimes in common pool resource use 
Property rights regime Characteristics 
State property The state has the right to determine use and access rules. Individuals 
have a duty to observe use and access rules that are instituted by 
the state 
Private property Individuals have the right to undertake socially acceptable uses and 
have the duty to refrain from socially unacceptable uses. The 
individual or corporate property owner has the right to control, 
lease, rent and transfer ownership 
Common property73 A clearly defined group (owners) has the right to exclude non-
members and the non-members have a duty to abide by the 
exclusion. Individual members of the group have both rights and 
duties with respect to use and maintenance of the resource owned. 
Open access There is no specific group of users or “owners” and thus the benefit 
stream is available to anyone. Individuals have both privilege and no 
right or duty with respect to use and management of the resource.  
Source: Adapted from Nemarundwe (2003). 
 
                                                          




While the above categorisation is appropriate to analyse rights and duties of resource users, 
it has been found that property rights are more complex than portrayed above. In practice, 
natural resources are managed and used under different property regime (Hara et al., 2009). 
Bruce et al. (1993) offered a more detailed typology of tenure systems than the above four. 
They noted that tenures are not that discrete but overlap and that there are de facto land 
tenure systems that involve a multiplicity of actors engaged in struggle over property rights. 
If one examines the territory of a single community where land is governed by indigenous 
tenure, one finds the landscape is divided into a mosaic of land under different uses and 
tenure systems. Each area or mosaic constitutes a tenure niche, that is a space in which access 
to and use of it is governed by a common set of rules. These tenure systems are neither static 
nor simple (Bruce et al., 1993), they change over time and under different management 
systems e.g. with weak management systems in place, state property can become open 
access or communal property (Ostrom, 1990).  Customary systems are used in all tenure 
systems, though the degree of use differs and is often most pronounced in communal 
property (Bruce et al., 1939) and less so in state owned property. Generally, a positive 
relationship exists between granting of tenure rights and access to benefits by the right 
holder. However, as Ribot and Peluso (2003) show, power and not access rights, may be the 
key in determining the volume and direction of benefit flow.  
6.2 Results  
The baobab production capacity under different tenure systems was assessed by measuring 
tree size, and fibre and fruit production levels. The results of the assessment are presented in 
the sections below. 
6.2.1 Tree sizes 
The average tree height across all three tenure systems was 13.6 m (±4.9m), with an average 
diameter at breast height (DBH) of 5.8m (±3.1m) (Table 17). There were no significant 
differences in tree height across the three tenure systems (n=244, F=2.611, p>0.05). No 
significant differences were noted in DBH between privately-owned and communally-owned 
trees although there were significant differences in the DBH between privately-owned and 
state-owned trees (n=244, F=4.607, p<0.01).  
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Table 17: Average values (±s.d.) for baobab tree height, diameter at breast height (DBH) 
 and number of fruits.   
Tenure No. of trees Tree height (m) DBH (m) No. of fruits 
Private 106 14.2(±5.4)a 6.3(±3.2)a 109.2(±259.4)a 
Communal 80 13.9(±4.7)a 6.0(±3.3)a,b 69.3(±100.3)a,b 
State-owned 58 12.4(±4.5)a 4.7(±2.6)b 23.3(±40.9)b 
Total no. of trees 244    
Mean  13.6(±4.9) 5.8(±3.1) 75.9(±179.5) 
Values were taken from trees in three different tenure systems in the Chimanimani District. 
Differences in average values for each variable were determined by ANOVA and a Tukey post-
hoc test. Dissimilar superscripts denote significant differences at p<0.05. 
The difference in tree height between Jinga and Nyanyadzi was insignificant (n=186, t=1.76, 
p>0.05) (Table 18). However, there were significant differences in tree diameter between 
trees in Jinga and Nyanyadzi (n=186, t=2.49, p<0.05). All the three tenure systems are found 
in Jinga and Nyanyadzi. Baobab tree density is similar in both villages. 
Table 18: Average values (+s.d) for baobab tree height, diameter at breast height (dbh)  
and number of fruits.   
Area No. of trees Tree height (m) DBH (m) No. of fruits 
Jinga 52 15.5(±6.5)a 7.1(±3.7)a 154.0(±191.3)a 
Nyanyadzi 134 13.5(±4.4)a 5.8(±3.0)b 68.0(±210.1)b 
Total no. of trees 186    
Mean  14.0(±5.1) 6.1(±3.3) 92.0(±208.1) 
The values were taken for trees from Jinga village and Nyanyadzi. Differences in average 
values for each variable were determined using Student’s t-test. Dissimilar superscripts 
denote significant differences at p<0.05. 
6.2.2 Number of fruits 
Average annual fruit production per tree was 75.9 (±179.5) fruits (Table 17). Privately-owned 
trees produced significantly more fruits than the trees on state-owned land (n=244, F=4.229, 
p<0.05). There was no significant difference in the number of fruits per tree between 
privately-and communally-owned trees. 
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Trees within the Nyanyadzi cluster produced significantly fewer fruits per tree (68.0 (±210.1)) 
than in Jinga 154.0(±191.3) (n=186, t=2.569, p<0.05) (Table 18). By comparison, Jinga trees 
produce 226.5% more fruit than the least-producing areas in Nyanyadzi.  
6.3 Harvesting dynamics 
6.3.1 Bark harvesting on trunks and branches 
Bark harvesters began debarking at least 30cm above the ground, and when the entire trunk 
was debarked, they also removed bark from the branches. To reach the top parts of the tree 
trunk and branches, bark harvesters used stilts or scaffolds. Sometimes the scaffolds reached 
heights of up to 6m.  
6.3.2 Intensity of debarking 
Across the three tenure systems each tree was debarked on average 2.7 (±1.8) times (Table 
19). Trees on privately-owned land were harvested the least number of times at 2.3 (±1.8), 
with trees on state-owned land harvested the most at 3.8 (±1.8) times. There were no 
significant differences in the frequency of harvesting between trees on privately-owned and 
communally-owned trees, although both tenure systems differed significantly from state-
owned trees in terms of the number of times that debarking had occurred (n=244, F=13.754, 
p<0.001).  
There was a significant difference in the number of harvests between Jinga and Nyanyadzi, 
with trees in the former harvested 0.4 (±0.6) times compared with 3.1 (±1.4) times for the 
latter (Table 5) (n=186, t=13.637, p<0.001). 
6.3.3 Area harvested 
An average of 0.33m2 (±0.20m2) was debarked from each tree per bark harvesting session 
(Table 19). There were no significant differences in the area debarked for private- and 
communally-owned trees. However, state-owned trees differed significantly from the two 




6.3.4 Years since last harvest 
This variable indicated the period given to a tree to recover from debarking (Table 19). 
Between the three tenure systems, trees were debarked within two years of the last 
debarking 2.0 (±2.4). There were no significant differences between the years since harvest 
across the three tenure systems (Table 19) (n=244, F=2.392, p>0.05).  
Table 19:  Average values (±s.d.) for bark harvesting and its impact on baobab trees for 





No. harvests Total area of fresh 
harvest (m2) 
Years since last 
harvest 
Private 106 2.3 (±1.8) a 0.30 (±0.20) a 2.3 (±2.6) a 
Communal 80 2.6 (±1.6) a 0.32 (±0.19) a 1.5 (±1.6) a 
State-owned 58 3.8 (±1.8) b 0.40 (±0.16) b 2.0 (±2.9) a 
Total no. of trees 244    
Mean  2.7 (±1.8) 0.33 (±0.20) 2.0 (±2.4) 
Differences in average values for each variable were determined by ANOVA and a Tukey post-
hoc test. Dissimilar superscripts denote significant differences at p<0.05. 
6.3.5 Impact of bark harvesting on the tree trunks 
In both Jinga and Nyanyadzi, bark harvesting had significant impacts on tree trunks in 
communal areas and on state-owned lands. In these two areas trees were debarked more 
than one rung up the trunk, up to 6m. Tree branches were also debarked (Plate 1). Trees on 
private lands were also debarked up to more than one rung, but 39.9% of the trees had not 
yet been debarked.  
In Nyanyadzi, the trees surveyed showed signs of mild to severe debarking. Only 0.8% of the 
trees in the area had not been debarked at all while 15.7% had been debarked only once. 
Most (83.5%) of the trees had been debarked more than once. It was observed that trees in 
communal areas close to the residence of the Ward Environmental Management Committee 
chairperson in Nyanyadzi had not been debarked. Beyond the vicinity of the chairperson, 
trees were severely debarked, suggesting that monitoring of bark harvesting was weak. 
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In Jinga, there was nil to mild debarking. A total of 61.5% of the trees in Jinga had never been 
debarked, while the remainder (38.5%) had only been debarked once. 
6.3.6 Impact of bark harvesting on branches 
Trees in communal areas in Nyanyadzi were generally debarked up to the branches (Table 
20). On private and state-owned lands, debarking of branches was insignificant. Debarking of 
branches for fibre in the study site was a new phenomenon, not reported in previous studies 
(Mudavanhu, 1998; Mukamuri & Kozanayi, 1999; Romeo et al., 2001). In Jinga there was no 
evidence of debarking at branch level. 
Values taken for trees in Jinga and Nyanyadzi, in the Chimanimani District. Explanations for 
the different index value categories are explained in Table 2, Chapter 3. The proportion of 
trees in each category within each tenure system is shown. 
There were significant differences between Jinga and Nyanyadzi and the impact of baobab 
bark harvesting on stems (n=186, df=3, χ2=130.32, p<0.001); branches (n=186, df =2, 
χ2=13.33, p<0.01); and the provision of fibre (n=186, df =2, χ2=96.02, p<0.01) (Table 20). 
However, the index of tree health did not differ between tenure systems (n=186, df=2, 
χ2=2.61, p>0.05). 
In Nyanyadzi and College (a state-owned area), just a small number (less than 10%) of trees 
were still able to provide good quality fibre. The bulk of the trees produced poor quality fibre 
which was an indication that the trees had been debarked several times. However, in Jinga 
the bulk of the trees appeared to still be producing good quality fibre. Despite there being 
little debarking taking place in Jinga, there was an almost similar number of trees producing 
very poor-quality fibre. This anomaly is explained by the fact that black soot disease is one of 
the factors that contributes to fibre quality, and occurred in baobab trees in an idiosyncratic 
fashion. Even trees that were benignly debarked were prone to infestation by the disease, for 




Table 20:  The impact of baobab bark harvesting on (a) stems, (b) branches, (c) fibre 




6.3.7 Tree health 
The health of the tree, as defined by the level of infestation by black soot disease, was of 
concern to resource harvesters and managers alike. For harvesters, bark from diseased trees 
could not be used for commercial purposes, while the number of fruits per tree reportedly 
decreased with an increase in black soot infestation. Locals and the EMA and Forestry 
Commission (FC) officers thought that diseased trees would eventually succumb and die.  
6.3.8 Ability to provide fibre 
A tree’s ability to provide good quality fibre is important to craft makers. It is an indication of 
the potential productivity of that tree. Poor quality fibre means poor quality crafts are made 
which ultimately means less money for the craft makers.  
If trees were able to produce good quality fibre, bark harvesters tended to be indifferent in 
terms of where they got the fibre. However, as quality decreases (for example once all the 
good quality first-cut fibre had been harvested), more fibre was harvested from across the 
different tenure systems. This was due to the fact that second-cut fibre (mupindwa) was 
generally of poorer quality than the first-cut fibre (mutanguro), and craft makers would use 
more second- cut fibre to make a craft than they would if they had first cut fibre. Harvesters 
also preferred using first cut fibre which produced longer lasting crafts.  
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Plate 1: Heavily debarked (left) and black soot infested (right) trees 
  
6.4 Cross site analysis for non-continuous variables 
There were significant differences between tenure systems and the impact of baobab bark 
harvesting on trunks (n=243, χ2=28.66, df=6, p<0.001); branches (n=243, χ2=51.26, df=4, 
p<0.001); and the provision of fibre (n=243, χ2=14.22, df-4, p<0.01) (Table 20). However, the 




Table 21: The impact of baobab bark harvesting on (a) stems, (b) branches, (c) fibre 
provision and (d) tree health.   
Values taken for trees under three different tenure systems in the Chimanimani District. Explanations 
for the different index value categories are explained in Table 2, Chapter 3. The proportion of trees in 




6.5 Relationship between variables 
Spearman rank correlation coefficients were calculated to analyse the relationship between 
different variables.  
The number of harvests was significantly positively related to the area harvested as well as 
the impact of harvest on stems and branches (Table 22) The larger the area harvested, the 
more patches on the trunk that were harvested. However, the area harvested was not related 
to the impact on the branches. This was because only the upper side of branches were 
harvested. It was impossible for harvesters to debark the underside of branches because of 
the design of the scaffolds used to access the branches. The impact on the stems, however, 
was significantly related to the impact on branches. The more the trunks were harvested, the 
more harvesters debarked the branches. 
Table 22: Spearman rank correlation coefficients for the number of harvests, area 
harvested and the impact of harvesting on stems and branches.   
 Area harvested Impact on stems Impact on branches 
No. harvests 0.575*** 0.777*** 0.199*** 
Area harvested  0.587*** 0.057 
Impact on stems   0.226*** 
These figures taken from 245 trees in the Chimanimani District. Significance values are: *** = 
p<0.001. 
The number of harvests (but not the area harvested) as well as the impact on tree stems and 
branches was significantly related to the ability of the tree to provide fibre (Table 23). 
Continued harvesting, however, produced poor quality fibre. There was a negative correlation 
between the number of harvests, the area harvested, the impact on stems and the number 
of fruits. The number of bark harvests, area harvested, and the impact on stems and trunks 




Table 23: Spearman rank correlation coefficients for the relationship between bark 
harvesting of baobab trees and the number of fruits, the ability of the trees to produce 
fibre and the health index.   
 No. of fruits Ability to produce fibre Health index 
Number of harvests -0.183** 0.244*** -0.022 
Area harvested -0.164** 0.077 0.037 
Impact on stems -0.199*** 0.281*** -0.022 
Impact on branches -0.060 0.157** 0.007 
These figures were taken from 244 trees in Jinga and Nyanyadzi in the Chimanimani District.  
Significance values are: **=p<0.01; ***=p<0.001. 
6.6 Perceptions of sustainability 
The high frequency of harvesting in Nyanyadzi has led the national government, through the 
FC, to declare the area the “epicentre” of baobab degradation. Hence a suite of regulatory 
mechanisms were put in place by the FC in collaboration with the RDC and EMA (Chapter 7).  
The FC district officer and the Entomology Department regarded the black soot disease as a 
major threat to the survival of the baobab tree and this was communicated through the print 
media (Community urged to: 2014)74. Debarking was strongly believed to be a factor that 
predisposed the baobab tree to further infestation by the disease. The Department of 
National Museums75 in Mutare concurred with the FC that debarking was responsible for the 
spread of the black soot disease, and that fruit harvesting was not having a negative impact 
on the sustainability of the baobab.  
Results from a household survey carried out for this research showed that 71.0% of the 
population in Nyanyadzi believed that the current rate and pattern of baobab bark use was 
not sustainable. In Jinga, during a PRA exercise in 1993 (Hot Springs Report, 1995), locals 
projected that at the then rate of baobab use, there was not going to be a major change in 
                                                          
74Forestry Commission spokesperson, told the Zimbabwean newspaper that debarking reduces the lifespan of 
the baobab tree so there was need to educate harvesters on how best to debark (The Zimbabwean, 2014). 




the quality of the resource base in the village twenty years later (in 2013). In 2012, locals 
believed that baobab fruits were still able to provide enough fruits and fibre to local residents. 
Overall, in assessing the sustainability of baobab use, both the technical experts and local 
users focused on bark-use and the black soot disease and less on fruits, for which lucrative 
markets have opened in the West.  
6.7 Discussion 
This chapter has illustrated the production capacity of the baobab trees under different 
tenure systems, as well as use patterns across the same tenure systems in Jinga and 
Nyanyadzi. Below I present a summary of the main findings from this chapter.  To ascertain 
the ecological outcomes of the interaction of customary practices and statutory forms of 
governance in the regulation of baobab products across different tenures, production levels 
of the trees in Nyanyadzi and Jinga are discussed. This is followed by a discussion of the link 
between production and the black soot disease.  
Fruit production and harvesting 
Fruiting trends can be indicative of a tree’s potential to regenerate, and can be a proxy for 
health status of the tree (Venter, 2012). Fruit estimation is also important to give an indication 
of the economic opportunities available (Venter & Witkowski, 2013b), and of the availability 
of food for both people and wildlife. Fruit production can be estimated using tree diameter 
or canopy. While this might give an indication of quantity, it does not consider fruit size, and 
is therefore, inappropriate for the study of baobab trees (Venter & Witkowski, 2013b). 
Therefore, physical counting of fruits was carried out. 
By comparison with other baobab trees, the trees in the study site constitute an aging 
population (Venter, 2012). Based on the size of the trees, however, they may be considered 
at their peak in terms of fruit production (Schumann et al., 2010). On average, for Jinga and 
Nyanyadzi, each tree produced 92.0 (±208) fruits per year. However, there was a very high 
variability in fruiting between Jinga and Nyanyadzi. Nyanyadzi trees produced fewer fruits per 
tree than Jinga. Trees in Jinga produced 226.5% more fruits than Nyanyadzi trees. In both 
areas, communally-owned trees, as well as those on state-owned land, had a lower number 
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of fruits per tree – 69.3 (±100.3) and 23.3 (±40.9) – respectively, than trees on privately owned 
land – 109.2 (±259.4). Importantly, these two tenure systems were characterised by having 
the worst debarked trees.  
Predation of fruits by wild animals, especially baboons, might have contributed to the low 
fruit yields in the state owned and communal areas. Shells of fruits were observed in the 
communal and state-owned lands that had been eaten by baboons well before they reached 
maturity. Therefore, the potential yield in these two tenurial systems could be slightly more 
than what was captured in the survey. Fruit trees around homesteads and crop fields were 
generally protected from baboons as there was usually someone at home or in the field 
protecting the crops.  
Relative to baobabs in Botswana and South Africa, baobab trees in the study site, particularly 
Nyanyadzi, are producing less fruit (Rhodes, 2009; Venter, 2012). Earlier work in the study 
area indicated fruit production figures of 250 fruits per tree (Mudavanhu, 1998; Romeo et al., 
2001). Venter & Witkowski (2013a) found similar rates in the north of South Africa. There was 
a lot of speculation from people who were interviewed about why there was a reduction in 
the number of fruits per tree, especially in the Nyanyadzi area. The district level state officials 
attributed the reduction to excessive debarking of the trees and heavy infestation by black 
soot disease. Local people in Nyanyadzi suspected reduced fruiting to be caused by spirits 
who were angry with the wanton way local people were utilizing natural resources. Overall, 
reduced fruit harvesting and debarking were topical issues.  
Debarking versus black soot and fruit production  
Results unequivocally illustrate that trees in state-owned land are debarked the most. The 
trees also produce less fruit, presumably due to excessive stress from debarking, since there 
is a strong negative relation between debarking and fruit production. That the baobabs are 
excessively debarked can be explained by the fact that the state does not enforce its 
regulations, which is further compounded by the accessibility of the trees to harvesters. Most 
of the trees on state land are located close to harvesters.  
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Results from this study show that there was a significant correlation between numbers of 
harvests, areas debarked and extent of trunk debarking, and the fruiting pattern of baobabs. 
This, together with frequent droughts, are plausible explanations for the below average fruit 
production. Work by Schumann et al. (2010) shows that debarking on its own has little or no 
impact on fruit production. However, this could be due to different levels of debarking. In 
Nyanyadzi, locals debarked trees all the way to the branches, usually in less than the two 
years stipulated turnaround time.  
Debates in the literature on the impact of debarking on fruiting are many. In West Africa, the 
site for Schumann et al.’s (2010) research, there are no cases of debarking up the trunk and 
branches, as was the case in Nyanyadzi. Rather, Schumann et al. (2010) argue that branch 
pruning, which is uncommon in the study site, is the greatest contributor to poor fruiting. 
Dhillion (2004) postulated that leaf harvesting causes mutilation that reduces the number of 
fruits on each tree. Leaf harvesting in the study site is mild and most probably would not have 
any impact on fruit production. Elsewhere in national parks in Zimbabwe, Swanepoel (1993) 
and Mpofu et al. (2012) discovered that trees that are severely stripped by elephants tend to 
produce less fruit. Thus, beyond a certain degree of bark and leaf harvesting, the tree 
succumbs and limits fruit production. Results from this study showed that debarking affects 
the fruiting capacity of trees. Trees debarked up to branch level within a two-year period 
produce fewer fruits. These results call for reconsideration of the baobab’s unique healing 
process which enables it to recover after debarking.  
Debarking, just like bark stripping by elephants, has been known to predispose the tree to 
secondary infections by diseases (Piearce et al., 1994; Kamatou et al., 2011). As described, 
black soot infection has been one of the reasons for policy intervention by both the state and 
traditional leaders. The degree of bark stripping that caused a tree to succumb to infection 
was unclear, and it was a subject beyond the scope of this research. Preliminary results 
presented from this study showed that the number of bark harvests, and the area harvested, 
had no impact on the health of the tree by causing black soot outbreak. The harvesting of 
fibre up the entire stem to the branches was a new phenomenon which was not observed by 
earlier researchers (Mudavanhu, 1998; Mukamuri & Kozanayi, 1999; Romeo et al., 2001; 
Mutasa, 2008).  
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A conclusion drawn from these findings is that there is a need to balance the increased 
demand for bark and the need to observe the two-year resting period for a harvested portion 
to heal. However, based on these research findings, it can be concluded that the two-year 
resting period stipulated by traditional leaders, is not sufficient. Romeo et al. (2014), after 
monitoring debarked baobab trees for five years in Zimbabwe, noted that debarked trees 
required a minimum of six years to recover to the pre-debarking level. Results by Kamatou et 
al. (2011), suggests a similar resting period, while estimates by Matose and Clarke (1993) of 
ten years seem exaggerated. The difference between customary practice and scientific results 
calls for the need to meld, if not support, customary practices with Western science-based 
knowledge. 
Black soot disease: an outcome of stress? 
During this study, respondents attributed black soot disease to severe debarking, droughts, 
and to the vengeance from spirits of the land who were reportedly angry with the excessive 
abuse of natural resources in general, and the baobab tree in particular, and with human 
rights abuses. 
Results showed that the black soot disease was common in both Jinga and Nyanyadzi. Using 
predetermined indices, baobab trees in Jinga were on average still in good health, with the 
rate and intensity of infection in all the villages in Nyanyadzi not very much different from 
Jinga. This raises an interesting question regarding the impact of debarking on the spread of 
the black soot infestation. 
Results suggest that bark harvesting has no significant impact on the outbreak of black soot 
disease and the infestation of trees by the pathogen. These findings refute earlier 
assumptions by Mudavanhu (1998) that the pathogen that causes the disease is transmitted 
using utensils used to harvest the bark. Trees in Jinga, where limited bark is harvested, have 
an almost equal level of infestation to Nyanyadzi. Causes other than stress from damage seem 
plausible. Such causes for example, include prolonged periods of drought (Piearce et al., 1994; 
Rhodes, 2009) coupled with the shallow root system of the baobab tree which is sensitive to 
droughts (Sharp, 1993).  
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Zimbabwe’s rainfall over the past decade has amounted to the lowest cumulative total on 
record since the 1900s (Bolding, 2004). The argument that drought is the main cause of the 
disease is given credence by Sharp (1993), who reported that at Birchenough (in the 
Nyanyadzi area) between 1992 and 1993 (both drought years) a total of 27% and 44% of trees 
respectively were severely attacked by the black soot disease. Black soot infestation started 
in the 1940s in Zimbabwe, including in the Save Valley (which falls inside the study site), and 
its outbreak was associated with below average rains at the time (Piearce et al., 1994).  
A forestry officer for Manicaland discovered a number of affected baobab trees in the study 
site in 1949. These infected trees, which the FC has been monitoring, were still alive, 65 years 
later (Piearce et al., 1994). This refutes earlier views especially by the FC that affected trees 
will die (immediately) as a result of the disease. The ban on bark harvesting was initially 
motivated by this perception. According to work by Fisher (1981), the baobab is the only tree 
species known to survive complete girdling. It does that by having its xylem parenchyma cells, 
which are just below the exposed wood surface, dedifferentiate into cambial derivatives that 
then regenerate xylem and phloem tissues. Normally, most trees regenerate bark slowly from 
the vascular cambium on the margins of the wound (Romeo et al., 2014) which results in trees 
dying if ring barked.  
Black soot and fruit size 
In a separate assessment, Machingambi (2007) discovered that bark harvesting affected fruit 
size while the black soot disease affected the number of seeds per fruit. According to 
Machingambi (2007), heavily debarked trees produced smaller fruits while heavily infected 
trees resulted in fewer seeds in each fruit. There was a positive correlation between fruit size 
and the number of seeds per fruit; the smaller the fruit, the fewer the number of seeds it 
contained, and the reverse was also true. This negative impact of bark harvesting and black 
soot disease on fruit size and number of seeds validates the case for strengthening the 
regulation of bark use and of the factors that control black soot disease. From this 
perspective, the ecological sustainability of the fruit value chain is threatened with more 
debarking and black soot infestation.  
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With regard to black soot disease, there have been many different views expressed on what 
predisposes baobab trees to this fungal infection, and the official narrative seems to be based 
on inconclusive results if not speculation.  
If indeed drought was the main cause of black soot disease presented above, as compellingly 
argued by numerous researchers, climate change will add a new dimension to the debate on 
the disease and local livelihoods dependent on baobab products. Climate change models 
predict higher temperatures in all baobab growing areas in Zimbabwe (Sanchez et al., 2010).  
Regeneration and recruitment 
Although the regeneration and recruitment of baobab tress was not assessed as part of this 
work, a detailed study on the subject carried out in the area (Mudavanhu, 1998) showed that 
there was enough recruitment in the area. Work by Mpofu et al. (2012) in Gonarezhou 
National Parks, Zimbabwe and by Venter and Witkowski (2013a) in South Africa, also 
indicated that in general there was enough regeneration of baobab trees in most land use 
types.  
In Jinga, residents thought there was enough recruitment as evidenced by young saplings 
seen under and near baobab trees. However, in Nyanyadzi, there were mixed sentiments 
about the recruitment trends with some informants highlighting that there was not enough 
recruitment due to the excessive sale of fruit and seed outside the producer communities. 
The FC was proactive by promoting some silvicultural interventions, together with local 
leadership to encourage the growing of baobab trees. In Nyanyadzi, the FC partnered with 
the local traditional leadership to establish an indigenous woodlot. Communities were 
provided with seedlings of indigenous trees to plant during the annual National Tree Planting 
week.76 Active planting and protection of adult trees has been recommended as a way to 
ensure sustainability of the resource base (Venter & Witkowski, 2013c).  
It has been observed in several studies that communities can successfully cultivate indigenous 
trees. These include Warburgia salutaris (Veeman et al., 2014), Afzelia quansensis 
                                                          
76 In Zimbabwe, the first Saturday of every December is designated a national tree planting day. The day was 
launched by the Prime Minster of Zimbabwe in 1980. Individuals, communities or organisations are expected to 
plant trees from this day to the end of April. 
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(Nemarundwe, 2003), Uapaca kirkiana and Sclerocarya birrea, Ziziphus mauritiana (Kwesiga 
et al., 2000; Nemarundwe, 2003; Gerhard & Nemarundwe, 2004; Akinnifesi et al., 2007), and 
Adansonia digitata in West Africa (Akinnifesi et al., 2007). Surveys on tree preferences in 
Zambia, Malawi, Zimbabwe, and Tanzania showed that Adansonia digitata was one of the 
natural trees locals preferred for domestication (Akinnifesi et al., 2007). Cultivation and good 
tree management has been shown to improve fruit traits of planted indigenous fruit trees 
(Maghembe, 1995; and Leakey, 2005). It also improves security of tenure which means even 
poor households will have direct control over productive resources.  
Use of baobab trees in state owned lands-the soft under belly  
Results from this study unequivocally illustrate that trees in state owned land suffered the 
most from debarking. They also produced less fruit, presumably due to excessive stress from 
debarking, since there was a strong negative relation between debarking and fruit production. 
That the baobabs were excessively deba rked can be explained by the fact that the state did 
not enforce its laws which was further compounded by the accessibility of the trees to 
harvesters. Most of the trees were located close to harvesters. These trees were targeted 
when traditional leaders tightened access rules in the communal areas. Mandondo and 
Chahweta (2008) concluded that use of state lands usually gives rise to contestation as 
communities living close to the resource claim their own tenurial niches in order to harvest 
some resources. This appears to be the case in Nyanyadzi.  
These findings were consistent with what Matose (2002) found around gazetted forests in 
Zimbabwe. Matose (2002) concluded that even with staff on the ground, gazetted forests 
were still poorly guarded, making them vulnerable to local communities who could easily 
harvest prohibited forest resources. Poor working conditions and rampant corruption by 
authorities in the last fifteen years has demotivated the skeleton staff on the ground 
(Alexander & McGregor, 2013). This has greatly compromised policy implementation. This 
conforms to the findings of Cerutti et al., (2012) in Cameroon, that when disillusioned state 
officials on the ground perceive those at the top to be corrupt this can cause policy failure.  
In addition, the Zimbabwe government has been struggling to generate funds to manage even 
high-value state forests (Mutimukuru, 2010). According to the Minister of Finance (2009-
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2013), the country had been struggling for more than a decade to fund key sectors such as 
health (Biti, 2012), which has left very little money to support the conservation of forests. This 
has left traditional authorities having oversight of baobab trees traditionally under 
custodianship of the state. In evaluating the effectiveness of customary practices in ensuring 
ecological sustainability, cognisance should be taken of the fact that traditional authorities as 
enforcers of customary practices, are spreading their efforts over additional areas that the 
state should be responsible for.   
Pertinent to this study is what Kajembe et al. (2003) noted as the weakness of the state when 
it takes over management of a communally-owned resource area. Kajembe et al. (2003) noted 
that when government takes common property from the people and makes it state property, 
unless the state is able to enforce its laws, the land slides into an open access regime. The 
case of the “college” area in Nyanyadzi which could result in open access for fibre, is a good 
example. Ecological results from the “college” show a situation slowly sliding into Hardin’s 
(1968) envisaged tragedy of the commons whereby the communally owned natural resources 
are depleted beyond sustenance as each harvester tries to maximise the benefit they get from 
the area.  
However traditional authorities still exercise some level of control of resource management 
even in those state-owned areas where the state is reducing its influence. Furthermore, 
traditional authorities have to regulate use of trees on private lands, such as those growing 
around homesteads. While the management of such trees was the direct responsibility of 
homestead owners, it behoved traditional leaders to ensure that all trees under their 
jurisdiction are well managed, regardless of their location. This is also a statutory 
requirement. The Traditional Leaders Act (TLA) of 1998 mandates traditional leaders to 
ensure that natural resources under their jurisdiction are used according to national laws, and 
to “immediately report any contravention of the law to the police.” The trees might be on 
state land or around a private homestead, but if they grow within the traditional leader’s 
geographical area, s/he still considers that they are under her/his jurisdiction.  
Traditional leaders also have a traditional duty to care, for resources under their jurisdiction 
and argued that, “elected governments come and go but we remain guarding the land and 
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resources of our forefathers”77. Similarly, Baldwin (2015) observed in neighbouring Zambia 
that chiefs’ longer time horizons encourage investment in local institutions that enable the 
provision of local public goods. Failure by the traditional leaders to guard against wanton 
destruction of natural resources was believed to invoke the anger of the spirits of the land. 
For that reason, traditional leaders exercised oversight over “privately” owned trees around 
homesteads. The traditional leaders felt that they owed it to their ancestral spirits to 
safeguard all natural resources found in their areas, regardless of tenure.  
Socio–technical considerations 
For the Gumbu people of Nyanyadzi, craft making was part of their culture and identity. It 
defined who they were. Much as debarking was stressing the trees, putting a moratorium on 
craft making as a policy option (as has been attempted by the local District Council Authority) 
was considered a harsh intervention. Alternative sources of fibre for example, from jute or 
sisal were proposed, while at the same time promoting trade in fruit trading for companies 
involved in processing and exporting baobab pulp and oil. Results by Schumann et al. (2010) 
on commercial fruit use seem to show minimal impacts on the baobab tree, provided enough 
seeds are left in order to regenerate new trees.  
Propagation of the baobab trees by harvesters should be considered as an option to enhance 
ecological sustainability and improve livelihoods. Their growth rate has been found to be 
reasonably fast especially after the first five or six years (NRC, 2008), with fruiting possible 
after eight to twenty-three years (UNCTAD, 2005). Thus, as noted by the NRC (2008), planted 
trees can be “life-insurance plantings” that provide permanent food security for the 
household. Already, one community in Nyanyadzi has started to plant baobab trees, albeit on 
a small scale. 
Harvesting of privately-owned and communally-owned trees was regulated to some extent. 
Therefore, it can be inferred that communally-owned resources, despite pressure arising from 
use of products, were still managed by customary practices. As noted by Agrawal (2007), 
                                                          
77 Similar sentiments were also raised in during a community meeting when the ephemeral nature of elected 
governments was likened to a running stomach that does not last long. Further, the TLA (1998), section 12, 
subsection (1g) mandates traditional leaders to report any resource degradation and disasters in” the area under 
their jurisdiction”.  
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customs and social conventions designed to induce cooperative solutions, can overcome 
collective action problems and help achieve efficiency in the use of such resources. This was 
very clear in Jinga village, where, despite there being a lucrative market for baobab products 
in Nyanyadzi, only 20km away, baobab harvesting was still well regulated. In Nyanyadzi, use 
was particularly excessive in state owned areas due to lax enforcement of rules by the state, 
while in private and communal tenure areas, it was moderate to bad respectively.  
In Nyanyadzi, as use pressure increased, some of the traditional methods of conservation 
started to wane. Customary practices that had been observed over the years, such as giving 
debarked sites at least two years to recover, are no longer being adhered to. This confirms 
observations by Mutenje et al. (2010), that the effectiveness of local level practices can be 
weakened by exogenous pressures arising from increasing market integration, and high 
population pressure. A need to strengthen these customary practices is imperative.  
On the basis of the ecological variables assessed, the exploitation of baobab products in Jinga 
was still sustainable. The absence of bark harvesting in the area rendered use sustainable. 
The same cannot be said about Nyanyadzi. A long history of bark use, which has intensified in 
the last two decades, has put the baobab tree under immense pressure. Cultural differences 
between the two areas explained the differences in use patterns. The need to effectively 
manage baobab trees in both Jinga and Nyanyadzi is imperative to ensure ecological 
sustainability. As noted by Hara et al. (2009) and Quan (1998), sustainable use depends on 
sound management of the resource base. Both customary and statutory forms of governance 
are key to achieving this double dividend principle. Chapter 7 presents and discusses the local 
level forms of governance that are regulating baobab use in the study site.  
In some respects, baobab use is pitting the state against the peasants, and customary versus 
statutory forms of governance. The state has control over all the land and the resources on 
the land. Even what is considered private or communal land, belongs to the state, with 
communal areas held in trust by the traditional leaders as communally-owned property rights 
(Mandondo, 2001). However, as Bromley and Cernea (1989: 25) point out, “many states have 
taken on far more resource management authority than they can be expected to carry out 
effectively”. Further, Murphree (1993) concluded that management of communally owned 
resources by the state in Zimbabwe has been demonstrably ineffective in both the colonial 
142 
 
and post-colonial eras. The case is worse for NTFPs, or minor forest products like baobab, 
because of their perceived low values.  
6.8 Conclusion 
This chapter concludes that although customary practices, just like the baobab tree itself, 
have shown a lot of resilience in regulating the use of baobab trees under different tenure 
and use regimes, in Nyanyadzi, such customary practices appear to be stretched to the limit.  
This is evidenced by over harvesting of trees in the area. Customary efforts at regulating use 
need to be complemented by the state. However, as shown by the degree of resource 
degradation in state-owned areas in this study, the state was ineffective in enforcing its 
statutory regulations on baobab use. Both the customary and statutory forms of governance 
have inherent weaknesses. Use of either or both calls for serious consideration.  What 
mechanisms then can be proposed as the form of support which the state and customary 
forms of governance should provide to each other? These questions are further developed in 





CHAPTER 7: CUSTOMARY AND STATUTORY FORMS OF GOVERNANCE OVER BAOBAB IN 
THE CHIMANIMANI DISTRICT OF ZIMBABWE.  
The aim of this chapter is to understand how customary and statutory practices govern the 
use and management of baobab in the Chimanimani District of Zimbabwe. The chapter 
elucidates what happens in practice in relation to how people gain access to the baobab tree, 
and how they negotiate different systems of governance to access, harvest, use and sell 
baobab products.  In this chapter I develop issues raised in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 and provide 
empirical evidence from Nyanyadzi and Jinga to demonstrate how the interaction between 
customary and statutory practices occurs at the local level. The chapter starts with an analysis 
of institutions involved in the governance of baobab products and an assessment of how local 
people perceive the roles of different institutions. An overview of customary and statutory 
practices used to manage baobab products is given, followed by a discussion of resource 
users’ knowledge of, and compliance with these forms of control.  
7.1 Institutions and their influence in regulating baobab use 
An understanding of the institutions involved in regulating the use of baobab, as well as their 
perceived influence, is important in order to appreciate the different dimensions of baobab 
governance. Table 24 below presents a ranking of the influence of different institutions on 
baobab governance, based on the perceptions of residents in Nyanyadzi. The score denotes 
the relative weighting accorded to the institution by informants, while the rank reflects the 
position of the institution in relation to other institutions insofar as managing natural 





Table 24: Institutions and their influence in regulating baobab use in Nyanyadzi 
Institution Score78 Rank79 Remark 
Village heads 20 1 Live close to the resource base. They are the 
traditional custodians of all the natural resources in 
the villages.  
Chief 17 2 Though the chief lives far away, he is very influential 






14 3 They are locally resident and interact often with 




11 4  Facilitate the crafting of local by-laws that regulate 
baobab use. 
Teach sustainable harvesting methods and business 
models. 




9 5  They can protect trees around their homestead 
through fencing, using charm (muzazata), barbed 
wire or brush.  
Ward 
councillor 
8 6  Articulates ward needs at council. Spearheads 
development in the ward by “luring donors”.  
Mandated by local by-laws to regulate access to 






7 7  Coordinate harvesting activities. It is headed by the 
ward councillor as its chairperson while traditional 
leaders help to decide who has access, and how 









5 8 Make occasional visits to the area to discuss use of 
baobab bark. 





4 9  Among other duties, the MP courts donors to come 
to the area, for example to support initiatives to add 
value to baobab products.  
                                                          
78 This was the perceived influence of the institution to governance of access to baobab. Importance was 
illustrated by the number of counters allocated to each option. 
79 This was prioritisation of the options according to their perceived weighting by local informants. 
80 Such committees have limited powers. Residents used the analogy of a security guard from a private company 
whose mandate is only to guard a small area for example, an Automated Teller Machine (ATM), and turns a blind 
eye to other crimes away from the ATM machine. The argument is that the committee members can only control 
the behaviour of members in their groups. 
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Schools 3 10  Both primary and secondary schools cover 
environmental science in their curriculum to educate 
children on the value of forests. 
Police 2 11  Maintain order through settling domestic disputes 
arising from baobab use. 
Churches 2 11  Pray under some baobab trees which then become 
protected. Some teach good environmental 
practices.81 
Witchdoctor82 1 13  Kusinga musha – ring fence trees and property 
around the homestead using charms which 
purportedly ensure that any unsanctioned 
harvesters will easily be identified by the homestead 
owner.  
Traditional authorities (village head and chief) were ranked highly on account of their being 
the ‘owners’ of the land and the resources found thereon. However, the chief was ranked 
second after village heads because he resided in Muusha, over 70 km away from Nyanyadzi 
and was not directly involved in the day-to-day governance of the baobab products.  
AGRITEX was one of the government departments that was highly ranked. Although their 
primary responsibility is to provide technical support in crop production, AGRITEX interacted 
directly with residents and taught them about environmental conservation. Each ward had 
an average of three resident AGRITEX officers. 
In Nyanyadzi, the institution of the witchdoctor was raised and explained by women. They 
reported that to deal with illegal bark harvesters, they had considered enlisting the assistance 
of Ndunge, a proficient witchdoctor.83 He is believed to have supernatural powers to inflict 
harm on anyone who steals from any person to whom he has given charm.  The charm is 
administered within the context of what is called the “kusinga musha” ritual.  The mere 
                                                          
81 This was mainly mentioned by congregants of the United Methodist Church (UMC).  Emery Alvord, the 
godfather of agricultural extension in Zimbabwe who was a United Methodist preacher and resident at 
Nyanyadzi in the 1940s, was credited by elderly people in the area for having preached about good forestry 
practices. The elderly in the United Methodist Church (UMC), still upheld such teachings. According to Rev. 
Manungo of the UMC, on environmental issues the church was guided by the social principles of John Wessel – 
the founder of the church who taught people to “do good” in order to preserve the natural resources that God 
created in their goodness as stated in Genesis 1 verses 26-31 (During devotion at an environmental training 
workshop at Mutambara Mission, 19/8/09). 
82 In particular, there was one prominent magician in Chipinge who was believed to have potent magical powers 
and was widely consulted especially by fortune seekers like alluvial diamond panners (see Athlete, pastor and 
master:  2015).  
83 Ndunge has received wide media coverage (for example, Athlete, pastor, master: 2015). 
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mention of Ndunge’s name within a deeply conservative society sends shivers up the spine of 
any prospective thief.  
WEMEC was ranked low despite receiving support from civic organisations (for example, 
SAFIRE and EAfrica) and the RDC. Reasons for this are varied but revolved around legitimacy 
and sustainability. Locals viewed the NGOs as sometimes pushing the agenda of the RDC. 
Furthermore, the NGOs usually implement very short programs after which the communities 
are left to do the projects on their own with limited or no resources.   
Formal institutions (RDC, EMA, and the FC) were ranked low, reflecting the residents’ negative 
attitude towards these institutions which they viewed as only interested in extracting taxes 
and levies from the resource harvesters and being part of the state, which had implemented 
a number of unpopular policies.  
Informants did not mention the Ministry of Education and Culture. The Ministry has an officer 
resident at Nyanyadzi who is responsible for promoting cultural values and practices. Follow-
up interviews indicated that the Ministry, through a local officer, was working with organised 
craft groups in Nyanyadzi to promote marketing of the crafts through attending District and 
National Arts Council fetes.  
For Jinga, institutions involved are presented in Table 25. The institutions included traditional 




Table 25: Institutions and their influence in regulating baobab use in Jinga 
Institution Score Rank Remark 
Village head 20 1 “Owns” the land-and everything in it. He has 
prosecuting powers including evicting habitual 
offenders.   
Presides over rain making ceremonies and other 
rituals.84 
Aides to the village 
head 
12 2  These are the village head’s eyes. They wield 
power to arrest offenders but do not have 
powers to prosecute. 
Chief 10 3  Imposes punitive fines on offenders.  
Though powerful, he lives far away. 
Ward councillor 9 4  Advises residents of new environmental policies 
from council. 





7 5  They promote community horticultural projects 
in the village. As part of their training they also 
teach good environmental practices. 
Police 6 6  Instil discipline in residents, so that residents 




4 7  Usually discusses political and development 
projects rather than forest issues. She 
articulates residents’ concerns and aspirations 
about the use of local natural resources in 




3 8  It was once active in the late 1980s controlling 
charcoal trading which had started in the area 
and was threatening to cause deforestation. It is 
not actively involved in the management of 
baobab products in the area.  
Schools 1 9  Teach children good forestry practices.  
Source: Survey, 2012 
In Jinga, power was concentrated in the hands of a village head, more than in Nyanyadzi. 
During the ranking exercise, one elderly man aptly summed up the power dynamics in the 
village. “Muno muva Garwe hatidi dongawatonga remwedzi nenyeredzi” (“We, of the Garwe 
                                                          
84 Failure by the traditional leaders to conduct thanksgiving is believed to invoke the fury of the spirits of the 
land which consequently causes suffering among residents. Thanksgiving was believed to result in 




tribe, detest the multiplicity of power nodes like that of the moon and the stars – only a 
central source of power should prevail – like the sun during the day).” However, within the 
Jinga community there is some devolution of power. A sister to the village head, with the help 
of her daughter-in-law nicknamed Mugabe,85 dealt with small administrative issues by 
allowing baobab harvesters living near her, particularly women, to harvest baobab products 
(Box 2, Chapter 5).86  
Aides to the village head also authorised the harvesting of small quantities of natural 
resources without necessarily having to consult the village head. On that account, they were 
recognised as an important institution that enjoyed some degree of autonomy from the 
village head.  
Informants were not aware of the existence of WEMECs, nor had they elected the committee. 
Though the police were mentioned, residents reported that the police were only informed of 
environmental issues after cases had been reported to the village head. Bypassing the village 
head by first reporting cases to the police brought a backlash and a fine from the village head.   
7.1.1 Comparisons between Nyanyadzi and Jinga in terms of institutional configurations 
Jinga differed from Nyanyadzi in a number of ways. In Jinga, there were fewer institutions 
involved in the governance of baobab products (9 compared to 13 for Nyanyadzi). The 
institution of village head was prominently mentioned in Jinga, together with the supportive 
aides to the village head. Though aides existed in Nyanyadzi too, informants did not want to 
differentiate them from the village head because they did not sanction the harvesting of 
baobab products without the authority of the village heads. Instead, in Nyanyadzi, the chief 
was ranked as the second most influential though he lived some 80 km away. Fortuitously, 
the chief had his subordinate resident in Nyanyadzi and he was actively involved in issues 
regarding the management of baobab products.  
Although power appeared centralised in the village head in Jinga, there was some degree of 
devolution to the village head’s aides and relatives and this improved the efficiency of 
                                                          
85 A figurative name meant to denote the immense power the woman had, just like the president of the country 
who has ruled the country with an iron fist for more than three decades. 
86 In Ndau policy women from the ruling family are influential figures (Beach, 1994). 
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governing baobab products and natural resources in general. Furthermore, in Jinga the role 
of NGO involvement in regulating the use of baobab products was less influential, confined 
to training in environmental conservation and community horticultural programs.   
In both Nyanyadzi and Jinga, traditional leaders had centralized powers and considerable 
authority in the governance of the different aspects of baobab. Another similarity was that in 
both areas, state institutions were ranked low. In both areas, there was recognition of the 
roles schools played in environmental education but their influence was not considered to be 
strong. Overall, for both Jinga and Nyanyadzi, traditional authorities were ranked highly while 
elected and government departments were held in low regard. Perceptions about traditional 
authorities and formal authorities influenced the way resource users negotiated access to 
baobab products.  The nuanced negotiation strategies used by resource users to access 
various baobab products are explained later in this chapter.  
7.2 Actors involved in the local baobab value chain  
Actors involved in the baobab value chain were identified and characterised in terms of their 
interests and linkages (Figure 7).  Actors are institutions who have a direct or indirect interest 
in baobab products and services. An appreciation of the range of actors and their interests is 
crucial to understanding baobab use dynamics; interrogating the governance issues at each 





Figure 7: Actors in Baobab value chain 
While fruits and fibre by-products end up in regional and international markets, particularly 
in South Africa and Europe, only local actors were considered in this study. These included 
the private sector, state institutions, NGOs, local harvesters, and banks. Each of these actors 
had a specific interest, and they often conflicted. For example, some users were only 
interested in harvesting for subsistence purposes while others had commercial inclinations. 
Banks provided lines of credit to entrepreneurial resource harvesters who processed baobab 
fruits into pulp for sale to big private companies. In Nyanyadzi, the NGO Phytotrade Africa 
coordinated the promotion and trade of baobab fruits through supporting buyers like Kaite 
and Specialty Food Africa. NGOs including EAfrica, SAFIRE and Practical Action also worked in 
Nyanyadzi with a view to ensuring the sustainable harvesting of baobab fibre. 
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7.3 The cultural significance of baobab products 
The baobab tree played a key cultural role in the lives of people in Chimanimani. The cultural 
significance of baobab tree products was expressed in local languages, and described 
harvesting dynamics and the cosmologies around use. This has a bearing on the governance, 
of baobab. Such expressions were also used to emphasise principles of equity and 
sustainability in the utilisation of shared natural resources, including baobab.  
Language is an indispensable feature of culture in all societies (Gombe, 1995; Bogopa, 1999). 
Linguists readily acknowledge the use of language to communicate culture and shape the 
behaviour of people (Mpofu, 2003; Chigidi, 2009). It is the major vehicle for the transmission 
of people's beliefs and values (Mpofu, 2003). Treating language in this light helps to 
understand why the Ndau use a particular type of language on a particular occasion in their 
use of baobab products. Understanding such languages helps to situate local customary 
practices in proper context. 
Culturally, spendthrift behaviour was abhorred and discouraged in the utilisation of 
communally owned natural resources, such as baobab. Behaviour such as the harvesting of 
unripe fruit products (matakufa) was regarded as a form of greediness (mbawu) and was 
punishable by the spirits of the land.  Mbawu was when one harvested more than what one 
wanted to use or sell. This form of hoarding was discouraged because some of the harvest 
could eventually rot without being consumed or sold. Such wasteful behaviour was also called 
kuzhuwa, a form of pillaging. Some harvesters could be very efficient at harvesting baobab 
products (kuva nechara), but that was not regarded as a problem because as soon as they got 
what they wanted to meet their needs, they would stop.  High productivity (chara) was usually 
inborn or was acquired as harvesting skills were honed. Either way, harvesters who had chara 
were adored because they were efficient resource users and were not wasteful, especially 
with baobab bark. They were quick to harvest enough of their target yield and gave others a 
chance to harvest as well. Thus, while a utilitarian mentality was associated with conservation 
efforts, it had to be guided by rationality on when to stop harvesting.   
Generally, the baobab tree was considered a priceless, God-given resource, and locals in 
Nyanyadzi argued that if they were given access, and were conscious of the centrality of the 
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tree to human welfare, they were bound to exercise duty of care. Reasonableness in the use 
of the resources was expected to prevail among users.  
7.4 Cosmologies of the Ndau in the governance of natural resources 
Ndau cosmologies also play an important role in the conservation of baobab. There was a 
strong belief that the spiritual world manifests itself through physical resources. There is a 
close relationship between the well-being of the forest and that of the people who use and 
manage the forest. Environmental abundances or disasters were often explained in religious 
rather than biophysical terms. In the case of baobab, the fact that an increase in black soot 
disease coincided with the period of economic and political repression was sometimes 
explained by locals as a consequence of ruthless repression of dissenting voices by the 
regime.87  Elderly informants in Nyanyadzi supported this belief by using a long-observed 
behaviour of child and mother, “a baby never suckles from its mother if the mother is 
weeping.” People cannot be nourished if Mother Nature is weeping from savage abuse. 
Sound, responsible management of the forest and its products is required for nature to 
provide abundantly for its residents, so went the logic.   
Bad behaviour at a personal level could be construed as causing community-wide 
environmental problems. Thus, each time there was a natural disaster, someone was 
suspected to have done something wrong to warrant the wrath of the spirits of the land. This 
called for the traditional leaders to consult with their diviners. In Jinga, one Mr. L, was accused 
of incest with his daughter and was evicted from the village by the head with the blessing of 
Chief Mutambara.88 Frequent droughts, outbreaks of menacing quelia birds and poor baobab 
fruiting was allegedly caused by this act. Consequently, this forced community members to 
show good manners at an individual level for the common good.    
At Nyanyadzi, the local United Methodist Church hacked down a very large Xanthocersis 
zambeziaca tree that was supposedly sacred, for the purpose of building a preschool. The 
                                                          
87 In Shona history, another interesting case of such historical coincidence is the outbreak of the rinderpest 
disease in 1896 which killed many cattle. The outbreak of the disease coincided with the arrival of the colonial 
column and the Shona believed that the disease was caused by the arrival of the Whites which the spirits of the 
land disapproved of. The Shona then rose up against the Whites in what was to become the first Chimurenga– 
war of revolution.  
88 The issue was also covered in the Manica Post, provincial tabloid (Father deflower, sires, 2012) 
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Church had to approach the local traditional leadership for the purpose of rapprochement 
with the spirits of the land after the roof of the preschool was blown away by mysterious 
winds on two separate occasions (Kozanayi et al., 2014).  
Traditional leaders were regarded as the earthly custodians of natural resources and used 
customary practices to regulate their use. They also belonged to the spiritual realm as they 
acted as intercessors between the living and the spirits when they presided over rituals of 
appeasement or rapprochement.  
Before any forest product harvesting, a ritual to supplicate the spirits of the land was carried 
out by the harvester. For baobab products, the traditional leaders were supposed to do the 
supplication on behalf of the whole community for plentiful provision. The degree to which 
this was still being observed by both the resource harvesters and the traditional leaders could 
not be ascertained but local accounts suggested that it was now rare.  
In Nyanyadzi, more than in Jinga, group discussions indicated that there had been significant 
changes in the locals’ belief system, brought about by social, political, and religious factors. 
The Jinga village head summed it thus, “Rave bindura nyika kuridza ngoma ngeguvhu 
(incomprehensible change as illustrated by a person playing the drum by their navel).”  This 
denoted admission by the village head that the socio-politico-religious factors were having 
profound and confounding impacts on local customary practices.  
7.5 Customary practices regulating use of baobab products in Nyanyadzi and Jinga villages 
Table 26 below details the rules and practices used to regulate access to baobab products. 
Traditional rules were similar for Jinga and Nyanyadzi with differences in the way the rules 
were enforced. In Jinga, almost all rules were formulated and enforced by traditional leaders. 





Table 26: Customary rules governing utilisation of baobab products in Nyanyadzi and Jinga 
Baobab Product Rules 
Fruits Only harvest ripe fruits when they have fallen to the ground. 
Leave some fruits for wild animals. 
Do not burn the shells of sweet fruits. 
Bark Only harvest from mature trees.  
Ring barking is prohibited.  
In Nyanyadzi, harvesting for sale has to be authorised by 
traditional leaders. 
To harvest bark and fruits from trees around homestead one must 
seek authority from homestead owner. 
Leaves Do not harvest from sacred trees. 
Tubers Only gather enough for own use. Selling is prohibited. 
Whole tree Cutting down of the whole tree is prohibited. When it is absolutely 
necessary to cut it down, permission has to be sought from 
traditional leaders. 
Non consumptive uses Worshipping under the tree has to be authorized by traditional 
leaders.  
 
7.6 Changes to customary and statutory forms of resource governance 
Both customary and statutory forms of governance for baobab have changed over time in 
Nyanyadzi and Jinga; 18.7% of households reported changes in customary practices since the 
early 1990s, and 27.4% considered statutory forms to have changed as well. Causes for the 
changes were political, economic, and social. Figure 8 presents some of the reasons for the 




Figure 8: Reasons given for changes in customary and statutory systems of baobab 
governance in Jinga and Nyanyadzi 
A number of exogenous factors related to the macro-economic and political situation in the 
country, contributing to the weakening of both governance systems. Such factors included 
unemployment, lawlessness, repressive policies by the government and poverty. There were 
also some inherent weaknesses within the state and traditional leaders’ authorities which 
respondents believed contributed to the weakening of baobab governance. These included 
corruptions among traditional leaders and lack of resources on the part of the government. 
There was a belief that both forms of governance undermined each other’s efforts. Traditional 
authorities accused the state of disempowering them in the early 1980s. Their views on this 
were best captured by Headman K of Nyanyadzi, who remarked that in the early 1980s there 
was wanton destruction of the forests, as traditional leaders were rendered powerless by the 
new government, “we were also made subjects of the new leaders (VIDCOs)”. Traditional 
leaders argued that since then, they had been struggling to regain control of the populace 
with regard to regulating access to natural resources.  
Local people in both Jinga and Nyanyadzi readily admitted that through the intermingling of 
different ethnic groups there were ethnic cultural practices that were not commonly 
observed. In both areas, a distinction was made between local and upland rules and practices. 
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Often, they spoke of “that practice is done in the uplands not here in the valley89.” Ndau 
residents who lived in the valley waived some customary practices in order to survive in the 
dry valley. Differences mainly arose with regard to the commercial harvesting of baobab 
products; while the chiefs were generally unhappy with the practice village heads supported 
it. 
Table 27 below presents informants’ perceptions on the nature of the changes to the 
customary and statutory practices in Nyanyadzi and Jinga. 
Table 27:  Nature of changes to customary and statutory practices 
Nature of change Customary practices 
(%) 
Statutory practices (%) 
Became more relaxed  
Became stricter  
Replaced by statutory laws 
Replaced by customary practices  
Replaced by by-laws  




















Weak enforcement of rules was the main cause of the change for both forms of governance. 
However, 29.7% of the respondents felt that customary practices had become stricter as 
compared to 13.0% who felt the same about statutory practices. Overall, commercial 
utilisation of baobab products did not impact the two forms of governance regulating baobab 
use (customary practices (8.1%) and statutory practices (10.9%). It appeared many informants 
were not aware of the statutory rules in place, as shown by 41.3% saying they did not have a 
view to the issues under discussion. 
                                                          
89 This is reference to other Garwe and Gumbu who live on the escarpment where dry land crop production is 
more productive due to better rains received. Chiefs Mutambara and Muusha for the Garwe and Gumbu also 
live upland.  
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7.7 Negotiating access to baobab  
Access to baobab products was negotiated in complex ways from household to ward levels. 
Application of customary and statutory rules at these levels differed and is described in the 
ensuing sections.  
Grazing areas were the main source for baobab products, and accounted for 37.9% and 42.3% 
of harvested fruits and fibre respectively. A sizeable number of households harvested the two 
products from around their own homesteads and crop fields. Trees in sacred areas were not 
harvested a lot; less than 2.0% of the households harvested both fruits and fibre from these 
areas. Kinship and residence-related access patterns were discerned. Neighbouring districts 
were an important source of products. A total of 7.5% and 12.8% of households in Nyanyadzi 
harvested fruits and fibre respectively from Chipinge and Buhera Districts which bordered 
Nyanyadzi. Vendors supplied 3.3 % of households with fruits and 15.4% with fibre. A quarter 
(25.4%) of the households harvested fruits from their own yards, compared to 21.8% who 
harvested fibre from their own yards. 
Complex customary and statutory practices were used to negotiate access, at a variety of 
different geographical scales.  
7.7.1 Customary practices regulating use 
 Intra household level 
In Nyanyadzi, every member of the family had access to fruits and fibre from privately-owned 
trees located around homesteads. Proceeds from the harvest were usually shared among 
family members. Village heads had oversight over the use of baobab trees around 
homesteads and punished anyone who violated rules. Men were mainly responsible for the 
harvesting of baobab fibre while women and children were mainly responsible for the 
collection of fruits for sale. Granting of rights to access small volumes of fruits around the 






Access to products from baobab trees around homesteads was negotiated with the 
homestead owner. The demarcation between homesteads was usually a perimeter fence. 
While terms of payment for accessing the homestead trees differed between homesteads, 
often an equitable sharing of harvest between harvester and homestead owner was used.  
For fruit and bark harvesting, access was regulated through allotment size. The household 
head set a limit to the quantity of resources one could harvest. The guiding principle was a 
local axiom – “Munzara haapinzwi mudura (you do not give a hungry person unfettered 
access to the granary).” The reasoning, which became popular with the commercial use of 
fruit and fibre, was that approaching someone for permission to harvest baobab products 
around the homestead was an indication of desperation. So, a desperate harvester would be 
tempted to over-harvest to maximize their yield, and therefore there was a need to closely 
monitor the harvesting pattern. 
Fruits around the homestead were usually for local use, but in certain cases, access by other 
residents could be negotiated between homestead owner and fruit collector. Inter-household 
negotiation for access to bark was common in Nyanyadzi. Commodification of fibre around a 
homestead has been a recent development, for financial gain by those endowed with trees 
around their homesteads. For fibre the husband usually decided, while for fruits, tubers, and 
leaves it was usually the wife or adult children. For leaves and tubers, access was usually free 
but out of courtesy, the harvester asked for permission from the homestead owner if these 
were harvested close to someone’s homestead. This gendered access-granting arrangement 
made it easy for harvesters and resource owners to negotiate.  
Access to trees in crop fields was complex. There was speculation among informants in 
Nyanyadzi that the reason why some families grew crops each year when the crops always 
failed was to gain legitimacy over baobab products in those fields. Crop fields were out of 
bounds during the cropping season provided the field was under some crop. So, the field 
owners enjoyed some exclusive rights over the baobab fruits until about April when the fields 
reverted to communal ownership. The same was noted in Jinga. One woman confirmed that 
one reason she ploughed her field yearly was to have exclusive access to Berchimia discolor 
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fruits.  She even swept under the tree to make sure that the fruits fell on clean ground for 
hygienic reasons and easy of picking. “I do not expect a normal person to come and pick up 
fruits from an area I would have cleaned alone,” she remarked.  
Money could also be used to gain access to baobab products in communal areas in Nyanyadzi. 
Harvesters confided that they sometimes paid an expedite fee to village heads. Traditional 
leaders did not readily acknowledge receipt of the expedite fees which ranged from a scud to 
about $5.90  
In all negotiations, parties involved had to know and trust each other. Thus, if a harvester was 
connected to many people in the village, s/he had several options that could be explored to 
get access to baobab products. Trust was often found among people who belonged to the 
same group such as church members, members of a revolving fund, burial society, or craft 
traders’ group. Therefore, harvesters who belonged to several groups tended to negotiate 
and gain access from many sources, drawing on their social capital. An example was Mrs. M. 
who held several positions in the organisations in which she belonged; fruits and fibre were 
harvested from different sources, drawing on her range of social contacts in her village (Figure 
9). 
 
Fig. 9: Mrs. M’s use of social capital to access baobab products for sale 
 
                                                          
90 Opaque beer sold in a container called a “scud”, to denote that the beer hits hard like the Iraqi scud missile.  
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In return for accessing the various baobab products from various people, Mrs M, a respected 
widow, sometimes provided advice on how to make and sell baobab products. In church, she 
led women’s prayer groups where she championed developmental projects for 
disadvantaged women like widows. She also provided marketing information on crafts to 
people like Mr. M1 and Mrs M2.  
In Jinga, all harvesting of fruits and bark was done in communal areas and crop fields on 
account of there being no trees located around homesteads. Human settlements were 
located in areas that do not have baobab trees. For trees in crop fields, harvesting was 
prohibited during the cropping season as harvesters could end up trampling on crops. Once 
crops had been harvested, anyone from the village could have access to the fruits. For fibre, 
if a harvester wanted to harvest large volumes, permission had to be sought from the crop 
field owner who could put a limit on the amount of fibre to be harvested.  
 Chiukira: a case of self-exclusion in Nyanyadzi 
Chiukira was a practice rooted in tradition and in the practice of kusunza – expeditions to seek 
food in food-secure areas in exchange for labour. With Chiukira, the commodity in short 
supply is not necessarily food and the harvester does not have to offer something in exchange 
for the product they want; they just draw on their social capital to access the product. Ethnic 
relations, and not the abundance of the resource per se, becomes the determining factor. 
This was a prevalent practice in Nyanyadzi. Fibre harvesters and fruit collectors crossed over 
to Chiefs Chamutsa and Chiadzwa’s areas in Buhera and Marange Districts to get these two 
products. To recap, the people under Chamutsa and Chiadzwa are of the Gumbu clan.  So, 
people from Nyanyadzi went and stayed with their relatives in Buhera while harvesting 
baobab products.  
It was interesting to note that the Gumbu of Nyanyadzi would rather go and harvest bark 
from Buhera, and Marange, distances of more than 30 km, than go to closer Jinga, 20 km away 
which was endowed with many baobab trees. Bark harvesters argued that it was degrading 
to go and beg for fibre from the Garwe people who had a different culture to the Gumbu. The 
Gumbu regarded the Garwe as too proud to consider their plea for baobab products. On the 
other hand, the Garwe generally despised the Gumbu on the basis that the Gumbu borrowed 
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a number of cultures from the “inferior” Nguni people. To exemplify their assertion, the 
Garwe (until recently), pointed to the wearing of traditional multiple frill skirts (zvikisa), and 
body tattoos among the Gumbu, which is uncommon among the Garwe.  
Sacredness as a control strategy 
Sacredness was used to manage baobab trees. A sacred tree was one where some form of 
spirit was believed to be present. How a tree became sacred varied but usually involved 
spiritual significance. For example, a tree under which rituals were carried out was usually 
revered as sacred, as were baobab trees under which people were buried. Graveyards were 
the revered final resting place for the dead and trees in those areas could not be harvested. 
The sacredness of graveyards differed between commoners and traditional and spiritual 
leaders. While trees at graveyards of commoners in Nyanyadzi showed signs of heavy 
debarking, those at the cemetery for the royal Gumbu were well protected. To qualify their 
point, local traditional leaders in Nyanyadzi gave an account of some Chinese diamond 
prospectors, who, in 2011, tried to take soil samples from an area that was close to the burial 
ground of the ruling elite and were chased away by the traditional leaders. The ward 
councillor, a son of the ruling family, claimed that he contacted a weekly newspaper to 
publicise the story of the Chinese as a way to register the community’s anger with the 
Chinese.91  
Sacredness could also be invented. For example, a black spot in Nyanyadzi along the highway 
where fatal accidents had occurred became haunted and was therefore considered a sacred 
site. When driving past the spot, one was advised to rhetorically murmur something to allow 
safe passage. Trees around the area were considered sacred.  
Anyone who harvested products from sacred trees was believed to develop a cargo cult 
mentality, a bad habit which could lead one to be a habitual thief. The belief was that if a 
harvester collected forest products from a sacred place, it was akin to stealing from the spirits 
of that place. Everything from the sacred place was the property of the spirits of that vicinity, 
which could cast a bad spell on the harvester.  
                                                          
91 (Irrigation scheme under: 2011) 
162 
 
Ordinarily, there were a number of specific practices and activities that were not permitted 
around sacred trees. Taboos were used to ensure conformity to the rules around sacred trees. 
Such taboos usually related to how and what level of access could be enjoyed and by who.  
In Jinga and Nyanyadzi, women beyond menopause enjoyed some level of unfettered access 
to fruits from sacred trees, but only after murmuring some words to the effect of excusing 
herself for “picking up fruits” from the resting place for the dead92. The belief was that old 
women were sinless “like angels,” and were responsible enough to know how to share so they 
should be allowed access to the baobab products they needed. In Jinga, trees that produced 
sweet fruits were revered and had names that denoted the sweetness of the fruits. Fruit 
collection for domestic consumption was allowed from these sacred trees. Bark harvesting 
was not allowed, nor was harvesting of unripe fruits. A big snake was said to exist at one of 
the revered baobab trees. Anyone who defiled the sacred tree would allegedly be bitten by 
the snake.  
In both Jinga and Nyanyadzi, traditional leaders had supreme decision over how baobab trees 
were used. They could override an individual resident’s decision. For example, if a resident 
overharvested bark from trees around his or her homestead, the village head could put a 
moratorium on bark harvesting on that individual.  
7.8 Statutory regulatory practices of baobab products at community level 
In Chimanimani District, the district council played a part in the governance of baobab trees. 
The state explained that its intervention in baobab management was to avoid environmental 
degradation and possible local extinction of the baobab tree in the Nyanyadzi area (CRDC, 
2012).  
The RDC’s regulatory framework for baobab use was informed by several key Acts, namely 
the Rural District Council Act, Environmental Management Act, Traditional Leaders Act, 
Communal Forest Produce Act, Communal Lands Act, and the Forestry Act (Chapter 4). To 
operationalise these Acts, the RDC used a number of strategies and instruments including 
                                                          
92 Mukamuri and Kozanayi, (2014) also noted that among the Ndau the harvesting of Warburgia salutaris-
valuable medicinal trees is shrouded in many rituals which are grounded on conservation philosophies.   
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planting baobabs, crafting by-laws, mounting road blocks to impound illegally harvested fibre 
as well as imposing levies and fines on resource harvesters. As shown below, the initial 
approach was confrontational, followed by the adoption of an all-inclusive model. Most of 
the instruments were meant to regulate baobab bark fibre use, rather than fruits. 
7.8.1 Mounting of road blocks 
Occasionally, in the early 2000s, the FC, EMA and the RDC set up road blocks along the 
Mutare-Chipinge highway, arresting anyone caught with large volumes of baobab fruits or 
bark without a written permit. Mainly, the targets were traders from Marange, who came to 
sell bark in Nyanyadzi. The FC impounded all illegally-harvested fibre and imposed a fine on 
harvesters. That strategy did not achieve much. These were occasional raids, and the FC and 
its partners were operating from Chimanimani, some 120 km away, so it did not deter 
harvesters. Harvesters reported that they would maximise the period that the FC was not 
monitoring to harvest as much fibre and fruits as they could. Also, to circumvent the 
restrictions and penalties, harvesters started to use new routes that avoided the main 
highway when transporting fibre. Restrictions on the baobab fibre trade, for example, 
through road blocks and fines, most probably affected poorer households who were mainly 
involved in this activity. It also affected the institution of Chiukira which was used by locals to 
access baobab products from neighbouring areas. 
7.8.2 Local by-laws and the creation of Ward Environmental Management Committees 
(WEMECs) in Nyanyadzi. 
Residents of Nyanyadzi crafted local by-laws in 2004 with the help of EAfrica, the RDC, EMA, 
and the FC.  The motive for developing the by-laws was largely to protect baobab trees from 
excessive debarking. The by-laws were also meant to regulate commercial trading of baobab 
fruit outside the ward. 
The role of WEMECs 
For the purpose of enforcing the by-laws, and in accordance with the Communal Lands Forest 
Produce Act (section 19) WEMECs were formed in Nyanyadzi. Some villages such as Dirikwe 
reported that they ended up electing Village Environmental Management Committees 
164 
 
(VEMECs) for effective enforcement of the by-laws. These were elected positions and this 
extra layer of authority failed to take off as it did not integrate well within the existing political 
structures of traditional leaders.   
Local Permit system  
A key provision of the by-laws was the requirement that permission be given by way of written 
authority (a stamped letter or receipt) from either the village head, headman, chief, or ward 
councillor. This meant that every harvester had to visit these authorities to get written 
authority before they went out to harvest. Some people lived far away from the authorities 
and it was a challenge for them to get the permits. To grant permission, the traditional leaders 
and ward councillors were supposed to consult WEMEC, and the council of elders that 
supported the village head in the discharge of his duty. This somewhat cumbersome 
arrangement in the by-laws resulted in some harvesters taking advantage of the numerous 
centres of authority to “forum shop” for different options to get access to baobab products. 
For example, if a harvester thought they stood a good chance of being granted permission for 
access, they approached WEMEC instead of the village head. This created conflicts between 
the traditional authorities and the newly elected WEMECs. 
Fiscal issues were not devolved to the local level by-laws. These stated that all fines and levies 
had to be collected by the RDC. The headman only handled the money from levies on behalf 
of the RDC. The council decided how the money that accrued to the community was used. 
Traditional leaders were encouraged to impose non-monetary fines as per African tradition. 
The non-collection of cash fines by local leaders was a contentious issue that traditional 
leaders were livid about. Traditional leaders complained that they never got paid for the work 
they did to conserve the baobab tree. They argued that the RDC did not remit the community 
share of levies collected as provided for in the by-laws. Furthermore, traditional leaders 
expressed some reservations about the commitment of WEMECs. Headman K of Nyanyadzi 
observed, “We note that the RDC is forming committees to manage natural resources but 
without incentives, there is no commitment from the elected leaders.”  
Residents from outside Nyanyadzi were not allowed to harvest baobab products from the 
ward with exceptional cases only being approved by the village heads, headmen, or ward 
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councilors upon payment of a permit fee of $10. The by-laws also called on harvesters to 
observe any cultural, spiritual, and traditional values that were attached to the baobab tree.  
Another provision in the by-laws was that harvesters were to be organised into groups of 5 
to 6 members for the purpose of coordinating their harvesting operations and payment of 
levies to Council.  Every group member paid a joining fee of $10 and an annual marketing fee 
of $20. The fee from the registration and licensing of harvesters was meant to generate 
money to support environmental programmes for the benefit of the community.  Revenue 
collection was centralised as resource users were expected to travel to Chimanimani (120km 
away) to pay their marketing levies. Later on, a satellite office was established at Nyanyadzi, 
but that also did not improve the inflow of levies, reportedly due to weak enforcement from 
RDC authorities.  
Forty (40.0)% of the funds raised from the levies accrued to the RDC to cover administrative 
costs while 60.0% was supposed to be remitted to the community. A community fund was 
created, under the stewardship of the headman. The traditional leadership was entitled to 
25.0% of the amount allocated to the community trust fund while 75.0% was supposed to be 
ploughed back into the community for development purposes. However, Mr. N confided, “for 
all the 4 years I was the council vice chairperson, we never gave back money to communities. 
There was always no money. Only $140 was raised in the whole of 2011. The RDC’s revenue 
collection from baobab use is very low. At its peak, it was less than 20.0% of the potential 
value.”  
Most residents in Nyanyadzi shunned marketing groups. Results from a household survey 
revealed that only 17.6 % of the households belonged to these groups. Initially, in 2004, 11 
groups were formed in Nyanyadzi but most of these groups failed to take off due to a lack of 
group solidarity, coupled with weak monitoring and technical support by the RDC.  As of 2012, 
only five groups were still operational.  
Sometimes, political power was used to gain access to baobab products. The youth argued 
that having unfettered access to baobab fibre was part of the broader indigenisation 
programme which was promoted by government. Such politically-connected unsanctioned 
harvesting went unpunished by all the local authorities who always remarked thus, 
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“ngezvematongerwe enyika, it is political, so it’s a hot potato.” The same sentiments were 
expressed by district level officials from the FC, EMA, and the RDC who claimed that to enforce 
the existing rules to the letter would take them on a collision course with politicians. 
7.8.3 Permit systems by the government for harvesting and marketing products 
The FC regulated use of baobab products through issuing harvesting permits to ‘bulk’ 
harvesters upon payment of an inspection fee of $20. The harvester would then have to pay 
for a movement permit to be able to move the resource from one area to another. Exporters 
of bark or crafts had to pay $10 or 1.0 % of the value of the goods to be exported (or whichever 
of the two was greater) to the FC.93  If caught without a permit, a fine of $30 was imposed, 
regardless of quantities involved.  
For the export of baobab crafts, traders further paid for a fumigation certificate which was 
obtained in Mutare, the provincial capital which was 120 km away from Nyanyadzi, a distance 
that cost at least $10 for a round trip.  This presented a challenge to cross border traders, 
especially poor people. As observed by one informant (personal communication, 2/3/12), 
“How can the FC expect someone who has never been to Mutare because of poverty to 
suddenly go there to get a permit to sell baobab fibre crafts?” 
Further, the marketing of crafts along the highway went under the radar; craft traders 
displayed poor quality crafts to minimize their loss if these were confiscated by the RDC for 
non-payment of the marketing levy. At the national border, illegal routes were used to avoid 
paying customs duty, while other cross-border traders engaged in corrupt dealings with 
customs officials. In the process, the local authority lost out on potential revenue which it 
could get through taxes and levies charged on resource users and traders.   
7.8.4 Softening of stance by the state 
Around 2006, EMA and the RDC had to change their tactics when dealing with baobab 
harvesters. It took these institutions about 15 years to shift from being confrontational with 
harvesters to being able to embrace local people’s practices in baobab management. They 
                                                          
93 See Kozanayi et al, 2014) for a detailed account of this complicated permit system. 
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adopted a conciliatory tone towards the harvesters, because they had come to recognise that, 
“We need to promote use of indigenous knowledge in the management of the baobab 
products, as provided for in EMA.”94  
The FC officer commented, “I am in a tricky situation. You know they say once a forester, 
always a forester. If there are no trees around, then I become irrelevant as a forester. But we 
cannot say to the local people do not debark the baobab trees, all we say is harvest but come 
up with a management system that ensures ecological sustainability.”95 These statements by 
the FC and EMA officers seemed to epitomise the policy shift in government towards a more 
accommodating approach.   
7.9 Perceptions on fairness of governance practices  
Fairness of rules was assessed from different actors. Differences in motives gave rise to 
differences on perceptions of fairness. Overall, 27.2% of households that were interviewed 
believed customary practices to be always fair, while 18.4% were of the view that the 
practices were fair, but not all the time. A total of 21.1% of households felt customary 
practices were unfair, while 33.3% were indifferent. For statutory forms of governance, only 
11.6% households considered them to be consistently fair, with 15.3% saying they were fair 
but not all the time. A total of 20.6 % viewed them to be unfair, while 52.4% were indifferent. 
Both forms of governance were unfair to the majority of the respondents; this could be an 
indication of the inherent weaknesses of the two practices. 
In Nyanyadzi, Ward councillors believed that any rules that deterred locals from harvesting 
baobab would be viewed as unfair and contested. Attempts by the state to put a complete 
ban on bark harvesting were thus viewed as unfair and therefore, unpopular. Customary 
practices were regarded as fair because they allowed the commercial harvesting of fruits and 
therefore addressed the welfare needs of the local people. However, there were discernible 
undercurrents of disgruntlement from non-dominant groups such as women and recent 
immigrants. They claimed that traditional leaders were corrupt and nepotistic. Traditional 
                                                          
94 EMA officer, 3 January 2011. 
95 The District Forester for Chimanimani during an interview on 3 January 2011. 
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leaders and their relatives reportedly violated established rules and practices and did not get 
written permits to harvest fibre. 
 With regard to statutory systems, most residents in Jinga were indifferent because the state 
was conspicuously absent from the area. The only time the state was active in Jinga was in 
the late 1980s when the EMA intervened to ban locals who had embarked on charcoal trading. 
Customary practices were conducive as far as harvesting of products for domestic use was 
concerned.  
7.10 Rule formulation and enforcement 
Table 28 below presents results of a survey that captured residents’ perceptions on the 
institutions that established and enforced the arrangements that were used to regulate the 
use of baobab products. Enforcement was taken to mean the degree to which sanctions were 
imposed if standing rules were violated (Ostrom, 1990; Jagger et al., 2014). 
Table 28:  Participation of institutions in rule formulation and enforcement in Nyanyadzi 
and Jinga  
Institution Percent of setting up 
rules 
Percent of enforcing 
the rules 
WEMEC 6.1 16.3 
Village head 41.0 58.4 
Headman 4.5 7.9 
Ward councillor 2.3 3.2 
FC 30.9 4.7 
EMA 3.9 1.5 
RDC 7.3 1.1 
NGOs 1.7 1.1 
Individual households 2.3 5.8 
Total 100 100 
Overall, the majority of the respondents (41.0%) regarded traditional leaders as the main 
source of rules used to regulate baobab use, followed by the FC (30.9%). Village heads were 
also the main institution responsible for enforcing the rules (58.4%). The state was reported 
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to be inconsistent in the way it developed and enforced its rules. In Nyanyadzi where the RDC 
was visible, one headman cautioned, “Pore ne Kanzuru, chirungu manyoka (Take it easy with 
the Council, enforcement of its rules is ephemeral like a running stomach).” Informants 
reported that after advising locals of new policies, the RDC went away with no or little follow 
up. This discouraged locals from respecting the statutory rules. A small number of households 
(2.3%) were formulating rules, especially to regulate harvesting of products from trees around 
their homesteads. This was concomitant with the rise in commodification of baobab products 
in and around homesteads. 
7.10.1 Enforcement of rules 
The enforcement of rules and the prosecution of offenders by both the RDC and traditional 
leaders was low. From the household survey 95.8 % of the households reported not having 
been arrested or fined in 2011. This was surprising considering the violation of rules in 
Nyanyadzi. For example, trees were clearly debarked without adhering to the two-year 
resting period. Of those who were arrested, 7.5% paid a fine while 3.2% said they “talked” 
which was a euphemism for paying a bribe to have their case dropped. The rest did not pay. 
According to the FC Officer (quoting the Forestry Act 19:09, Section 17), only designated 
officers, namely, the police, EMA, and the FC had arresting powers. All of these institutions, 
except the police, were located more than 100km from the study site. WEMECs as a local level 
structure of the RDC was mandated to arrest offenders by issuing them with tickets for the 
offence committed. But the fine itself was paid to the Chimanimani RDC. In Nyanyadzi, 
WEMEC officers were demotivated due to a lack of remuneration, and faced many challenges 
such as threats of physical and verbal abuse, being bewitched, as well as straining their 
relationship with fellow residents. The chairperson for Nyanyadzi WEMEC aptly stated this 
view, “at the end of the day I leave with my relatives and neighbours while the RDC is 
stationed far away from us. So, if I strain my relations with my neighbours who will help me 
in the hour of need?” WEMECS were also viewed by locals as an imposition from a council 
that was determined to usurp management rights from traditional leaders. 
There were instances where force was used to ensure compliance. To deal with an influx of 
bark harvesters from Nyanyadzi, village head P in Chishanyi area, Buhera, reportedly armed 
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himself with a gun and threatened to shoot anyone he caught poaching fibre in his village. He 
patrolled his village and if he caught anyone harvesting fibre he burned it. Because of his 
supposed fiery temperament, bark harvesters stopped going to that village. He passed on 
after a short illness and some bark harvesters from Nyanyadzi suspected that he was killed by 
the spirits of the land for the heavy handedness with which he dealt with transgressors. 
For its part, the RDC reported that the cost of collecting fines was unsustainable vis-a-vis their 
budgets. “As part of the government we work with budgets. If the fine to be collected is small, 
I will not go and collect it, if it is high enough to warrant driving down I will go collect it,” said 
the FC officer.  The fines established in RDC environmental by-laws for most offences did not 
exceed level 3 in the schedule of fines that is usually ranging between $5 and $20.  
Traditional leaders in Nyanyadzi felt that the RDC’s process of fining offenders was 
bureaucratic, which discouraged transgressors to comply. The process was described by 
village head Q, “When it comes to decision making, the government walks and never runs, it 
has no urgency.” Transgressors had to travel to Chimanimani, over 100km way to pay fines.  
7.11 Awareness of the rules 
In Nyanyadzi, 22.9% of households were aware of statutory rules, with 19.1% being uncertain 
about whether what they knew was correct or not, while the majority (58.0%) were unaware. 
In total 42.1% of the respondents were aware of customary practices, while 12.7% were 
uncertain. For Jinga, 54.4% of the households were aware of the customary practices around 
baobabs compared to 15.0% who were aware of the statutory rules. 
During discussions, traditional leaders appeared ignorant of the full range of their powers as 
they bemoaned their lack of legal power to effectively manage natural resources in their 





7.12.1 Customary practices and use of historical relations to access baobab products 
Access to baobab products was regulated by a number of customary practices, some of which 
were rooted in historical ties. According to Govo et al. (2015), among the Shona of Zimbabwe 
the elements of totems, kinship, and clans are still highly regarded, as these give rural 
societies a sense of oneness, unity, and belonging.  Overall, historical narratives around 
kinship ties have been used to assert or claim access rights to natural resources in many areas 
(Berry, 1997), including fishing zones (Sunde, 2014) and state forests (Matose, 2002).  
However, the practice of chiukira is a unique and interesting one.  Usually, access is 
conceptualised in common property debates as an exclusionary mode whereby the 
disadvantaged suffer impaired access because of exclusion by some powerful right bearers 
(Ostrom, 2000; Ribot & Peluso, 2003; Geschiere & Stephen, 2006). Chiukira shows that 
beyond exclusion by right bearers or those presumed as powerful, some people may actively 
self-exclude themselves on cultural grounds, that is through shunning any association with 
those they look down upon. Cultural identity and pride are some of the main reasons behind 
the Gumbu’s shunning baobab products from Jinga, a village endowed with baobab products. 
This observation can be explained in terms of Nielsen (2006) and Ncube (2014)’s explanation 
that culture may explain why some people do certain things and yet others facing similar 
conditions do not (that is the contrast between the Garwe and Gumbu).  
7.12.2 Groups as organising units 
Because social networks are strong among the Ndau (MacGonagle, 2007), groups still stand 
out as important organising units for conservation initiatives (for example Figure 8, Box 6). 
Resource harvesters may join together in order to achieve their individual goals (Nyangena & 
Sterner, 2008; Cronkelton & Larson, 2015). These goals can be economic alliances, as is the 
case with mukando, which unlocks economic potential of group members.  Even at village 
level, social ties are critical in accessing baobab products, as illustrated in Box 5 and Figure 8 
and the chiukira arrangement. This conforms to what has been observed in literature – that 
social networks offer security (Bromley, 2008) and unlock economic potential (Dasgupta, 
2000).   
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7.12.3 Complexity of relationships among local actors 
Though residents derive benefits from being in groups, among the residents themselves 
dichotomous relations were discerned between locals and immigrants. Results from this 
study also demonstrate that accusations that immigrants’ defiance of local customary 
practices results in a breakdown of rules is a fiction that is conveniently used by the locals. 
The immigrants also gave accounts of how the natives, particularly from the royal family, 
violated local rules protected by the fact that they were immune to prosecution. As has been 
demonstrated by MacGonagle (2007:207), “Ndauness has been created and recreated within 
communities through marriages and social structures, cultural practices, and rituals.” Recent 
immigrants saw a culture that was no longer pristine, albeit still intact (MacGonagale, 2007), 
and to blame them for a breakdown of local practices (Figure 7) is disingenuous.  
Further, traditional leaders had their own leadership conflicts, particularly in Nyanyadzi. 
When these conflicts play out in the natural resource arena, as was the case in Nyanyadzi, it 
affected baobab conservation. 
Jinga provides important insights into the impact of having one centre of power. While 
modest progress has been made in regulating baobab use, a ban on any commercial selling 
of fruits (Box 3) has negatively impacted residents’ potential revenue. In Jinga village, 
households got an average of $33 per year from the sale of baobab products, compared to 
$233 for residents of Nyanyadzi. To further put this into perspective, in Jinga, baobab trees 
produce 250.0 % more fruit than those in Nyanyadzi (Chapter 6) which in theory means more 
income for Jinga residents. Jinga’s case confirms research results that show that excessive 
regulation of access to natural resources has negative returns for local people (Ndoye & 
Awono, 2010; Robinson et al., 2013).  
7.12.4 Statutory practices regulating access  
Notions of resource degradation and the inequitable distribution of benefits influenced the 
state’s decision to intervene in regulating baobab use in Nyanyadzi. Later on, when 
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commercial fruit harvesting started in earnest in 2004 in Nyanyadzi96, the CRDC got more 
involved in regulating the harvesting of baobab products in order to ensure equitable 
distribution of benefits from the fruit sales among stakeholders, one of whom was the RDC. 
The reasons for formalising NTFP use are consistent with the observations of Hara et al. (2009) 
and Wynberg et al. (2015) that ecological concerns, social justice factors, and economic 
considerations are the priorities. The statutory rules and by laws seem to be overly concerned 
with regulating fibre harvesting, and revenue generation.  
Considering the deep cultural role of baobab among the Gumbu, a framework that does not 
include local interests presents a challenge in baobab governance. Attempts by the RDC to 
put a moratorium on bark harvesting, oblivious of the deep-rooted role that fibre crafts play 
in the cultural history of the Gumbu people, was one obvious policy blind spot. As noted by 
Dore (2001), any policy intervention that is insensitive to local context is bound to fail. We 
can attribute the weaknesses of statutory rules to this policy oversight.  
Another blind spot of the state’s intervention was the fact that baobab tree-use boundaries 
transcend administrative boundaries. These findings concur with what Mandondo (1997) 
found in Nyamaropa, Zimbabwe where he noted that resource-use boundaries overlap and 
wane in response to demand. The fluidity in resource-use boundaries was one coping strategy 
for customary practices which made them adaptive to resource-use change and pressure. In 
terms of key theoretical debates on common property resources, this is contrary to the fixed 
and clearly defined boundaries advocated in the design principles by Ostrom (1990) which 
have been used to guide and shape resource use in communal settings.  
In addition, the state intervened in Nyanyadzi with heavy handedness, typical of what 
Wynberg et al. (2015) observed as over-regulation of natural resources by the state in many 
rural areas. A cumbersome permit system for one to harvest, move, and market products 
both within and outside the country was put in place. This complex permitting system had a 
number of unintended consequences. In short, the bureaucratic processes to get permits 
                                                          
96 2004 is when SAFIRE started promoting the harvesting and selling of baobab fruits to companies like Speciality 
Food Africa. Some local entrepreneurs were supported with loans and machinery to process pulp and oil for the 
export market.  
174 
 
provided perverse incentives for harvesters to break existing rules and engage in corrupt 
activities. In the process, marginal groups like women were exploited.97  
Other unintended outcomes of the intervention by the state are worth noting. First, bark 
harvesting spread beyond Nyanyadzi as residents from Chipinge and Buhera Districts started 
supplying weavers in Nyanyandzi with baobab fibre. Second, there was overharvesting of 
baobab fibre, up to branch level (Plate 8.1) by those who had paid for the harvesting permit 
ostensibly to recoup the money they used to pay for the permit.  
There is strong recognition of the feuding between traditional leaders and the RDC (Mukamuri 
et al, 1998; Hughes, 2001). A pertinent source of conflict between the two institutions is fiscal 
oversight. The RDC claims for itself money and responsibilities earmarked for the local people 
despite the fact that the Traditional Leaders Act and the ward by-laws in Nyanyadzi bestow 
some fiscal responsibilities on traditional leaders.  Yet the TLA (Chapter 29:17) Section 12, 
subsection (1j) mandates village heads to collect levies, taxes, and other charges payable in 
terms of the RDC Act (Chapter 29:13). Traditional leaders have also shown good accounting 
systems with the hut tax (Makahamadze et al., 2009) which allays any fears of 
misappropriation of funds.  
Related to the above is the failure by the RDC to remit the community’s share of revenue 
collected as fines or levies; this is a source of disillusionment among traditional leaders and 
residents in Nyanyadzi. This disenchantment breeds corruption involving resource harvesters 
and traditional leaders. The expedite fees paid to traditional leaders by resource harvesters 
are one of the corrupt practices involving local leaders.  
Weak monitoring and enforcement of rules by the RDC also contributed to corrupt activities 
(Ostrom, 1990; Nemarundwe, 2003). Monetary and human costs were usually deterrents. In 
Chimanimani, field operations were carried out with shoestring budgets which forced officers 
to limit the number of trips they made into the field even to collect fines, which were “usually 
too small to justify such mileage” (Mr. O).  Linked to this was reluctance by elected officials 
                                                          
97 For example, some women stopped going to South Africa to sell their crafts because they were asked for 




(WEMECs and Ward councillors) and the RDC to enforce policies that would cost politicians 
political capital. 
7.12.5 Interface between customary and statutory practices 
There was a pervasiveness of linkages and conflicts between formal and informal institutions. 
Traditional leaders appealed for the strengthening of customary practices from the RDC, 
particularly through formal recognition of customary practices. On the other hand, the RDC’s 
willingness to collaborate with traditional systems was shown through its conciliatory tone 
when urging local residents to recognise traditional rules when harvesting baobab products. 
The two forms of governance accommodated each other, although traditional leaders 
cautioned against wholesome adoption of statutory rules by saying, “chirungu manyoka – 
statutory rules can be ephemeral.”  Conflicts arose mainly over fiscal responsibility and the 
philosophy underlying conservation policies and models. 
Overall, there were integrative and conflicting linkages between the customary and statutory 
forms of governance regulating baobab products.  
7.13 Conclusion 
The chapter concludes that statutory and customary forms of governance interact in complex 
ways that produce different outcomes. Such interactions include phases of collaboration and 
conflicting which renders access to the various baobab products a continuous negotiated 
process. Regulatory mechanisms included soft controls and hard rules. Locally, there was 
dependence on taboos and mores, which statutory forms, relying on scientific practices, is 
quick to dismiss as irrational (Mawere, 2013) to protect the environment. Related to this was 
the use of counterfactual methods, such as allowing errant behaviour in order to invoke 
punishment from the spirits of the land. Such approaches are at the centre of local people’s 
cognitive understanding of the environment-spirit nexus.  A number of statutory tools (rules, 
by laws, moratoria and policies) used to regulate access to baobab products were identified 
and explained.  
Overall, the account of customary practices given in this chapter shows that, largely due to 
political and use pressure and conflict, institutions undergo alternate phases of effectiveness 
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and ineffectiveness or, in the eyes of the resource users, legitimacy and illegitimacy.98 The 
implication of using customary and statutory forms of governance is discussed in Chapter 8 
within the framework of broader governance debates underpinning this study. 
  
                                                          
98 This is consistent with the observation by Hirchman (1970) and Le Grand (2003) that every institution has 
moments or inherent traits of lapses from efficient to dysfunctional. Every resource user learns to live with a 
certain amount of dysfunctionality in the system, beyond which they start to act. 
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CHAPTER 8: DISCUSSION 
This chapter provides a synthesis of the findings and relates them to the broader theoretical 
debates described in Chapter Two. In doing so, the discussion focuses on three themes, 
namely: 1) the factors that shape the relationship between customary practices and statutory 
forms of resource governance; 2) the ecological and livelihood outcomes of this interplay; and 
3) an analysis of the implications of using the two forms of governance. 
8.1 Factors shaping the relationship between customary and statutory governance. 
8.1.1 Strength of traditional authorities 
The commercialization of baobab use strains customary practices while the resilience of 
customary practices depends on the type of traditional authority in place. A traditional 
authority that has a clear centre of power and has minimal interference from the state is 
important in ensuring the effective enforcement of customary practices and rules. In Jinga, 
for example, a clear and effective traditional authority structure operated with minimal 
interference from the state, and baobab was sustainably used. Although harvesting was 
mainly limited to domestic use in Jinga, there were signs that the traditional authority was 
able to effectively regulate use, adjusting to the rise in demand through decentralising power 
to two women. This was different from Nyanyadzi where there were several traditional 
authorities, some engaged in power struggle; here the state was strongly involved and there 
were significant ecological challenges. The breakdown of customary practices in Nyanyadzi 
occurred at about the same time as the state intervened in the governance of the baobab. 
The pattern of this breakdown, combined with historical accounts given by local people, 
suggests that the state’s intervention had a role to play in the weakening of customary 
practices in Nyanyadzi. In Nyanyadzi informants were equivocal about the relationship 
between state regulation of baobab harvesting and over harvesting. The main conclusion 
drawn from the two scenarios is that for customary practices to cope with commercial 
harvesting, the state needs to consider customary forms of governance before it imposes new 
institutional arrangements drawn from the statute books. Uninformed interventions by the 
state may weaken traditional authorities and override local resource sharing arrangements. 
Overall, this is confirmed by evidence elsewhere. In Cameroon, for example, Brown and 
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Lassoie (2010) show that customary systems undergo strain with the commercialization of 
Non-Timber Forest Products (NTFPs). 
8.1.2 Overregulation by the state 
Overly restrictive governance is abhorred by harvesters, even if done by individuals or 
traditional leaders and leads to unintended social and ecological consequences. This is 
because excessive regulation results in compromised livelihoods. Overregulation by the state 
in Nyanyadzi and at a national level through a stringent export permit system has affected 
those who are weakest in the baobab value chain. Women who were engaged in cross border 
trading, for example, gave up involvement in the baobab trade and resorted to selling their 
crafts locally. Similar results of marginalisation of already disadvantaged groups because of 
overregulation by the state have been found elsewhere. Ndoye and Awono (2010) note that 
in Cameroon, excessive regulation of the NTFP trade resulted in corruption and reduced 
revenue to the state. In Jinga where commercial trading of baobab products is not allowed, 
the village head still made provision to grant permission to special cases. Denying residents 
access to natural resources is against the cultural values and principles of the Ndau. The case 
of village head P from Buhera who used excessive force to keep Nyanyadzi harvesters from 
accessing baobab products from his area is a case in point. When the village head passed on, 
some residents in Nyanyadzi celebrated, something which is a taboo in the local culture. 
Several cases from across Zimbabwe of residents who have used subtle ways to protest 
against excessively restrictive resource governance have been documented (Matose, 1994; 
2002; Nemarundwe & Kozanayi, 2003; Mandondo & Kozanayi, 2006). After Giddens (1984), it 
is argued that in most cases, resource harvesters are able to resist unfavourable governance 
through agency. 
8.1.3 Exogenous factors 
The strength of TAs, inter alia, is affected by external factors in the macro-economic 
environment, and the participation of intermediary organisations in the governance of 
natural resources. The loss of formal jobs due to the economic meltdown and annexation of 
former commercial farms by the state resulted in many people resettling in rural areas such 
as Nyanyadzi where they started harvesting baobab to earn a living (e.g. Mrs. E). This put 
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more pressure on the baobab tree and strained local forms of governance. At the time of the 
study, the Zimbabwe economy was in a coma which Jones (2010) aptly called the “kukiya kiya 
economy” to denote the various “making do” activities that everyone in the country was 
embarking on in order to survive. Because the country’s economy was stagnant, argued Jones 
(2010), the middle-income class was eroded. Driven as much by a discourse of necessity, the 
middle class pursued activities they would not consider under normal circumstances in order 
to supplement their meagre salaries. Although this seemingly contradicts evidence in the 
literature that points to the trend that the poor are disproportionately dependent on forests 
(Cavendish, 2000; Campbell et al., 2002b; Belcher et al., 2005; and Belcher & Hogarth, 2013), 
it also affirms the view that NTFPs are often seen as safety net in times of shocks. 
Debates on governance do not usually acknowledge the role of civil society in the governance 
of natural resources, yet these are important “intermediary organisations” (Laird et al., 
2010:370), which facilitate dialogue between the state and other actors. They also help TAs 
in their discharge of duty. The present study shows the important role played by intermediary 
organisations (e.g. SAFIRE, and EAfrica) in law formation and implementation. This finding 
builds on the growing cases of the successes of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and 
local organisations in the governance of natural resources. Such organisations represent 
another layer of authority intermingled with customary practices and laws. Wynberg and van 
Niekerk (2014), illustrate how two NGOs, the African Centre for Biosafety (ACB), and Biowatch 
played a pivotal role in raising awareness on the unfair practices by the private sector in the 
harvesting and trade of Pelargonium and Hoodia, two NTFPs that have significant markets. 
Consequent to the involvement of ACB and Biowatch, enabling policies that recognised the 
contribution of local indigenous knowledge were promulgated by the state. It should however 
be noted that because of the short-term nature of NGO projects, their role is limited to a very 
short phase of the governance process, in contrast to the continuous and interactive process 
required for long-term engagement. 
8.1.4 Time and responsiveness of different governance systems 
A major difference between customary and statutory systems is the time taken for such 
systems to adjust or reconfigure themselves when situations change and adaptation is 
needed. Such changes include high demand for natural products to meet demand for super 
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foods in international markets. De Koning (2014) suggests that adjustment will take three 
forms, namely aggregation (coming together), alteration (adjusting to accommodate the 
other) and articulation (incompatible with the other). Statutory and customary systems will 
respond very differently. Statutory forms of governance are typically static and take long to 
change. In this case, they were less adaptive than customary forms of governance. As aptly 
captured by an informant in Nyanyadzi, the state does not show urgency with policy: “Council 
does not run, it walks” (Chapter 7). This local observation resonates well with a long-held 
observation by Murphree and Mazambani (2002), who, from their study of Rural District 
Councils (RDCs), noted that, in its dealings, the state uses bureaucracy and established ways 
of doing things. Part of that bureaucracy involves disregard for local level customary practices, 
qualifying to be some form of articulation (de Koning, 2014). Pierce and Burgener (2010) note 
that globally, most states are inefficient at enforcing environmental policy because of the 
range of different government departments which are responsible for regulating NTFPs and 
the associated bureaucratic processes linked to different laws. A review of some 
commercialised NTFPs indicates that the state is often slow to act and when it does so, it does 
it with heavy handedness, making blanket provisions for all people in communities which 
creates social injustice as weaker groups are further marginalised from accessing natural 
resources. Wynberg and van Niekerk (2014) reported that in South Africa, when Hoodia and 
Pelargonium were commercialised, the state only intervened when the resources were 
dwindling. The state intensified its interventions when resource degradation worsened. 
Ideally, the state should be pro-active to intervene and when it does that, the guiding principle 
could be “less is often more” (Wynberg & Laird, 2007), meaning a gradual but relevant level 
of intervention is enough to redress whatever governance problems there might be. 
For customary forms of governance and TAs, adjustment times are shorter due to the 
flexibility characterising these systems. And because these are embedded in social and 
economic processes (Granovetter, 1989) customary practices and TAs are indeterminate as 
they evolve all the time. This suggests reinvention but not in the passive sense envisaged by 
Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983) in their seminal work on the invention of tradition. In this case, 
customary practices and traditional authority evolve on their own volition in order to adapt 
to changes in the environment. 
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Because they have agency, customary institutions and resource harvesters are reinventing 
themselves as espoused in Giddens’ (1984) structuration theory. TAs for example, may 
contest some of the newly created positions of ward councillors, but recognise rather than 
stifle household level resource sharing arrangements, actions that represent alteration and 
aggregation according to de Koning, (2014). A gamut of local level resource-sharing 
arrangements in Nyanyadzi and Jinga were crafted from households, village and ward level 
arrangements (Chapter 7). These inter-household arrangements were particular for different 
parts of the tree to be accessed and specific family members responsible for enforcing for 
different tree products were identified. For example, rules were waived for vulnerable groups 
of people such as elderly women, widows and children; these groups were allowed to harvest 
fruits from sacred trees. As noted by Campbell et al. (2002b) rural people have an infinite 
resourcefulness to make ends meet, especially in the face of adversity which makes them 
adapt to rapid changes in their environment. This resourcefulness is usually missed in policy 
pronouncements and may explain why globally resource degradation continues despite there 
being a plethora of statutory practices to regulate access to natural resources. 
Findings from Jinga and elsewhere (Bromely & Carnea, 1989; Byers et al., 2001; FAO, 2008) 
support the view that customary practices can sustainably regulate harvesting of products for 
domestic use. However, to handle the pressures that arise from commercial harvesting, it 
might be necessary for the state to come in to support the local arrangements in place, 
making sure its intervention facilitates and does not prohibit. As Treib et al. (2007:3) note, 
“Empirically, only hybrid forms may be found since one mode of governance always entails 
elements of other modes of governance”. Aggregation and alteration (de Koning, 2014), 
appear to be the most plausible forms of interaction between customary and statutory forms 
of governance. The challenge has been that the state over-reacts when it intervenes, in some 
cases completely overriding the customary forms of governance. If the state intervenes with 
excessive force and does not have enough resources to effectively enforce its rules, resources 
are likely to be overexploited (Kajembe et al., 1999). 
Models that are sensitive to local arrangements are also needed to avoid a situation where 
“organisational structures have been copied from developed countries, not considering the 
completely different task they are confronted with” (Kooiman et al., 2008: 7). A preferred 
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scenario is having a mosaic of site-specific arrangements that are sensitive to local contexts. 
This calls for the avoidance of oversimplification of local complex realities and nuances that 
make local practices resilient and relevant. 
8.1.5 Culture and beliefs 
This study confirms that there is rich local knowledge about the uses of baobab products and 
the ecology of the tree. This can be used by policy makers to craft forms of governance that 
can be used to regulate appropriate access. This confirms earlier findings by Saxena et al. 
(2014) and Berkes (2004) that customary practices are important in the governance of natural 
resources because local people have a rich body of historical knowledge that needed to 
ensure ecological and economic sustainability. 
The way local people use natural resources is also influenced by their belief systems and 
cultural values. These cultural values, which differ between communities, are important as 
they shape the framing of conservation and governance frameworks of local people. 
Examples suggest that cultural belief systems are at the heart of governance in many parts of 
the world (Andersen, 1996; Cocks et al., 2012). Cocks et al. (2012: 1), for example, writing 
about the cultural and spiritual value of forests among the Xhosa of South Africa conclude 
thus, 
The benefits of being in nature were ascribed not only to the physical experience of 
the forest environment and its biota, but also to the presence of ancestral spirits. 
Being in nature thus contributes significantly to the physical, mental and spiritual well-
being of local people, and is also integral to their sense of cultural identity. This study 
has made it clear that maintenance of biodiversity and natural vegetation is as much 
in the interest of the local community’s well-being as it is in the interest of 
conservation planners. 
Failure to appreciate this cognitive understanding of nature sometimes leads into differences 
in the meanings given to natural resources by local people, the state and other actors. Such 
differences give rise to struggles with the possibility that local people might use customary 
rights as arguments to gain access to resources. For example, local people in Nyanyadzi 
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argued that, “this is our fore fathers land so we have to take care of it” (Chapter 7), 
disregarding the authority of the RDC over the area. This observation resonates with what 
Kepe (2008: 965) found in South Africa: “In Pondoland, South Africa local people justify their 
actions by calling on customary rights, locally referred to as ukujola (legitimised stealing), 
which are based on historical claims predating the gazetting of the state land”. It can be 
inferred that some of the conflicts encountered at the local level might emanate from 
differences in conceptualisation of the environment-human nexus between the state and the 
local people. The state has a narrow view of natural resources as it is mainly driven by 
ecological and economic values of resources while local people have more nuanced views and 
interpretation of these resources including spiritual and cultural functions. 
While customary practices have been widely regarded as only relevant to deal with low value, 
subsistence resources (Neumann & Hirsch, 2000; Ribot & Oyono, 2005; Brown & Lassoie, 
2010), results show that they are also relevant in the context of commercial use. This is due 
to customary practices imbuing elements of dynamism, flexibility and conservation 
(abhorrence to plundering behaviour) when harvesting that ensure sustainable livelihoods 
and ecology. 
 This study reveals that despite use pressures and interactions with statutory forms of 
governance, the spiritual institutions of the land, mhondoros, are still at the centre of resource 
management in the Shona culture. (Bourdillon, 1998 and 1999).99 Among the Ndau people 
from Chimanimani their cosmological beliefs or philosophies on natural resources provide a 
spiritual function by providing an immediate interface between the living and dead. This 
cognitive conceptualisation of nature through an immediate and delicate nexus between the 
users and powerful spirits of the land ensures compliance with existing customary practices, 
in particular sacredness.100 The cosmological beliefs inform the philosophies that underpin 
strategies used to manage natural resources across scale. To that effect, customary practices 
                                                          
99 Mystic spirits are central to ecological conservation in other societies outside Africa. The Chinese, for example, 
have a strong belief system where trees and rocks are believed to have their indwelling guardian spirits which 
may include dragons (Anderson, 1996). 
100 Kozanayi et al. (2014) for example report of how in 2010, the leadership of the United Methodist Church in 
Nyanyadzi had to approach the local traditional leaders for purposes of rapprochement after the church had 
chopped down a sacred tree to establish a creche. The roof of the creche was blown off by mysterious winds on 
two occasions before the church leaders consulted the traditional authorities. 
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require that at all times, even in scarcity, resources have to be used responsibly and equitably. 
These customary practices, though they infuse tenets of sustainable ecology and livelihoods, 
are typically quickly dismissed as irrational local beliefs by Western science (Mawere, 2013). 
Hara et al. (2009: 521), concur, “Although often condemned as environmentally 
unsustainable, economically unviable or socially anachronistic, this mode of natural resource 
tenure and governance remains vitally necessary in the livelihoods of the rural poor across 
much of the (African) region”. 
Globally, there is increasing evidence of local communities sustainably managing forests with 
minimum influence from the state, under different arrangements including community-based 
forestry initiatives (FAO, 2016). According to FAO (2015), in Nepal, local people now manage 
30.0 % of the country’s forest area after the government devolved power to over 95 million 
peasants. In The Gambia, a 1998 Forest Bill stipulates that 75.0% of forest land should be 
managed by communities. In 2010, an 8.5% increase in forestry cover was recorded as a 
consequence. In Latin America, an increasing area of forests is being put under the ownership 
of traditional communities, with evidence of sustainable use (Pacheco, 2012; FAO, 2016). 
Hagen (2014), quoted in FAO (2016), reports that communities in Latin America now legally 
manage 216 million hectares of forest, or one-third of the forest area. 
The implication is that customary practices can regulate access to natural resources and 
where they are still strong, can deal with commercial pressures; in such cases the governance 
of natural resources can be left to local people with the state playing a supportive role. 
8.1.6 Historical context 
History and politics are usually neglected in the analysis of governance yet these profoundly 
shape current forms of governance and their outcomes. As the findings in this thesis reveal, 
history has played an important role in shaping customary and statutory forms of regulating 
baobab. As noted by Cleaver and de Koning (2015: 6), “history is at the centre of the study of 
governance - as colonial and post-colonial governments have interacted with traditional 
authorities in ways that have profound impacts on the governance of natural resources in 
communal areas”. In Zimbabwe, pursuant to the arrival of colonial authorities in 1890, 
conservation of natural resources began to be based on Western scientific and neo-liberal 
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economic notions such as biodiversity conservation and revenue generation from tourists 
visiting national parks (Hara et al., 2009). Local traditional belief systems, myths, and 
mythological teachings, were readily undermined by Western world epistemologies that 
viewed local practices as irrational. The state usurped resource management responsibilities 
from the TAs from the colonial era and even after independence in 1980 and both eras were 
characterised by wanton destruction of natural resources. Since then, the narrative of the 
state-TAs nexus has been conveniently used by the TAs and local people to discount state 
interventions. The state is regarded as always having a sinister motive in the affairs of the TA 
and local customary practices. 
A review of history also shows that past events helped to frame policy that is relevant to local 
practices. For example, the making of artefacts from the baobab fibre is deeply rooted in the 
Gumbu culture - the bags are material culture.101 The Gumbu derive their name from making 
the fibre bags which they started in the 15th century. Therefore, any governance intervention 
that bans harvesting of bark to weave artefacts like fibre bags would destroy the Gumbu’s 
cultural history. In order to protect their cultural history, the Gumbu resisted such moves 
from the RDC. It is clearly important that any interventions should be sensitive to local level 
histories. As argued by Dore (2010), any policy that is not sensitive to local conditions is 
unlikely to succeed. 
8.1.7 Socio-economic factors 
Both customary and statutory forms of governance can break down due to exogenous forces. 
Local level customary practices can be weakened by increasing market integration, high 
population pressures, corruption, and the disempowerment of traditional authorities (Misana 
et al, 1996; Ticktin, 2004; Venter, 2012; Sanchez, 2011). As Chapter 5 explains, confounding 
factors such as national economic meltdown or government policies like Murambatsvina and 
the absence of rule of law in the country led to a break down and weakening of both statutory 
and customary practices. Murambatsvina resulted in craft traders losing their source of 
livelihoods after their market stalls were destroyed, some of which had been in existence 
since 1950s. This led to resentment of the state by the local people (Chibisa & Sigauke, 2008; 
                                                          




Kozanayi et al., 2014). To the locals, such destruction of markets was synonymous with the 
ruining of local livelihoods and an attempt to stop a cultural practice that runs deep in the 
history of the local people. 
The poor working conditions of field staff from government also affected the state’s ability to 
enforce statutory rules on the ground. Civil servants, who are supposed to enforce statutory 
laws and policies have been demoralised for the fifteen years due to poor working conditions 
and poor remuneration and equipment (Kapingidza, 2014). These results are consistent with 
findings from other areas. In Cameroon, for example, Cerutti et al. (2012) discovered that 
even with the best of policies in place, if field staff were demoralised then degradation of the 
environment continued unabated due to lack of implementation and enforcement of the 
policies. Therefore, the effectiveness of statutory systems depends on the prevailing 
economic environment. With most governments in the developing world, cutting down on 
their budgets for the environment (Biti, 2012), it is likely that customary practices will 
continue to be used to regulate access to natural resources in rural areas. 
8.1.8 Geographical scale of interventions 
Results from this study lead to considerations that the RDC’s raft of legal instruments and 
policies for regulating baobab use have been ineffective on the ground, and rather, have 
resulted in the RDC in direct collision with TAs and customary practices that have long been 
regulating resource use in these communal areas. To make matters worse, the RDC has been 
grossly underfunded and equipped which has meant it has been unable to effectively 
discharge of its duties in the governance of natural resources in rural areas. As noted by 
Bromley and Carnea (1989:25) this paradoxical situation is a case of, “the state taking on far 
more resource management authority than they can be expected to carry out effectively”. 
Insights from this study confirm that local rules and practices are more pragmatic and 
adaptive to local requirements than statutory rules. Elected ward councillors who were 
members of the ruling traditional families, for example, did not enforce necessary but 
unpopular rules that would “make people starve”. At household and village level, there is a 
gamut of arrangements that facilitate resource sharing and management. These range from 
reciprocal and inter-household arrangements, through to the privatisation of trees such as 
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through the tillage of crop fields. They also include sacredness, use of social capital, tweaking 
of customary practices to respond to local conditions and the involvement of women in 
negotiating access in Jinga, ensuring gendered access. It is a bricolage of arrangements 
(Cleaver, 2012). According to Cleaver and de Koning (2015: 4), 
Institutional bricolage is a process through which people, consciously and non-
consciously, assemble or reshape institutional arrangements, drawing on whatever 
materials and resources are available, regardless of their original purpose. In this 
process, old arrangements are modified and new ones invented. Institutional 
components from different origins are continuously reused, reworked, or refashioned 
to perform new functions. Adapted configurations of rules, practices, norms and 
relationships are attributed meaning and authority. These refurbished arrangements 
are the necessary responses to everyday challenges, and are embedded in daily 
practice. 
In designing resource sharing arrangements, local leaders and households are also informed 
by reactions of the resource harvesters. For example, the ward councillor might not ban bark 
harvesting for fear of losing elections. Lastly, according to a more contemporary narrative by 
Cleaver (2012), for institutions to be effective, adapt, and become relevant in changing times, 
they have to be entwined in everyday social processes. Findings of the study suggest that 
access to natural resources is a complex and dynamic negotiation process that underpins 
governance. It is unlikely that state institutions would be effective at this level. 
 Resource users use multiple access strategies involving networks created at different levels 
– individual, household, village and across the district. The use of such methods enables 
resource harvesters to negotiate through different property rights and other impediments 
such as complex permit systems introduced by the state. Access is about more than property 
rights or fixed administrative boundaries; it concerns the ability to negotiate and knit 
networks with others in and outside one’s community. Such findings affirm the theory of 
Ribot and Peluso (2003) which suggests that access is about the ability to benefit from things 
such as natural resources. 
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Kooiman et al., (2005) propose a model with orders of governance which envisages 
negotiation taking place in a defined community across structured orders of governance. 
However, this study shows that negotiations transcend into neighbouring districts under the 
jurisdiction of another administrative body, creating complexity in the governance of natural 
resources. Such linkages and arrangements also take place across scale which possibly 
increases the robustness of local arrangements. As Scoones (2009) notes, a mixed cocktail of 
survival tactics is crucial in high risk areas such as the drought-prone areas in which this study 
occurs. Flexibility allows for an efficient system of resource governance. In theory, this is 
explained by the principle of subsidiarity. This principle states that when dealing with cross 
scale environmental problems,  
particular tasks should be decentralized to the lowest level of governance with the 
capacity to conduct it satisfactorily…… a higher level of organization should refrain 
from undertaking tasks that could be performed just as well by a grouping closer to 
the individual (Marshall, 2008:80). 
This leads one to suggest that there is no ideal natural resource governance regime; 
regulators have inherent weaknesses, resource use boundaries shift, roles change, 
communities are fluid, resource users have agency and local regulators are also affected by 
the very same harvesters whose behaviour they aim to regulate. This finding is important in 
the context of commercial NTFP harvesting. Despite the fact that communities in this study, 
just as other indigenous communities elsewhere, have developed sophisticated traditions and 
practices to safeguard vulnerable resources (Kaimowitz & Sheil, 2007), increased 
commercialization suggests the need for more robust governance systems in order to cope 
with harvest pressures and to meet market standards. There may be, for example, the need 
to certify produce as sustainably harvested, or to demonstrate phytosanitary requirements. 
This suggests a merging of both customary and statutory forms of governance and the likely 





8.2 Livelihoods and ecological outcomes of the interplay between customary and 
statutory forms of governance 
8.2.1 NTFPs as a poverty trap? 
The preceding discussion has introduced some of the reasons for customary and state 
involvement in the governance of natural resources, and alluded to some of the outcomes. 
However, in much of the literature on NTFPs a gap exists regarding the way in which such 
systems influence livelihoods and ecological systems. In the African context, natural resources 
are important for supporting local livelihoods through provisioning of food, medicines, 
spiritual fulfilment, and income (Cavendish, 2000; Campbell & Luckert, 2002, Kepe, 2008). 
Customary practices and statutory instruments constitute the main forms of governance 
across much of rural Africa (Wiersum et al., 2014). Considering the interconnectedness 
between livelihoods and natural resources, any form of governance put in place should 
provide for the sustainability of both livelihoods and the resources on which the livelihoods 
depend. 
Findings from this study suggest that the notion that NTFPs are a poverty trap is not 
necessarily true for communities that have a market for their products. It may also not apply 
to communities that have few economic opportunities and face frequent shocks.102 Context 
is thus an essential part of understanding the role of NTFPs in livelihoods. The so-called 
“poverty trap debate” (Angelsen & Wunder, 2003) and (Belcher & Schreckenberg, 2007) 
posits that NTFPs are not able to lift harvesters out of poverty largely because of low values 
and the high costs of marketing the produce (harvesting and transportation to the market). 
Consequently, harvesters have to harvest more resources to maintain a minimum income 
level. In this study, baobab trees were located close to the harvesters, as was the market for 
fruits (15km away from study site) and harvesting fruits and bark fibre required basis 
instruments which greatly lowered transaction costs. 
Because of the favourable market conditions in my study site, NTFPs have transformative 
functions. Households showed progressions from dependence on natural resources to other 
non-forest economic activities (e.g. Mrs. A and Mr. H investing in better houses and 
                                                          
102 Such as crop failures, diseases, loss of jobs due to economic challenges. In the last 20 years Nyanyadzi and 
Jinga had experienced these shocks often. 
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diversifying into other enterprises, Mr. F sending his wife to a teacher’s college). The notion 
that NTFPs can be poverty traps tend to miss out of a cocktail of other innovative income 
generating activities that local people engage in. For example, Mrs. G’s involvement in 
mukando-revolving fund as an investment portfolio, Mr. F’s involvement in three-point 
trading. When invested wisely, the income from NTFPs has a transformative effect. Also, with 
NTFPs like baobab, there are very low production or transaction costs which gives high profits. 
According to Angelsen et al. (2014:23), improvement in income and non-forest activities and 
poverty eradication removes pressure from the environment”. Once harvesters diversify into 
non-forest dependent economic activities it reduced use pressure on the baobab. The 
transformative nature of NTFPs is usually not readily acknowledged in the literature yet it is 
important as it may offer pathways out of poverty into sustainable livelihood options. In this 
regard, having a functional national economy, markets for natural products and governance 
framework that is enabling at the local level is of paramount importance. 
8.2.2 Raising the profile of baobab 
State policies typically underplay the importance of NTFPs, a finding emerging from this study 
too. In this case, the commodification of baobab products (fibre and fruits) raised the profile 
of NTFPs which resulted in the state intervening. Examples from elsewhere also show that 
generally NTFPs are not readily recognised in policies, unless their commercial potential 
emerges. Cronkleton and Pacheso (2010) noted that policy to support the development of 
the Brazilian nut in Bolivia came about by coincidence. The state was in the process of putting 
in place policies to promote small industries and ended up crafting policy to support 
commercial use of Brazilian nuts. This simplistic narrative has influenced policy makers who 
view natural resources in ecological and economic terms only. Results from this study proffer 
a counter narrative that recognises the broad range of benefits that local people, government 
and other actors derive from NTFPs. Such intrinsic values include those which are spiritual 
and cultural – often called the “hidden harvest” (Campbell & Luckert, 2002). Policy makers 
usually ignore these values when designing governance frameworks. 
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8.2.3 Overregulation and income levels 
A key finding is that overregulation negatively impacts the income levels earned by 
households from natural resources. Both Nyanyadzi and Jinga faced similar conditions with 
regards to their resource endowments and agro-ecological conditions. The key difference was 
that in Jinga, the village head did not allow commercial use of baobab products. 
Consequently, resource harvesters invested in the conservation of the resource base through 
such subtle means as fencing off baobab trees or hiring witch doctors. Such investments 
support the view that when locals derive benefits from the resources, they are inclined to 
manage them and secure the land on which the trees are located. Also, as argued by 
Matowanyika (1991), Bruce et al. (1993) and others, it affirms the critical role of land in the 
politics of access to natural resources; once people have access to land, they usually also have 
access to a range of resources found on the land. Given the strong dependence of rural 
livelihoods on the successful governance of natural resources (Hara et al., 2009), it is clear 
that excessive restrictions on access to natural resources, can be counter-productive in the 
sustenance of local livelihoods. In the majority of cases, for a long time, the state’s 
intervention has been unsuccessful. In the late 1980s, Bromley and Carnea, (1989: 24) argued, 
Indeed, a striking feature of the last two decades has been the rise of national 
government formal authority on the management of local natural resources through 
central regulatory policies, newer legal frameworks, project financing, and direct 
administration. However, most analysts agree that this shift in the locus of control has 
not resulted in effective natural resource management. It has, instead, simply 
weakened local customary regime. 
8.2.4 Holistic solutions to multiple challenges 
Findings from this study show that regulating NTFPs needs to be considered in holistic terms 
because different parts of the tree are used differently. The involvement of the state in the 
governance of the baobab tree was spurred by ecological concerns, specifically to control bark 
harvesting, ignoring the social, livelihood and cultural implications of that intervention. The 
multiplicity of uses and users associated with NTFPs has always posed a challenge when 
considering using statutory forms of governance to regulate access (Wynberg & van Niekerk 
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(2015). However, there is potential to use customary practices as there are specific rules and 
practices regarding access to each part of the tree. This makes the case for the inclusion of 
customary practices in the governance of multi-purpose NTFPs. 
8.2.5 Tenure and productivity 
This study reveals that baobab harvesting patterns across tenurial type have an impact on the 
tree’s productivity. Trees in state owned lands were heavily debarked and produced less 
fruits. Trees around homesteads and in crop fields were less debarked. This evidence suggests 
that customary practices are still in operation, although in a weakened state. It also supports 
similar findings in Burkina Faso that showed that baobab trees in state owned land, and 
managed by statutory instruments, were harvested more than those in communal areas 
under the management of customary practices (Schumann et al., 2010). In a global survey of 
271 villages done by CIFOR to assess the impact of tenure on livelihoods and incomes, it was 
observed that state forests provided much of the forest incomes for people living near forests, 
largely due to weak enforcement of rules (Jagger et al., 2014). The implication of this is that 
the state may hold property rights over those lands but local people enjoy usufruct rights as 
well. To ensure the sustainable utilisation of resources in state forests, consideration could 
be given to have co-management governance arrangements whereby the state and the local 
communities jointly manage the resource. Without such an arrangement, people are likely to 
harvest the resources as poachers and their inclination will be to harvest as much as they can 
- which will lead to a tragedy of the commons (Hardin, 1968). 
8.3 Implications of using customary and statutory forms of natural resources governance 
As Ostrom (1990) notes, getting the institutions right is crucial for effective resource 
management. Ostrom has informed contemporary thinking and environmental policies using 
her design principles. For institutions to be effective, certain principles have to be followed, 
including that there should be clear resource use boundaries, and economic returns that out 
way the costs (Ostrom, 1990). Yet evidence from this study shows that the reality is more 
complex than this. For example, in regulating resource use, the RDC uses fixed cadastral maps 
and boundaries (as espoused by Ostrom in her design principles), yet in reality, resource use 
boundaries do not coincide with administrative ones. In a similar fashion, chiefdoms can 
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extend into neighbouring districts or countries (Chapter 4) creating management problems. 
The understanding by traditional leaders is that where traditional boundaries overlap 
statutory ones, the state land is nested within the traditional land, and by corollary, traditional 
leaders can exercise some degree of oversight in those areas. Nuesiri (2014) found similar 
trends in Ghana where traditional authorities have control over land resources in their 
domain and that of the state. Bruce et al. (1993) articulate this using the tenurial niche 
approach which is a domain to which different people have access to at different times, 
sometimes with overlapping niches and conflicts. 
These findings, guided by Cleavage’s bricolage and Giddens’ theory of agency and 
structuration, suggest there is a need to fully understand the behaviour, power dynamics and 
motives of the actors involved. Such an understanding informs how the two forms of 
governance can interact in an ordered or hierarchical fashion without causing conflicts. Part 
of the solution entails institutional brokering which involves establishing new institutions like 
Ward Environmental Management Committees (WEMECs), but these, just like their principal, 
the RDC, need to be embedded within existing institutions. Part of the institutional 
negotiation may also entail resolving conflicts between TAs (for example in Nyanyadzi) which 
if unresolved, can lead to resource degradation (Chapter 7). Usually, the contestation of 
power in communal areas is perceived in dichotomous terms between the state and the 
traditional authorities (Mukamuri et al., 1998; Murombedzi, 1999; Hughes, 2001). Results 
from this study, however, show that there are internal conflicts within TAs which may need 
to be understood and taken into account during policy formulation. 
Integrated approaches to natural forest management have been noted to remain elusive 
across the tropics (Guarigauta et al., 2010; Wynberg et al., 2014). Reasons vary, but it is likely 
that both statutory and customary approaches have inherent weaknesses that compromise 
their timely reaction to changes in the local context. The roots of these inefficiencies and 
conflicts are located in the failure by the state to interweave “new” statutory forms of 
governance with already existing customary systems. The baobab case reveals a heavy 
handedness by the state – for example, by putting a moratorium on baobab product use, 
heavy fines and penalties and a bureaucratic permit system, that dissuades resource users 
from complying with such rules. Despite these rules, harvesters have continued to access 
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resources using local level arrangements and in some cases, through corrupt means such as 
paying expedite fees to the TAs or “talking”. Such patterns are likely to be repeated 
elsewhere. Tieguhong, et al. (2015) for example, working in Cameroon, found that the 
bureaucracy involved in the issuance of multiple permits for okok (Gnetum spp), and weak 
enforcement statutory rules, led to rampant corruption and negative environmental impacts 
due to illegal use and over exploitation. In this case, corrupt officers secured than 81% of the 
potential revenue earmarked for the state. 
Findings from this study reveal that in the process of crafting bylaws, the state allocated itself 
all the fiscal powers. This affected the morale and ability of traditional authorities to enforce 
the bylaws. Where the state intervened with heavy handedness, it stifled customary practices 
and created an institutional vacuum and paralysis. This resulted in the depletion of resources 
and undermining of local practices. Attempts to introduce a cumbersome permit system in 
Nyanyadzi resulted in heavy debarking of trees. Earlier attempts by the state to replace TAs 
with elected leaders soon after independence produced similar results (Chapter 4). This 
resulted in what Lee (1993: 12), called a “socially constructed stalemate”- a situation in which 
the state is unwilling to surrender its prescriptive policy approaches while lacking resources 
to make them effective. This stalemate was aggravated by the state’s lack of resources to 
monitor and enforce environmental laws and policies at the local level. 
As Dietz et al. (2003: 1907) remark, “Successful commons governance requires that rules 
evolve”. That evolution is happening through the interaction between customary practices 
and statutory forms of governance at district and above levels. Shifting and waning of 
resource-use boundaries (Mandondo, 1997) to accommodate the demand for products is part 
of that evolution. That fluidity of boundaries does not equate to porosity, as clear guidelines 
exist on how resources can be accessed, all the time. 
 Evidence presented challenges the simplistic view that the state always overrides traditional 
authorities (Baldwin, 2015). To explain this evolution, Giddens’ (1984) structuration theory 
and Cleaver’s (2012) bricolage scholarship offer plausible frameworks. Both recognise a 
constant interaction between the different forms of governance as well as between resource 
users and policy enforcers. As these interact, they learn from each other and create and 
recreate themselves and others, in the process form adaptive resource governance that 
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provide ecological,103 economic and social outcomes that are desired by the actors involved. 
As de Koning (2014) notes, alteration takes place as each actor changes practice to suit the 
local context, and in some cases, both forms of governance can come together in a form of 
aggregation. This gives scope for integrating both the customary and statutory forms of 
governance. 
 Bylaws and statutory rules on the other hand, focus on clarity of duties and responsibilities. 
However, their effectiveness is largely a function of the level of enforcement. According to 
Cleaver (2012: 1), “institutions have clear roles, rules and lines of accountability do not 
necessarily lead to better governance”. To be effective, institutions need to be supported by 
the state or traditional authority, and to be embedded within local level practices. As 
proposed by de Koning (2014), actors have to be flexible and willing to compromise their 
positions. State actors, because they operate within the framework of hard rules such as 
stringent budgetary requirements, have little leeway to manoeuvre. That lack of flexibility 
makes the state less adaptive to changes - and thus more prone to govern weakly. 
By way of an example, when the Zimbabwean currency lost value due to hyperinflation in the 
late 2000s, and stipulated level of fines were now valueless, the Zimbabwe government did 
not revise the rates until 2010. By 2004, in response to hyperinflation, the Nyanyadzi 
community had already crafted bylaws that updated the fines to US$ or equivalency in kind.104 
For the state, the new fines had to be gazetted by a special pronouncement by the head of 
state via the Attorney General’s office. Meanwhile there was a mismatch between fines paid 
and the gravity of offence committed. The informality of customary practices and the fact 
that the TAs as regulatory authorities are in constant interaction with resource users enables 
immediate and constant problem identification, crafting of solutions in the form of 
institutional bricolage (Cleaver, 2012). 
New resource sharing arrangements are crafted and recrafted on an ongoing basis. This 
happens in unpredictable but relevant ways to deal with the situation. Such unexpected 
arrangements need to be accommodated in any forms of governance. The issue of women 
                                                          
103 In broad governance terms, this is figuratively depicted as steering the ship towards a desired destination 
(Sowman & Wynberg, 2014). 
104 See also Tete (2005), for a detailed account of the process. 
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consulting a witch doctor to safeguard baobab trees around their homesteads from 
harvesters is one example. While witches are deterred in society, the hiring of one is an 
example of how unpredictable some of the institutional outcomes can be. Some of the 
solutions are pragmatic, for example promotion of use of synthetic fibres to colour artefacts 
as opposed to using organic dye from bark, roots and pods of trees which was threatening to 
harm the source trees. As argued by Gunderson and Holling (2001), institutional outcomes, 
just like ecological outcomes, do not assume a perfect fit, but are complex, dynamic and at 
worst unpredictable. In drafting forms of these it is important to anticipate and leave room 
to accommodate, rather than stifle these unexpected outcomes and arrangements. 
Two key findings emerge from the above discussion. The first is that to ensure compliance to 
statutory practice by resource harvesters, the state needs to be embedded within the local 
context (Granovetter, 1989) through physical presence in the area to ensure effective 
monitoring mechanisms in place. This is something Ostrom (1990) proposed under her design 
principles. The second is that though local people may not have power to sue the state, they 
have local ways of fighting injustice in the governance of natural resources. Disengagement, 
previously regarded by Scott (1985) as a weapon of the weak, is in contrast a form of 
institutional bricolage adopted by local people to get a desired outcome. 
8.4 Conclusion 
This chapter summarised the key findings from Chapter 4 to 7. The findings were organised 
into themes and interpreted through the lenses of theories and debates engaged with in 
Chapter 2. Figure 10 provides a conceptual framework used to interpret findings of this study. 
The figure is therefore a summation of this chapter, highlighting how customary and statutory 
forms of governance interact and, and in the process, influence ecological, livelihoods and 
social outcomes. It also presents the context in which the interplay between the two forms 
of governance occurs. Because resource users have agency (Giddens, 1984), there are 




Fig. 10:  Summary of points influencing governance 
Forms of governance that ensure sustainable livelihoods and ecological sustainability require 
both customary and statutory forms of governance. For domestic use, customary practices 
are usually strong enough to regulate access. When products are commercialised, the state 
may intervene, albeit in a graduated manner in order not to override local customary 
practices. Customary practices on the other hand, are likely to be important for both domestic 
and commercial use. Baobab, like most NTFPs, has multiple uses and some of the non-
commercial products such as the leaves may still be usual for domestic purposes. As aptly 
concluded by Buchmann et al. (2010: 165), drawing on their work on baobab use in West 
Africa, “It is of utmost importance that current baobab use in subsistence is not undermined 





 Governance is complex and context specific. Jinga and Nyanyadzi differ significantly in terms 
of the ecological and livelihood outcomes of governance approaches yet are only 20km apart. 
The implication is that the use of a one size fits all approach does not help to address 
governance problems. Solutions have to be area specific. To craft such solutions requires 
consultation with all concerned actors and an understanding of local level resource sharing 
arrangements. As TAs re-emerge, there is need to locate them in unfolding governance 
processes in order to ensure the sustenance of customary practices. 
The bricolage scholarship is still a new concept and has the potential to be used as a 
theoretical framework to understand the day to day interactions among actors and the 
designing and redesigning of solutions to the environmental challenges encountered by 
actors such as harvesters and regulators. This study contributes to this emerging scholarship 
by using empirical evidence to test it within the context of governance of natural resource. 









Baobab trees in Zimbabwe have been used since time immemorial but since 2000 use of the 
fruits and bark has increased in response to the emergence of a market for these products. 
Although customary forms of governance continue to be used to regulate access to baobab, 
intensified commercialization has led to an increased use of statutory governance 
approaches. This in turn has influenced the way in which traditional authorities have managed 
the resource. 
Using the lens of baobab commercialization, the research set out to elucidate understanding 
of the interplay between customary and statutory governance in managing natural resources, 
the influence of such interactions on ecological sustainability and livelihoods, and the 
contextual factors that shape such systems.   
Specific objectives supporting the research aim were: 
i. To identify the range of baobab products that are harvested and their contribution to 
livelihoods; 
ii. To determine linkages between different governance systems and the sustainable use 
of baobab, with a focus on different tenure regimes; 
iii. To elucidate historical and contemporary forms of statutory and customary 
governance regulating baobab use; and 
iv. To propose a framework to understand how customary and statutory forms of 
governance influence ecological sustainability and livelihoods. 
To get a deeper understanding of the issues, a case study approach was adopted. Detailed 
site-specific case studies have been found to provide greater insights into the governance of 
commercialised natural products. Two study sites were selected on the basis of similarities in 
resource endowment and contrasting use patterns and forms of governance. Qualitative and 
quantitative methods were used to gather the data, with the intention to provide rigour to 
the results through triangulation of different approaches, and depth through qualitative 
ethnographic query. The history of both customary and statutory forms of governance was 
reviewed from the pre-colonial up to the present-day era. Additional methods included 
200 
 
household interviews, ecological and market surveys, focus groups, institutional mapping, 
ranking and scoring, oral histories with key informants, participant observation and a review 
of grey literature including articles at the provincial museum and National Archive in Harare 
and newspaper articles. 
9.1 The benefits of baobab and its contribution to local livelihoods 
Harvesters of baobab products pursue a cocktail of innovative livelihood options. Such 
options include trading of baobab crafts, agricultural activities, group savings and lending 
schemes. These interlinked livelihood options reinforce each other and increase the 
robustness of local livelihoods, also providing for the integration of the baobab economy in 
local economic activities. Overall, the contribution of income from baobab products provides 
substantial support to households.  
There are also wider benefits derived from baobab and other non-timber forest products 
(NTFPs), used commercially in the context of economic decline. These have been typically 
overlooked in the literature. This study revealed that economic hardships such as loss of 
employment, hyperinflation and droughts led to more people, including the middle class, 
getting involved in harvesting, using and trading baobab products. This result confirms the 
contribution of NTFP income to local livelihoods, especially in times of shock such as drought 
or economic recession, and demonstrates that NTFPs such as baobab go way beyond being a 
safety net for the poor. Marketing of baobab products, albeit through a complex permit 
system, has unlocked the economic potential of the tree for many people, including cross 
border traders, craftspeople, and traders of semi processed products. The income from 
baobab has had a transformative effect on local livelihoods; improved wealth has led to more 
harvesting and trading of baobab products and subsequent diversification to other formal 
activities such as education, small businesses, and investment in assets such as houses and 
cattle.  A key conclusion is that the utilisation of baobab products has the potential to 
stimulate local and national economies in producer communities.  
Relative to other NTFPs such as Brazil nuts, hoodia and devil’s claw, baobab products are not 
high value, but the baobab tree provides many benefits to local people. These include both 
consumptive and intrinsic values, such as spiritual fulfilment.  The results from this study 
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affirm the intrinsic benefits of baobabs; such values are typically overlooked in the discourse 
of natural resource governance, largely because valuation has focused typically on the trade 
of products and tangible economic returns.   
The wider implications suggest that resource valuation should also consider non-monetary 
uses in order to give a comprehensive value of resources. This is important in informing policy 
interventions, which at the moment, appear to be principally driven by economic values 
ignoring other non-monetary values which may lie dear to the lives of local people.   It is 
impossible to talk about the governance of natural resources without talking about the 
livelihoods of local people. Common property theory places incentives at the centre of any 
successful resource management.  
9.2 Determining the linkages between different forms of governance and the sustainable 
use of baobab, with a focus on different tenure regimes 
The study illustrates that state interventions to manage baobab in the study area have been 
driven largely by ecological concerns, alongside interests to strengthen local livelihoods and 
revenue collection. This is despite the fact that studies on bark harvesting and black soot 
disease - the ecological reasons given by the state to justify its interventions - are inconclusive. 
In contrast, the interest of traditional authorities in regulating baobab use and access has 
been informed by reasons relating to sustainable livelihoods, ecological sustainability and the 
need to maintain a delicate spiritual link between the environment, the spirits of the land and 
resource users.  Some of the customary practices used by traditional authorities appear 
counter-intuitive, such as allowing errant behaviour in order to invoke punishment from the 
spirits of the land. Such approaches are at the centre of local people’s cognitive understanding 
of the environment-spirit nexus. 
Excessive control of access by the state, that compromised local livelihoods, resulted in 
unintended consequences such as harvesters not complying with regulations and illegal 
harvesting of baobabs especially in state lands. Further, this resulted in trade going under the 
radar which resulted in corruption involving traditional authorities and officials at the national 
borders. The lack of regulatory compliance to state laws or customary practices by local 
harvesters conforms with Giddens’s (1984) assertion that people have agency and are able to 
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act on and influence their situation, especially when their livelihoods are threatened 
(Granovetter, 1989).   
In state-owned areas, tenure is insignificant in regulating access to natural resources as de 
facto local rules are used to access baobabs. At best, there was weak enforcement of 
statutory systems and traditional boundaries did not coincide with administrative boundaries. 
The wider implication is that when boundaries do not coincide as is usually the case due to 
the history of colonialism and internal migration of local tribes, local people use traditional 
boundaries to access resources. This results in local people encroaching onto state lands for 
purposes of harvesting baobab. For privately owned areas, there is a gamut of resource 
sharing arrangements put in place that are more nuanced than those found at community 
level. When traditional leaders tightened access rules in the communal areas, harvesters 
ended up harvesting trees in state lands. 
The study concludes that based on the identified parameters of ecological sustainability, 
namely the ability to produce fibre, fruiting ability and the level of infestation by black soot, 
customary systems are stronger in Jinga than in Nyanyadzi. The weakening of customary 
practices in Nyanyadzi could be due not only to resource use pressure but also to socio-
political factors emanating from years of leadership contestation. Statutory systems are not 
robust enough to deal with the complex situation at the local level, and suffer from weak 
enforcement. Results unequivocally illustrate that trees in state-owned land are debarked the 
most. The trees also produce less fruit, presumably due to excessive stress from debarking, 
since there is a clear negative relationship between debarking and fruit production. That the 
baobabs are excessively debarked can be explained by the fact that the state does not enforce 
its regulations. Reasons for weak enforcement are largely related to poor resource availability 
on the part of the state and resistance from a populace that is rebelling against a plethora of 
unpopular state policies.  
Results reveal that the outbreak of black soot disease does not necessarily arise from 
excessive bark harvesting. Even trees that were not debarked in Jinga had the same level of 
infestation as those that were debarked in Nyanyadzi. Overall, the baobab tree appears to be 
fairly resilient to bark harvesting regimes and has a seemingly inherent healing mechanism. 
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However, excessive bark harvesting beyond the level of the first branch has been found to 
negatively impact fruiting.  
9.3 Elucidating historical and contemporary forms of statutory and customary governance 
regulating baobab use  
What, then, are the prospects of using customary and statutory forms of governance to 
regulate the use of natural products such as baobab trees in communal areas? Both 
customary and statutory forms of governance have inherent weaknesses and strengths, and 
it is important to ensure that there is good compatibility between different approaches and 
that interventions are appropriate. The historical and present interplays between customary 
and statutory forms of governance paint a picture of recurrent episodes of conquest, 
collaboration, subjugation and conflicts between the two forms of governance, this being a 
reflection of broader overarching socio-political processes. Such interactions include phases 
of collaboration and conflict which render access to the various baobab products a continuous 
negotiated process. In some cases, this has resulted in intended and unintended socio-
economic and ecological outcomes.  
A key finding is that history informs the way local people harvest and use resources. A typical 
example was the weaving of fibre crafts by the Gumbu people which dates back to the 
eighteenth century and is part of the social identity of these people. With regards to the 
governance of natural resources, the influence of history in shaping current practices is 
profound due to the long trajectory of the interplay between customary and statutory forms 
of governance that spans back to the colonial era. Therefore, efforts to understand current 
forms of governance in the African context without situating them in the historical context 
will overlook the nuances of history that are recast by local people in the present-day 
governance discourse. This is amplified by the fact that historical narratives around kinship 
ties have been used to assert or claim access rights to natural resources in many areas. 
The use of both customary and statutory forms of governance was also affected by exogenous 
factors, such as the socio-economic context. Such factors exert pressure on the resource base 
that strain and potentially warp local customary practices, requiring their realignment and 
reinforcement. Realignment might be in the form of creating new institutions. In the case of 
customary practices, the reinforcement could come from the state, but if excessive, may 
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cause unintended consequences. Related to this point is the observation that statutory 
interventions should not be rushed, as they distort a rich set of nuanced local arrangements 
that are well embedded in the local setting as part of the social fabric.   
The time taken for customary and statutory forms of governance to adjust when there are 
changes to the local contexts differs, with customary practices being more dynamic and 
responsive than statutory approach. The lag in response by forms of governance may result 
in resource degradation.   
Overall, this study demonstrates that, largely due to political interventions, use pressure and 
conflict, institutions undergo alternate phases of effectiveness and ineffectiveness. The 
adaptation time across systems is however different. Customary forms of governance tend to 
adapt more quickly to changes in the local context than statutory forms of governance. 
Although customary practices may be weakened by improper and excessive intervention by 
the state, findings from this study suggest that traditional authorities remain resilient. Indeed, 
findings challenge the notion that traditional authorities are powerless victims of a central 
state which have had their customary power eroded due to recurrent phases of 
disempowerment from the colonial to post-colonial periods. In contrast, traditional 
authorities are re-emerging stronger from this long history of interaction with the state.   
However, contemporary traditional authorities also exhibit inherent weaknesses. These 
include contestation of power among members of the ruling clan or lack of business acumen. 
It was typically believed that local players, notably traditional authorities, have the capacity 
to manage the resources on their own, drawing on their deep-rooted knowledge of the 
resource base.  But neither the state nor traditional authorities on their own have the capacity 
to copy with the pressures and complexities arising from commercial harvesting of 
communally owned baobab products. Customary efforts at regulating use need to be 
complemented by the state.  Strengthening customary practices and rules instead of 
overriding them with statutory forms of governance, offers a better opportunity for 
sustainability. This suggests the need for a governance approach that implements both 
customary and statutory systems in delicate measure to avoid one overshadowing the other. 
Melding these two systems entails changing some operational issues and mind sets. 
Recognition by the state needs to go beyond the formalisation of customary practices through 
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statutory laws. Timing as well as the degree of intervention is crucial for successful 
implementation of a policy framework that uses both customary and statutory forms of 
resource governance.  
A key conclusion is that where statutory forms of governance are used, they should recognise 
and infuse customary practices in order to reflect local context. Whilst most literature 
portrays the relationship between the state and traditional authorities in dichotomous terms 
- that is a subjugating state and the subservient traditional authority, the relationship is 
substantially more complex. 
9.4 To propose a framework to understand how customary and statutory forms of 
governance influence ecological sustainability and livelihoods. 
This study contributes to the understanding of NTFP governance, going beyond a description 
of statutory and customary forms of governance, also explaining the ecological and livelihood 
outcomes of using both. A historical perspective has helped to enrich understanding of the 
interplay between the two forms of governance.  
This analysis was carried out within the context of a broader discourse on the African 
continent that is embracing traditional authorities as an emergent form of governance 
without fully understanding the relationship between traditional authorities and statutory 
forms of governance and outcomes in the governance of natural resources (Nuesiri, 2014). In 
this regard, customary practices need to be integrated into the broader governance agenda 
for natural resources in order to improve resource ecology and local livelihoods.  While 
current conceptual frameworks used to understand governance such as Kooiman et al. (2005) 
provide valuable insights into the study of governance, especially when exploring interactions 
between the local, national and international levels, they are silent on local level dynamics. 
However, decisions and practices that ultimately affect livelihoods and ecological systems 
take place at the local level. Existing conceptual frameworks are typically based on European 
contexts which do not clearly capture local African contexts. African contexts are unique and 
complex due to the history of heavy dependence on natural resources by local people as well 
as conflicts between customary and statutory forms of governance. Most governance 
frameworks are based on Western contexts and may not address some of the unique local 
contexts in developing countries where communities heavily depend natural resources. To 
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augment such Eurocentric models of governance, there is need to consider theories that 
encapsulate access as ability not a right, celebrate resource users as having agency and 
embrace the multiplicity of local customary practices under the rubric of bricolage as a 
plausible governance option.  
Such local arrangements exhibit elements of pragmatism, sustenance of local livelihoods and 
ecological sustainability; these arrangements are not readily embraced in the formal policy 
domain that usually uses a one size first ball approach to natural resource governance. The 
proximity of spirits in the human-environment nexus in particular offers a nuanced narrative 
to the way local people relate with the environment. Normally, this relationship is viewed in 
simplistic ways whereby local people ‘mine’ the environment for survival but this study has 
shown that there is a spiritual link between the people and the environment that is immediate 
and shapes the way that residents perceive, use and frame resource use strategies. This 
suggests the need to avoid oversimplifying local complex realities and nuances that make 
local practices resilient and relevant. Governance models that are sensitive to local 
arrangements are needed. A preferred scenario is having a mosaic of site-specific 
arrangements that are sensitive to local contexts, informed by other frameworks used 
elsewhere.  
Customary practices have always been used by local people in the governance of natural 
resources in communal areas. They are robust, dynamic and are entrenched in the day to day 
lives of the resource users, making them an appropriate form of governance at that level.  
There is a need to embrace the different forms of resource sharing arrangements that evolve 
and operate at the local level. These arrangements may not fit into exiting technical toolkits 
or environmental blue prints where policy from the top may not be communicating with 
reality on the ground. In turn the diligent documentation of customary practices can help to 
inform existing and future statutory forms of governance. In sum, the results from this study 
provide a narrative that emphasises the importance of considering seemingly peripheral 
forms of governance such as customary practices within the continuum of resource 
governance in rural areas. 
 In reality, resource sharing is a bricolage. An understanding of the context in which the 
bricolage is taking place is important. Context gives meaning to current behaviours.  Key 
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factors to consider as part of the contextual analysis include history, the value of natural 
resources, socio-economic factors, and local cultural and belief systems.   
Given the complexities provided by the Zimbabwean socio-economic and political situation 
at the time of the study, a key question that arises is, “Would the current management 
practices yield the same outcomes in a stable country”?  Further work needs to be done in 
less volatile countries where traditional authorities and statutory practices operate side by 
side with each other.  Although these results might be context specific, there is scope for 
applying the lessons learned from this study to other developing countries. An understanding 
of the interface between statutory and customary approaches that govern natural resources 
in the developing world is important as it helps to inform the crafting of polices that ensure 
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Annex 1: List of informants 
Name of institution No. interviewed Issues discussed 
Chimanimani Rural District 
Council 
3 (chief executive officer, 
natural resources and 
project officers) 
Overview of RDC operations  
Environmental Management 
Agency 
2 (1 District, 1 Head 
Office) 
Environmental policy 
Enforcement of statutory rules 
Black soot disease Forestry Commission 4 (Head Office, Province 
and District) 
Agricultural Extension and 
Technical Services (Agritex) 
4 (field officers) Livelihood systems in the study 
site 
Conservation initiatives in the 
area 
Zimbabwe Republic Police 2 (Nyanyadzi Member in 
Charge and PISI detail) 
Police clearance and feedback 
reports 
Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe 1 Levies imposed on export crafts 
Ministry of Education and 
Culture 
1 Crafters participation in provincial 
and national art galleries 
Local cultural values and practices 
Mutare Museum 2 Grey literature on baobab black 
soot disease 
Media 1 (environmental 
reporter) 
Coverage of the baobab issues in 
the study site 
NGOs-SAFIRE and EAfrica,  5 (Project staff) Baobab management, by law 
formulation and support to 
budding pulp traders in 
Nyanyadzi  
Private buyers of baobab 
fruits 
3 Governance of the marketing 
aspect of the baobab products 
Prices of products 
2 
 
Phytotrade Africa 1 Governance of the baobab pulp 
and oil value chain 
Bulk traders of crafts 6 (4 local and 2 in Harare) Livelihoods issues 
Traditional leaders 24 (21village heads and 
aides and 3 headmen) 
Customary systems 
Ward councillors 3 Statutory systems 




at the University of 
Zimbabwe 
3 Historical information about the 
study site 
Value addition actors 2 Livelihoods issues 
Fibre harvesters 5 Institutional arrangements 
User group leaders e.g. fruit 
collectors 
7 Group organization, access and 
livelihood 
Cross border traders 5 Governance of the export market 
Fruit and crafts traders  5 Income levels, access, revolving 
funds 











Annex 2: List of focus groups conducted  
Date Place Typology of group Number of 
participants 
18/12/10 Nyanyadzi Ward councilors and traditional leaders-
setting up meetings with  
7 
3/1/11 Chimanimani EMA, FC, RDC 3 
Dirikwe Traditional leaders 12 
 Gudyanga Traditional Leaders 13 
31/12/10 Nyanyadzi Agritex 
Offices 
Traditional leaders including Headman 
Matiashe, Chief Muusha and ward 
councillor 
11 
8/1/11 Jinga Village head, ward councilor 
Ordinary residents 
32 
9/1/11 Nyanyadzi primary 
School 
Village heads 
Ministry of Education and Culture 




23/5/11 Chimanimani council RDC officials-Research permit 3 
4/2/12 Gudyanga Fruit and fibre harvesters 11 
26/8/11 Gudyanga village Cross border craft traders 
Bark harvesters 
Craft weavers 
12 - 5 women 
and 7 men 
3/2/12 Jinga Residents 19 
 Chimanimani RDC Natural Resources and Project 
Officers, EMA and FC 
4 




Annex: 3. Explanation of codes for ecological survey 
Indicator Scale Justification 
Index of health 1. Good - no black soot diseases 
2. Poor - early signs of black soot 
3. Very poor - all tree has black 
soot disease 
Black soot is an indication of excessive 
stress partly attributable to extensive 
debarking 
Diseased trees do not produce usable fibre 
and eventually such trees may die 
Ability to 
provide fibre 
1. Good -provides good quality, 
first cut - mutanguro  
2. Poor - second cut fibre -
mupindwa 
3. Tree cannot be used for fibre 
e.g. diseased, hollow or 
rugged surface. 
Bark fibre is an important product used in 
craft production. therefore its availability 
ensures the sustenance of the craft industry 
Heavily debarked trees produce second cut 





1. Nil – not debarked at all 
2. Mild - not debarked all round 
3. Severe-debarked all around 
4. Very severe-debarked more 
than one rung 
Debarked portions require 2 years healing 
time 
Severely debarked trees can potentially 
succumb to black soot disease.  
Intensity of debarking is an indication of 
serious break down of local institutions. 
Tenure 1. Privately owned - at and 
around homesteads 
2. Sacred sites - sites for grave 
yards, rituals and worshiping 
3. Communally owned -crop 
fields, grazing areas, 
mountains, forests 
4. State -along main road, 
college, Zimbabwe Republic 
Police Camp 
Tenure defines access, 
Sacred sites are worth studying on account 
of the centrality of sacredness in the belief 
systems and natural resource management 
systems of the people in the study areas. 
Additionally, this tenure system merits 
investigation on account of the fact that it 






Annex 4: Ecological survey tool 
Witness Kozanayi: University of Cape Town PhD studies.  
Questionnaire for the ecological survey on the baobab tree in Chimanimani District, Zimbabwe: 
     
Data collected by: _____________ 




















  E 
S 









  E 
S 
          
  E 
S 
          
  E 
S 
          
  E 
S 
          
  E 
S 
          
  E 
S 
          
 
Annex 5: Road side market survey 
Name Age Sex Village Level of 
education 
Years selling crafts 
      
      
      
      
      
      





Annex 6: Wealth classes for Nyanyadzi village cluster 
Wealth class Description 
1 - Richest Have irrigated crop fields and fields along the Odzi river 
Formal employment in the NGO sector or children with well-paying jobs 
including in the diaspora 
Have more than 15 cattle and 20 goats 
Own radio and TV 
Have electricity at home 
Might own a car 
2 Might have irrigated crop fields and fields along Odzi river but poor planning 
is a hindrance to potential productivity 
Civil servants and working in diamond fields 
Less than 15 cattle, less than 20 goats 
Have radio and TV  
Have solar panels 
3 Less than 5 cattle 
Temporary employment  
Few goats (less than 10), no cattle 
Have got radio and TV 
4 - Poorest Unemployed, survive on maricho - hired labour  
No cattle, nor goats 
Might have a radio but no TV 




















Annex 9: Household questionnaire 
Introduction 
This survey is being conducted by Witness Kozanayi who is a PhD student at the University of 
Cape Town as part of his studies. The research project is looking at the governance of baobab 
tree products with a special emphasis on the interface between customary and statutory 
regulatory systems. The results of the survey will be used for academic purposes only and no 
information gathered will be used to harm the informant. Information given will be treated 
in the strictest way possible.  Names of respondents and their responses will not be divulged 
to anyone or presented in the final report. You can ask for clarification on any question at any 
time during the interview. 
 
Identification  
1. Household name  
2. Sex of the household head (1. Male 2. Female)  
3. Village  
4. Ward (1. Chakohwa 2. Gudyanga 3. Nyanyadzi   
5. Name of Interviewer  
6. Date of Interview  
7. Questionnaire checked by  














1. Name of respondent:___________________________________________ 
 
2. Sex of respondent 
1 Male                                
2 Female 
3. Age of respondent (years):   




5. Above 60 
 
4. Marital status of the respondent:  
1.  Single  
2.  Married  
3.  Divorced 
4.  Widow  
5.         Separated  
 
5. How many people are in this household? 
Children1  Adults  
 
     
                                                          
1 Anyone below 12 years –who is unable to meaningfully contribute to household economy especially when it 
involves baobab activities. 
11 
 
6. How long has your household been living in this area (years)? 
 1. Less than 5 years ago  
2. 6-10 years  
3. 11-20  
 4. 21-30  
5.  Over 30 years  
7. What is the highest level of education of respondent?  
1. No formal Education  
2. Grade 7 
3. Incomplete “O” level 
4. “O” Level- Form 4 
5. “A” Level-Form 6 
6. Technical Diploma   
7. University Degree 
 





5. Other, specify ……. 
 
8. Where did you come from before you settled here? 
     1. Former commercial farms 
     2. Urban centers 
     3. Other rural areas in the district 
     4. Other rural areas in other districts 
     5. Mining area 
     6. Have always been living here 
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9. Other areas (state which): _______________________ 
 
10. Why did you come to settle here? 
  1. Security/Safety  
2. Agriculture prospects 
3. Job prospects 
4. Health reasons 
             5. To harvest baobab and other natural resources 
             6. Diamond mining  
             7. Family or relative was here 
             8. Resettlement program 
             9. Other (Describe): ___________________________________________________ 
 
Economic status: 
11. Are you in paid employment? 
1 Yes, always 
2 Yes, sometimes 
3 Occasionally/rarely  
4 No, never 
 
12. Are any household members in paid employment? 
1 Yes, always 
2 Yes, sometimes 
3 Occasionally/rarely 
4 No, never 
 










14. How many of the following animals does your household own (Table 1?  
1. None (0) 













16. OBSERVE (What is the state of the main house of the homestead?) 
1. Pole and dagga and thatch 
2. Pole and dagga and modern roofing material 
3. Brick and thatch 
4. Brick and modern roofing material 
5. Other (describe): _____________________________ 
 
17.  Does anyone in this household have links to anyone in leadership position? (1=Yes; 2=No) 
 
1. Traditional leaders 
2. Ward councillor 
3. WEMECs 
4. Political leaders 
5. Other, specify_____________________________ 
 
18. Do you belong to a craft seller’s group? (1 Yes, 2 No) 
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20. Please rank these sources of income in order of importance to your household in a typical year (1. Most 
important, 2. Next important, N/A not applicable) 
 
 1. Sale of baobab fruit 
                 2. Sale of baobab mats/hats/bags 
3.  Sale of livestock 
4. Sale of dryland crops  
5.  Sale of crops from irrigation scheme 
6. Hiring out labour (marikicho) 
7. Work at the diamond mines  
8. Work at the Green Fuels estate 
9. Remittances  
10. Illegal diamond mining (Mutsvare)   
    11. Cross border trading  
12. Other, ____________________________ 
 
21. In a typical year, what is the range of your household annual income –from all household members?  
1. Less than $500 
2. $500-$2000 
3. $2001-$5 000 
4. $5001-$10000 






22.  Does anyone in this household harvest baobab products mentioned in table 2?  
1=Yes; 2=No. If NO, skip 23 and go to Q30 
 





5. Grand child 
6. Non relatives 
 
 24. For how long have the different members of the household been harvesting the baobab products recorded in 
table 2? 
1. Less than 5 years 
2. 6-10 years 
3.11-20 years 
4. 21-30 years 
5. Over 30 years. 
 
Table 2 
Tree part  Does anyone harvest? Who is involved? For how long have they been 
harvesting? 
Fibre    
Fruits    
Leaves    
Tubers (zvitsupu)    
Roots     
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For products used by household in table 2, answer questions 25 to 29 in table 3: 
 
Table 3 Do one product at a time  
 
25. How often do you harvest the baobab product mentioned (Table 3, column 2) 
1. All year, round  
2. During dry season-(Chirimo), 
3. Occasionally 
4. Never  
 
 25 26 27 28 29 
 Frequency of using 
resource 
How easy or 
hard 






Fibre       
Fruits       
Leaves       
Tubers      
Roots       
 
26. How easy is it for your household to obtain this resource (Table 3, column 3) 
1 Easy 
2 Fairly easy 
3 Hard 
4 Very hard 
5 Don’t know 
  
27. Compared to about 10 years ago is it easier, the same or more difficult to obtain (Table 3, column 4) 
1 Easier 
2 Same  
3 More difficult  
4 Didn’t use the product then / Didn’t make the product then 
5 Don’t know 
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FOR THOSE PRODUCTS RATED AS “EASIER” 
28. Why is it easier now to obtain this resource (Table 3, column 5) 
1 Have more connections with those who regulate 
2 Have more /better labour 
3 Now harvest from my own yard 
4 Go to other areas where rules are less strict 
5 The product is being sold by people from outside 
6 Don’t know 
7 Other (describe) 
FOR THOSE PRODUCTS RATED AS “MORE DIFFICULT” 
29. Why is it more difficult now to obtain (Table 3, column 6) 
1 Fewer trees 
2 Have transport difficulties 
3 Have labour difficulties 
4 More people living now than before 
5 People taking the product to sell outside the area 
6 There are stricter rules restricting harvesting 
7 Trees are producing less than before (for fruits and fibre) 
8 Other (specify) 
9 Don’t know 
30. What do you use the resources in tables 2 and 3? for?  (1=Yes, 2=No) 
 
1. Fruit for own use 
 
2. Fruit for sale 
 
3. Fibre for sale 
 
4. Fibre for own use 
 
5. Fibre for commercial use  e.g. make mats  
 
 
31. Where do you mainly collect each of the products in from (Table 4, column 2)? 
 









33. Do you pay money to get permission to harvest different products? (Table 4, column 4)  
Table 4 
Name of baobab 
product 
Source area list for each 
1. Own yard  
2. Other  resident’ yards 
3. Own crop field 
4. Other resident’s crop field 
5. Grazing areas 
6. Sacred areas 
7. Bought from vendors  
8. Collected from neighbouring 
villages/Buhera 
From whom do you seek 
permission to collect products? 
1. WEMEC 
2. Village head 
3. Ward Councillor 
4. Neighbour 
5. State (RDC/FC) 
6. Other-specify ________ 






Fruit    
Bark    
Leaves    
Tubers (zvitsupu)    
Roots    
 
Income from baobab products 
34. Please indicate the quantity and values of baobab products and by products you harvested and sold 
respectively during 2011(Table 5) 
 
Table 5 
Baobab Products and by 
products 










PRODUCTS      
Fibre (bundles)      
Fruits (20 Litre buckets)       
Leaves (bundles)      
Tubers (dozens)      
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By PRODUCTS       
Pulp (20 litre buckets)      
Oil (litres)      
Mats (No.)      
Hats (No.)      
Bags (No.)      
Ice lollies (No.)      
‘Coffee’ from seed (tea cups)      
 
Expenditure  
35. For what purposes do you use income earned from baobab?  (rank uses: 1, most, 2 second best… ) 
1. Food 
                               






5. Agricultural inputs 
 
6. To build or fix houses 
 
7. To buy livestock (goats, cattle etc.) 
 
8. To buy capital equipment e.g. ploughs 
 
9. Other (describe)_______________________________ 
 
 
Rules and regulations for baobab 
Traditional and Government rules  















Baobab Product Are you aware of any traditional rules in place 




Do you think these 





Do local people keep to 




4. Don’t know 
Fibre for own use    
Fibre for commercial use    
Fruit for own use    
Fruit for commercial use    
Leaves    
Tubers    
Non consumptive use e.g. 
rituals/burial sites 
   
 
37. Have the traditional rules changed over time (table 8, column 2)?  
1. Yes 
2. No 
3. Don’t know 
 
38.  How have they changed? (table 8, column 3) 
1. Has been relaxed 
2. Become stricter 
3. Has been replaced by Government rules / have replaced traditional rules 
4. Has been replaced by rules formulated by NGOs working in the area 
5. Has been weakened by commercial use of baobab products 
6. Other, specify:……………………………………………….. 
 



















When did it change? 
1. Last 10 years ago 
2. 11-20 years ago 
3. 20-30 year 
4. Over 30 years 
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
 










Baobab Product Are you aware of any government rules in place 




Do you think these 





Do local people keep to 




4. Don’t know 
Fibre for own use    
Fibre for commercial 
use 
   
Fruit for own use    
Fruit for commercial 
use 
   
Leaves    
Tubers    
Non consumptive use 
e.g. burial site 




42. Have the government rules changed over time (table 8, column 2)?  
 




How has it changed2? 
(see footnote 2) 
When did it change? 
1. 10 years ago 
2. 11-20 years ago 
3. 20-30 year 
4. Over 30 years 
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
 
 







 Monitoring, Enforcement and compliance 
                                                          
1. Has been relaxed  
2. Become stricter 
3. Has been replaced by Government rules / have replaced traditional rules 
4. Has been replaced by rules formulated by NGOs working in the area 
5. Has been weakened by commercial use of baobab products 




44. Who mainly sets the rules for baobab products? (Table 10, column 2) List in order of importance for each actor 
for Qsn 43 and 44.  
1. Ward Environment Management Committee  
2. Village Heads,  
3. Head men,  
4. Chief Ward Councillor,  
5. Forestry Commission,  
6. Environmental Management Agency,  
7. Rural District Council,  
8. Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO)  
9. Individual people 
10. Other, specify________________________________ 
 
45. Who mainly enforces the rules (Table 10, column 3) 
Table 10 
Baobab product  Who mainly sets the rules Who mainly monitors and 
enforces the rules 
EXAMPLE: FLOWERS 9, 5 8, 4 
Fibre   
Fruit   
Leaves   
Tubers (zvitsupu)   
 Non consumptive uses e.g. burial   
 
46. Are customary rules actively enforced? (Table 11) 
1.  No, not at all, 
2.  Just a little,  
3.  Yes, quite effectively  
4.  Yes, very effectively 






Customary rule Enforcement level 
No debarking sacred trees  
No collection of fruit from sacred trees  
Healing time before a tree is debarked  
Quantity of fruits that one can collect  
Age of tree before debarking  
Seeking permission from village heads before collection of fibre  
Taboos e.g. no burning of fruit shells  
No cutting down of baobab trees  
Other specify  
Other, specify  
 
48. Are statutory rules actively enforced for the following activities? (Table 12) 
1. No, not at all, 
2. Just a little,  
3. Yes, effectively,  
4. Yes, very effectively 
5. Not applicable 
 
Table 12 
Statutory rules Enforcement 
level 
Seeking permission from WEMECs before collection of fibre  
Payment of an annual marketing levy  
Being a member of a baobab use club  
Healing time before a tree is re debarked  
Payment of export permit to the FC (for those who export crafts)  
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Not debarking trees in state land (e.g. along highways, in parks, and at Bocha 
College) 
 
Other, specify  
Other, specify  
 
49. How many times have you been arrested or fined by authorities for baobab transgression? (Table 13) 
Table 13:  
Authority who 
prosecuted 




3. More than once 




3. More than once 




3.  “We talked” 
4.  Don’t remember 
Traditional 
authority 
   
State (WEMEC)    
State FC/EMA/RDC    
Ward councillor    
 
Ecological sustainability   
 
50. Do you think there are enough young baobab trees to replace old or dead trees?  
1=Yes; 2=No  
 
51. What is the main problem associated with the black soot disease? 
1. trees produce less fruits 
2. trees produce poor quality fibre 
3. trees die 
4. makes the tree ugly 
5. other (specify) __________________________________________ 
 
52. In your own opinion, is there a link between the prevalence of the black soot diseases and rate of debarking? 
1=Yes,  2=No,  3.=Don’t know.  
 If No or DON’T KNOW skip 54 
 
 
53. If, YES, what do you think is the main cause of the disease? 
1. Angry spirits of the land 
2. Droughts,  
3. Flies from toilets  
4. Natural causes,  
5. Old age  
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6. Don’t know 
54. In your own opinion, are there problems associated with bulk collection of fruits for sale or processing into pulp 
and oil? 
1=Yes; 2 =No If NO, skip 55 
 
55. If yes, what is the main problem? 
1. No fruits left for wild animals 
2. No seeds left in the wild to geminate to make new trees  
3. Food insecurity  
4. Has angered the spirits of the land 
5. Other, specify 
 
56.  Have you taken any initiative to conserve the baobab tree locally? 1 Yes 2 No (if no, skip to 58) 
 
57. What initiatives have you made?  
1. Planting more baobabs trees 
2. Fencing off some baobabs 
3. Switching to substitute products 
4. Protecting saplings 
5. Switching to other livelihood activities 
6. Get baobab products such as fibre and fruit from other areas 
 
58. What other tree resources do you use to process baobab products e.g. bark into mats (see table 14)?  
 
59. What quantities of each of the resources did you collect last year? 
 
60. Comparing now and 10 years ago, what is the level of availability of the resource? 
(1. Same 2. More 3. Less  4. Don’t know) 
 
Table 14 
Complementary tree resource Used  





Level of availability 
of the resource over 
the last 10 years? 
Munyii (Berchimia discolour) bark (‘1kg3’ sachets    
Munyii roots (‘1 kg sachets’    
Musvosvoto bark (‘1 kg’ sachets    
Munzwa (Acacia spp) bark (‘1kg’ sachets)    
(Munzwa) Acacia pods (bundles)    
(Marasha) Charcoal (gallons)    
(Chikwenga)-Sisal (bundles)    
Mutsaa (Sanserviari spp) (bundles)    
Other, specify    
 
 




                                                          
3 To weigh each of the units used here e.g. bundles of sisal or ‘1kg’ sachet of bark and also measure the area 
harvested to produce each of these units. 
